The Manifesto of Peace and Freedom

Chapter 1

Either - Or!

The peaceful and bloodless revolution of the 20th century which will lead to a true world revolution differs by its radicalism from all preceding ones, which were actually only revolts. It goes to the roots of the establishment.

For it brings not only some liberties but full and complete freedom, real freedom. It does not replace previous domination by a new domination, but brings non-domination for each and all. It frees not only abstract groups or classes but, without exception, all individuals. It proceeds not from an ideological basis but from a logically unassailable one.

It therefore differs from all previous revolutions in its starting point, means and end, and will also supply a surprisingly simple answer to Pilate's old question: "What is truth?" It states only incontestable facts, which for many will mean saying goodbye to untenable ideas and accustomed ways of thinking. However, these facts can give everyone what he most lacked up to now — though without always being conscious of the lack. For the logical conclusion of these facts points to the unavoidable alternative: the alternative between aggressive force and agreement — on the only possible lasting basis!

For the first time in human history a basis is offered on which different world views, religions, moral systems and ideologies meet and not only can but must agree. For who can dare to declare himself openly an adherent of the law of the club and of aggressive force?

On this new, unshakable basis, from a surprising as well as a convincing point of view, there follows the description of a social state which is without domination not because it is classless, but is classless because it is without domination. Marx and his successors failed to describe such a society or even to think it through consistently.

Since the Greek word AN-ARCHY was chosen because of its meaning as the appropriate designation of this state, one should first of all exclude all notions which are normally associated with this concept. For it has to do neither with chaos nor with force, and not at all with terrorism. What has been and is considered "anarchistic" and "anarchy" is — with only relatively few exceptions — a distorted image of the real anarchism and rather the very opposite of it. One could even present the consequences developed here as what is actually meant by true democracy (which, of course, does not agree at all with the present reality of democracy).

A clever Frenchman once said: In the future there will be only two groups of

people — those who want to live by their own work, and those who want to live by the work of others. More appropriately and inclusively one could say: A line is to be drawn between those who want to enlarge their own sphere of freedom by force, at the expense of the freedom of others, or wish to maintain a state which already ensures such an imbalance of freedom, and those whose goal is the equal freedom of everyone, and who, therefore, do not require additional freedom for themselves at the expense of the freedom of others.

A condition of equal freedom for everyone (in which, for example, unemployment is as absurd as it is impossible) needs no dictatorship. On the contrary, it cannot tolerate a dictatorship. The non-dominating society corresponding to this state is not a mere future aim either. Its foundations can be established here and now, that is immediately (and to the benefit of all). With all its consequences it can be realized in the quite near future.

Einstein, among others, pointed out that progress in human thinking, especially in the social sciences, has limped far behind technological progress. Thus, as the most urgent task for our time, he demanded a new way of thinking. It is offered here.

Apart from the optimal solution for all social relationships, this new way of thinking offers the indispensable conditions for peace!

And it requires a clear decision.

Chapter 2

Illusion and Reality

"Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself the master of others, and still remains a greater slave than they. How did this change come about? I do not know. What can make it legitimate? That question I think I can answer."

JJ. Rousseau: THE SOCIAL CONTRACT I/1

The history of human society is above all the history of a more instinctive than conscious battle for release from chains that are more of a mental than material kind. It is especially a fight against religious and ideological systems of domination. In it the so-called conditions of production play a considerable but not the main part, since the conditions of production depend on the conditions of domination. The latter are circumscribed by certain ideas, and these ideas and the material conditions influence each other.

It is the sad history of errors thousands of years old, a "self-inflicted immaturity" (Kant) under the yoke of one's own and of others' thoughts. Their contents changed sometimes — but the yoke remained. For only with difficulty or not at all could even the most progressive people work themselves free of the vicious magic circle established by fixed ideas. These ideas are rooted in that remote antiquity when the first lucid thoughts ranged side by side with the instincts which up to then exclusively directed the behaviour of the first humanlike beings.

There is a very plausible theory of Oscar Kiss Maerth (Der Anfang war das Ende — The Beginning Was the End, Düsseldorf, 1971) according to which excessive cerebral growth caused by cannibalism led to cerebral deficiencies which manifested themselves in insufficient logic, hallucinations, insecurity of judgment and fear of thought. This theory of "original sin" may be accepted or refuted — but the fact that man is more driven by impulses and feelings than by intellect can hardly be denied. When Kant (in "What is Enlightenment?", 1781) addressed himself against the widespread dread of thinking — "Have the courage to use your own mind!" — he still assumed that human beings possess the natural ability to think perfectly, without any contradictions, in a comprehensive and exact way, and that only negligence, laziness and mean-spiritedness hinder us from using our "absolute" ability to think in a complete way. That it is not the case (and why it is not) was already demonstrated by Gustave F. Steffen (in Die Irrwege Sozialer Erkenntnis — The Errors of Social

Understanding, Jena, 1913). He said that human beings, especially primitive ones, create a vast number of social concepts which do not correspond to reality at all but are superstitions. Furthermore, there exists a mass not only of religious, but also of scientifically sanctioned superstitious concepts. Besides such superstitions we have, especially, prejudices. Often even highly intelligent people succumb to prejudices.

"The way a prejudiced person understands something is already essentially determined before he receives any information on a subject. His personal experience of the subject plays a part only insofar as it supports the already-given tendency to judge the matter. Opposite experiences are simply ignored. There is no desire to include something new in one's faith but, on the contrary, an inclination to continue believing whatever one has begun to believe, regardless of facts and logic.

"The prejudiced person hates 'renegades' unless they convert from 'wrong' beliefs to the 'right' ones — for rebels 'obviously' lack strength of character, as they do not defy reason and all their senses in order to maintain the 'right' thoughts taught to them by their parents, the authorities, their teachers and their class-mates. The superstitious person easily becomes a fanatic against those who see reality too clearly to see wonderful or dreadful things where he imagines them to be. Such human beings must lack, in his opinion, what is most holy in men: the impulse to believe, and the urge to pray or worship and to subordinate oneself.

"The socially prejudiced person does not judge his own material and cultural situation or that of his fellow creatures according to truly realistic and rigorous standards, but according to a systematically distorted image of the social conditions, an image whose origin he can scarcely explain but which he defends against critics as one of his holiest and most untouchable possessions.

"All thorough investigations into the human power of observation, as it manifests itself in daily social life, show that that power is highly incomplete even when it is not influenced by social superstition and social prejudices. This has often been proven of late, especially through the research of academic lawyers into statements by well-educated persons trained to observe unexpected events exactly. These events were arranged and completely controlled in their real sequence by the experimenters. Testimonies were quite regularly contradictory to each other and also, in most cases, completely misleading when compared with the play-acted reality."

Steffen asserts — and backs it up very thoroughly — that as a rule we think falsely or do not arrive at proper thinking, and that, properly speaking, we do not even think, although we endeavor to think and believe ourselves to be thinking.

At the same time we are born non-logicians and born logicians. Our thinking has in reality no unchangeably determined or regulated capacity for thought. The only completely general law of thinking is the law of the development of thinking. According to experience there seems to be a law of increasing faultlessness in thinking, but this has been little explored as yet. Pioneering thinkers seem to establish new paths of thought, like paths cut into a jungle which others can follow more easily. However, there is also the perilous tendency to follow merely those paths which lead to fixed ideas and to petrified ways of thinking.

Some of what is unusual in the following presentation could be understood more easily and be more useful if (besides the two above mentioned books by Kiss Maerth and Steffen) the reader was also to consult The Mind in the Making (1921) by James Harvey Robinson, translated as Die Schule des Denkens (Berlin, 1949).

The first human beings possessed only tiny traces of our capacity for logical thinking and critical judgment, which generally, even today, is still very incomplete. For them there was no difference, after all, between what appeared in their minds as concepts and what they could grasp with their hands. The one appeared as real to them as the other.

DOMINATION BY ABSTRACT AND FIXED IDEAS

Those first human beings, of course, soon recognized their own weaknesses and inferiority con-fronting the powers of nature. The latter seemed totally inconceivable and inexplicable to them, whilst they were able to recognize the effects of their own acts. So it was natural for them to suppose conscious acts by invisible beings, by ghosts and gods behind natural occurrences. Their mere conception of these quite unconsciously grew together with what they experienced as palpably real by their senses — especially since they thought they saw a real connection between those invisible beings and natural occurrences (as well as their own fates) quite distinctly, as effects, before their eyes. They were strengthened in this faith by medicine men, magicians and priests who possessed superior powers of thought and imagination and further superior abilities by means of which they gained authority, created tribal religions, and directed the faithful.

This happened not only — although frequently — as a pious or not-so-pious deception. The faithful, to whom self-thinking is a burden to be avoided, demanded and still demand today a leadership which will relieve them of this burden and impress them by superior appearances. On the other hand, most of the founders and interpreters of religions really acted in good faith, feeling themselves called and illuminated. Finally, the border between a "revelation" and an enlightening idea opening new dimensions is also fluid. Oscar Kiss Maerth declares, by the way, that the great philosophers and creators of religions

are those who with the best of intentions (although not uninfluenced by contemporary conditions) proclaimed some useful "truths" whose symbolic character was most misunderstood or misinterpreted. The same author holds that these people possessed intuitive abilities and a remnant of original supersensible clairvoyance (at least compared with today's human senses, which are far behind the instincts of free-living animals).

As a result of this development and from the earliest childhood on, the conviction was implanted in individuals that invisible beings and their self-appointed interpreters are to be worshipped and feared. The general spread of this conviction helped to strengthen the sense of its truth and reality, making it appear self-evident and hardly doubtable — and this all the more because individual skeptics found themselves exposed to the disapproval of rejection, if not the persecution and punishment, of the broad masses and authorities on account of irreverence and blasphemy.

This situation did not improve but became worse when the old animistic and fetishistic faiths were replaced by the great world religions, among which Christianity and Islam were spread with fire and the sword, while Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Shintoism, by promoting passive attitudes, indirectly promoted the authoritarian systems which included them. Even the dissipating influence of the various religions since the Age of Enlightenment changed nothing in the overwhelming influence of faith-conceptions on real life, for the role of religion was increasingly taken over by the ideologies, which took measures against their critics and heretics through their prophets and priests, their hells and paradises, and especially their inquisitors and criminal court judges. They knew how to create obedience by every means of mass psychology, as well as by massive pressure from the outside.

In this, German philosophy played an important part. Its strong influence was expressly acknowledged by Marx and Engels. With the exception of Stirner, this philosophy, unlike con-temporary French and English philosophy, did not proceed from the realities of practical life and from real human beings but from abstractions and intuitions of things, i.e. from concepts — from mere thoughts. It was theologically and metaphysically oriented, whether it thought theistically or pantheistically, and was, characteristically, obsessed with faith in the "duty" of the individual, in his "destiny" to serve some "higher purpose."

While on one side belief in a personal God gradually disappeared, even though it is still alive in millions, originally religious commandments remained still in force, but now as "ethical" commandments and without people being conscious of their origin. At the same time, new gods with new commandments took the place of the previous ones. Philosophy, sociology and even modern theology have depersonalized the concept of "God" more and more, and transformed it into the rather misty concept of an abstraction of "love" or an impersonal world law, which again sets a "task" or a "final aim." Naturally, the self-appointed prophets and interpreters of this new God determine the specific commandments and

prohibitions and, more or less through coercion, keep the individual at work to fulfill his "task" or "destiny."

Such "imposition of duty" was enforced increasingly by ideologies, e.g. by National Socialism, proclaiming nation and race to be absolute values for which the individual has to sacrifice himself unconditionally, though naturally it was self-appointed functionaries who proclaimed the "true interests" of the nation or race. Likewise, Marxist ideology sees in all events only economically conditioned class wars directed by an irresistible law of social development. The final result is supposed to be the liberation of man, who was, supposedly, alienated from his "true nature" and his "task." There is always and without exception this "imposition of tasks," with religions as well as with ideologies, and only the pressures by which the individual is urged and compelled to accomplish his alleged "task" were and are different.

What, then, is an ideology? The sociologist Theodore Geiger has established valuable and relevant distinctions, only the essence of which can be given here. For a closer explanation, also regarding possible objections, we refer to his work Ideologie und Wahrheit (Ideology and Truth), Vienna and Stuttgart, 1958.

Geiger differentiates between statements which may be proven right or wrong — verified or falsified — and those where this is not the case. He says: "Herewith is meant a procedure of verification before whose results everyone must bow. This is the case when the statement is nothing other than the ordering of observations according to the rules of logic. Here one can refer to perceptions of the mind. One can examine whether the material of perception is complete or shows gaps, whether the technique of observation is reliable or misleading, whether the conclusions are logically tenable or not, whether, for example, the declaration-content has exceeded the possibilities of the declaration-material, that is to say, whether too far-reaching conclusions have been drawn from the ascertained observations. The correctness or falseness of such declarations can be demonstrated. The classical example for this is the experiment.

"Such statements can only be made about objects which are perceivable with our senses — directly or indirectly — and only insofar as their — directly or indirectly — perceivable properties are in question. The essence of these objects is called 'the reality of recognition.' It corresponds to reality in space and time, for only this is perceivable to the senses."

In opposition to this stand the adherents of another concept of "reality," i.e. those who attribute reality to ideas or who speak of a subjective reality of experience, of transcendent reality, etc. From this asserted "reality proper" they derive conclusions and demands.

Geiger rightly opposes them as follows:

"The fact that you call these contents of the imagination (co-)realities, that you assert the possibility of true statements concerning them, has nothing to do with our question. You, too, must admit that the pretended reality of ideas, subjective experiences, super-sensibilities

and suchlike is of a different kind than the reality of the sensibly-perceivable, space-time conditioned world of objects. You may even grant the super-sensible contents a higher degree of reality than our sensible world of reality. This we will not dispute with you. But you agree with us that God is real in a sense other than that of visible, audible and graspable appearances, and that the subjectively experienced reality differs from the objective reality of outside things. And, finally, you agree that the "truths" to be pronounced concerning such contents are "true" in a sense other than that of statements about sensibly perceived things and the demonstrable conclusions which are logically drawn from them. Even theologians have realized this nowadays.

"Statements about the one and the other are obtained in a totally different way, and are of correspondingly different validity. One could express the essentials in the following way: Statements about the reality of perception can be proven or disproven by observation and logic in such a way that an evasion is impossible. Statements on other realities are beyond a testing procedure. One can just as easily assert the opposite. Then we have merely one statement against another statement."

It is characteristic of an ideology — that is, of an ideological statement — that it is not at all related or confined to the perceptions of reality but contains elements which are foreign to reality. It asserts things one knows or should know as impossible to prove. Ideological statements are, due to their nature and their contents, beyond empirical testing or refutation. The same applies, of course, to religious statements and demands.

Up to now there are no rules for relationships among men founded exclusively on the criteria of experienced reality as explained by Geiger. These relationships have hitherto depended exclusively on religious or ideological opinions or beliefs. Thus we can now make a first important part-statement:

The extremely varied and contradictory character of the various religions and ideological assertions and demands prove that at least most of them cannot have a basis in reality. They are merely mental images of concepts and wishes which allow no reasonable justification of the claims based on them. Even supposing that a small remnant of religious and ideological claims and concepts included a content of reality which goes beyond what is perceivable in experienced reality, the following statement applies: There is no objective criterion (as in the realm of experienced reality) for differentiating the asserted reality from images of pure fantasy.

In practice, daily life is therefore dominated by mere assertions (proven and unprovable) and opinions of faith, especially also by demands upon which an agreement is impossible from the beginning, since there is no objective criterion for right or wrong.

Up to now, not even an attempt has been made to regulate relationships among men according to criteria which are exclusively taken from the reality of perception, and thus must be generally acknowledged. Such an attempt can also benefit religious and ideological concepts — within the necessary limits of tolerance.

So things have not changed much even today, compared with the beginning of human thinking and judgment, since no clear distinction is made between reality and mere thoughts, between matters provable and unprovable. A number of ideas and concepts — similar to the demons and natural spirits of early history — fly about and are customarily considered quite real and generally valid, while closer examination reveals their religious and ideological character. For some people it comes as a real shock, and all their religiously and ideologically based prejudices revolt when they are con-fronted with Geiger's soberly objective declaration:

"This statement concerns something upon which in all eternity — that means absolutely — no empirically provable or disprovable statement can be made, since its contents are outside of experienced reality (transcend it). Or here something is stated about a real object which does not belong to the properties making it a real thing. As examples, I quote two sentences:

'Social justice demands the creation of equal educational opportunities for all talented persons.'

'In the sphere of experimental reality there is no 'social justice.'

'The symbol of the cross is holy. In the sphere of experimental reality there is no property called 'holy,' and therefore no object which can have this property."

N.B.: This is not at all an assertion of the unreality of all that goes beyond the realm of experienced reality. However, everyone who truly cares for understanding with his fellow creatures must first learn to practise self-criticism and realize what in his convictions and claims is provable fact, and what is supposition or an opinion of his faith. He must find out also which ideas and concepts rely only on subjective suppositions and evaluations, unlike those which are objectively provable and generally valid.

When on the one hand the "Social Market Economy" is praised as an expression of "social justice" and on the other hand — also with reference to "social justice" — this same "Social Market Economy" is condemned as exploitative and oppressive, then this shows distinctly enough that there exists no objective measure for "social justice." Thus the use of religious and ideological concepts is never convincing in arguments with those who think differently.

One must finally realize that with all ideological — as well as religious — convictions it is not a question of objectively provable knowledge but only of subjective opinions and faith. The degree of firmness of these convictions makes no impression on those who do not share them but hold differently oriented or contrary religious or ideological convictions.

In all such cases there are only two possibilities: either one tries by force to carry out one's convictions, regardless of others, as far as one is able to, or one tries to agree with others on some working arrangement.

For the latter, the first precondition is that both renounce the use of religiously or ideologically established claims or correspondingly coloured concepts — especially those based on completely different and even contrary contents, such as "social justice."

This condition is not easy to fulfill. While, with religious concepts, at least educated people are as a rule conscious of their basis in faith, this is not the case with ideological concepts. Even today, by educated as well as uneducated people, these are still considered true reality, not different from provable facts of experienced reality. They are defended and their implementation is attempted with an ardour and even fanaticism such as exists, nowadays, only rarely with religious concepts.

One of the most important ideological concepts is that of the "people" and the idea connected with it that it represents something "superior" to the individual, who, therefore, has to submit his interest to those of the "people" and has to serve the "people." This is, at the same time, an example of the personification of abstractions and of substitution of completely different contents in the same concept.

Here, first of all, a distinction has to be made between the concept "people" as a designation for the totality of all individuals who together make up the people concerned (this is really a concept from the sphere of experienced reality) and the abstract concept of "people" that ostensibly makes claims. The latter concept reaches back into the past and forward into the future. The first concept is not yet ideological as long as it is limited to the factual statement that this or that person belongs to this or that people, provided only that no evaluation or claim is derived from this fact. But "people" becomes an ideology whenever individuals or a group of individuals set themselves up as a council of the pretended interests of the "people" and make corresponding claims for the submission of other individuals or groups. In this they attempt to make us believe that "people" is an independent organism with a will of its own and of a value fundamentally superior 'to the sum total of all its individual members, who are supposed to have "duties" towards it. In reality, this is — by the standards of experienced reality — a purely mental construct, a fanciful image in the heads of those who merely believe this product of their faith — not even of their thinking — to be more than imagined.

It goes so far that Hitler said: "You are nothing. Your people is everything," and that he also correspondingly treated individuals as mere "human material" for his concept of a people as an idol requiring human victims. But before and after him were and are innumerable persons who, more or less stringently, share the same concept and submit others as well as themselves to it. The notions of "people" or "fatherland" or "nation" have developed more and more as

ideologies, the more intensively and systematically they have been disseminated through compulsory schooling and military service.

Originally, the feeling of cohesion in tribes and peoples was still purely instinctive and free from all mental motives. It was based on the familiarity of living together and on customs, as well as on the need for protection, as long as the members of foreign tribes and peoples mainly appeared as enemies, or at least as possible enemies, whose domination was feared. The conditions of domination in one's own people were veiled by morals and custom. Each naturally felt that his own interests as well as those of the whole group were furthered when somebody else distinguished himself in battle for his tribe or people and correspondingly earned praise and prestige. So the feeling grew — and was confirmed by the behaviour of others — that sacrifices for the community were something worthy of praise. They are this, in fact, under certain circumstances and within certain limits, provided the person concerned makes them himself voluntarily, and does not demand them from others through pressure and coercion. The feeling of solidarity is always strengthened when external dangers of any kind threaten. From this purely instinctive feeling that has nothing to do with ideology, it is not too far to the concept (n.b. concept!) that the totality of a people is meaningful and "superior" to the individual. This was expressed more and more frequently and finally taught systematically.

Is "donkey-hood" "superior" to the individual donkey? Admittedly, a number of donkeys is undoubtedly more precious than a single one — but for whom? For their owner! Accordingly, the leaders and dominators of each people cherished and proclaimed the idea of unity and submission. They are always thinking of submission under their leadership and domination. The priests also strengthened this faith, in their own interests, since the members of other peoples were, as a rule, also believers in other religions.

The ideology of "people," "fatherland" and "nation" thus became a substitute religion that among almost all peoples grew stronger than religion proper and in any case inspired more and greater sacrifices. In addition, there was the fanaticism, found even today, of the adherents of substitute religions, who consider every dissenter morally inferior if not a "traitor" deserving the death penalty. Even a Machiavelli, who thoroughly penetrated and revealed the business secrets of the dominators, was so obsessed with the idea of the national unification of Italy that he wrote his work The Prince primarily with the intention of giving the right hints to that man whom he thought the most appropriate for this unification: namely, not to be too squeamish with regard to perfidy and murder. This was quite logical within the framework of the old Roman "virtue," which most valued patriotism and sacrifices made in the service of one's country — sacrifice either of oneself or of others. Even today, the following thought of G. C. Lichtenberg's is only hesitantly quoted:

"I would like to know for whom, in reality, those deeds are committed, of which it is publicly said that they are done for the fatherland."

Since, unlike the invisible gods, "people," "fatherland" or "nation" are considered indubitable realities (which they are in fact — as non-ideological concepts), only few have recognized as a falsification the ideological over-extension of these concepts which insinuates that they have a life of their own, with their own will. For what is proclaimed the ostensible will or interest of the "people" is always a mere abstraction hiding either the will or the interest of an individual or group. Whoever believes in it lets himself be dominated by an idea that has become fixed. Each abstraction is merely a screen hiding something concrete which substitutes its will and its interests in the name of the abstraction, in order to impress those unable to criticize and judge.

This becomes evident when one talks about submitting the interests of individuals — and also of groups — to the "public interest." For the people is the totality of all members of the respective people. If the interests of a part are submitted to the interest of another part, then these are sacrifices which do not serve the whole community, but merely that other part, be it a minority or a majority.

And how does one know that it is "good" and "right" to make such a sacrifice? That is only asserted by those pretending to know the "true" interests of "the people" and who, quite evidently, do not represent the interest of all members of the people, at least not those from whom they demand or upon whom they impose the sacrifice. While the (non-ideological) concrete people has as many different voices, aims and interests as its individual members have, the (ideological) "people," as an abstraction, has no voice of its own, no will of its own which it can utter by itself. (The "democratic will" of the majority will be investigated later.) It is always only individuals or groups of such who speak and act for the abstraction "people," who usurp legitimacy for themselves for that purpose or let others legitimize them — others who generously delegate authority which not only applies to themselves, but is supposed to apply to non-participating and even resisting third persons. No proof is provided that "people," "fatherland" and "nation" are not merely subjective, but objective and absolute values, and that each individual has to respect these values and to serve them, like a religious commandment.

With religions it is evident from the beginning that it is not a question of knowledge but of faith, that what is asserted is thus not provable, for what one knows and can prove need not be believed. The philosophically educated person knows that and also why anything metaphysical (i.e. anything that goes beyond experienced reality) cannot be known and proven as experienced facts can be. Whoever relies upon religious doctrines and the revelations of others must realize that these others, as a rule, can know only as little as he himself. The subjective experience of a revelation may only be communicated to others by means of unprovable assertions. There is, above all, no standard for testing whether a particular revelation was really a metaphysical reality or a mere imagination, hallucination or self-suggestion.

With religions one can, in principle, admit that there may be a more comprehensive reality beyond experienced reality, one which may be beyond our limited senses and our mind, which is limited by insoluble contradictions (antimonies). In principle, one can even admit that this other reality may be comprehensible by meditation, perhaps even through revelation or intuition in a subjective and individual way. This does not change the fact that the results of such an access to this transcendent reality are not provable as "true" or "right." In the same way one could assert the opposite.

With ideologies, like "people," "fatherland" or "nation," however, it would be absurd to speak of a revelation by which someone is convinced of the objective superiority of what he fancies under these concepts, however large the subjective value of these concepts may be — according to his subjective conviction. Seen objectively, "people," "fatherland" and "nation" are no more superior entities compared with the individual than the individual is a superior being compared with these concepts.

This is simple logic. But it is psychologically easy to explain why these ideologically falsified concepts are so much liked by all demagogues: they speak so strongly to the broad mass's impulse to submit and worship, by appealing to an original instinct that has been sanctified by custom. And especially, they have hitherto always proven their strength as slogans, making the great majority follow the goals and interests of the dominators. The latter, to some extent consciously, have abused these slogans for their own interests and to some extent have submitted to them themselves and credulously obeyed them.

The concept of "duty" as well as its correlated concept of "right" are also ideological. Both appear often in connection with the previously mentioned concepts of "people", "fatherland" and "nation", though in other contexts. But always, when such a "duty" is postulated, it includes a "superior" command which has to be followed by the person concerned as a "duty."

Here, first of all, the following must be clearly distinguished: allegedly "given" "rights" and "duties" on the one hand; and rights and duties resulting from contracts on the other hand. The latter are not ideological and therefore can be proven as existing or not existing by witnesses or documents. Ideological "rights" and "duties," however, can only be asserted like religious ones and it is not possible to demonstrate their real existence.

However, unclear and vague thinking and, above all, general habit bring it about that people believe in these pretended "rights" and "duties" as realities, never doubting them at all. Mostly there is also real power behind them, compelling resistors to acquiesce or at least to silence their criticism and opposition. Thus, legally stipulated "rights or "duties" (frequently based on pretended ones and never on freely arranged contractual agreements) do indeed represent reality, but only the reality of superior power. They are not reasonable in themselves. Their "reasonableness" is effected openly by the stronger power.

Thus one is led to a dangerous confusion of concepts if one does not clearly

distinguish genuine (that means freely-agreed-upon) rights and duties from pretended "given" ones. The latter are either only based on assertions or legally dictated by a superior force, be it the power of an open dictatorship or of a majority. The latter will be discussed later in a separate chapter.

Ideological "rights" and 'duties" are, upon closer critical observation, nothing but wishes of the person concerned which he considers his "rights." He wishes others to respect them, which means that they should become his contractual rights. The same applies to the "duties" he wants to impose on others. Both wishes can be realized only insofar as there is power behind them to carry them out. Lacking this power, they remain mere wishes and mental speculations, and the person concerned has only the small consolation that "actually" he is "right." Imagination, at times, can indeed make one happy. But mostly it makes one unhappy —when bowing under the yoke of "duties" or respecting the pretended "rights" of others not because one freely agrees with them but because one feels oneself under moral pressure, under a "higher" obligation which is inculcated by one's environment.

Pretended "rights" and "duties" are floating about everywhere. They are mere fantasies which find their only props in their establishment by law or dictate (that is, through a superior power) or by mere habit, inculcated as self-evident by parents, environment, and school from earliest childhood. Each deviation from the norm usually encounters indignant reactions from all around us, so that habit finally forms corresponding behaviour and does not let any opposition arise.

A wise man once said: "What one learns in childhood sits firm." Therefore, most people utter opinions that are approximately thirty years old. As the teachers of that time were similarly influenced, most people — without regard to circumstances — hold opinions that have become senseless. With the end of their physical growth, the mental growth of most people also ends. Thus they carry their early acquired "views" to their grave.

Ignoring "rights" and "duties" founded by laws and dictates, to which we will come back later in detail, we start with the fact that from birth a human being finds himself and other people without any rights and duties as individuals and groups. This does not, however, mean that others can treat him arbitrarily. Nor does it exclude the possibility that they may, one-sidedly, grant certain rights to him. The assertion that there are "rights" and "duties" from birth is not superior to the opposite assertion. Claims based on the assertion of real "rights" and "duties" from birth must, therefore, be refused — even if they exist — for the same reason as is used by every objectively ruling court refusing a contested and unproven claim, even when it might really be justified. Assertions and claims of this kind are in principle simply unprovable.

The last statement is a provable piece of knowledge according to the criteria of experienced reality and refers to all "rights" and "duties" which are based on religious, moral, ethical or other ideological foundations. True rights and duties

are only founded by an agreement, which may also be entered into tacitly. What is called "morality" and "ethics" is partly based on such agreements but largely on fantasy images, wishful thinking and unprovable assertions — this is the reason why moral concepts and customs change so often — and to a quite essential degree on coercion and aggressive force. Whoever refers to such ideological "rights" and "duties" as a basis for claims against others is at best one who is not thinking clearly and whose concepts are confused. But as a rule he is someone who consciously wants to mislead those unable to criticize and who wants to justify the use of aggressive force.

So-called "natural law," too, belongs to the realm of ideological claims, as in the realm of experienced reality there is no "natural law." Even those who believe in a "natural law" — for it is purely a matter of belief — disagree totally on its contents. Often quite reasonable views are proclaimed as "natural rights." But their value lies in the fact that they are reasonable, not that they are "rights."

An intermediate position between ideologies and agreed-upon rights is occupied by the so-called "human rights." They were developed during the fight against club law in order to confine it more and more, especially against the omnipotence of the State in order to secure for individuals at least some modest liberties against this institution. But, partly, they arose also from purely ideological claims which exceeded the limits of equal freedom for all and became, to that extent, aggressive in themselves.

Up to now human rights are not of direct value to men, i.e. not all men, or even a great majority, give their express approval. Nor could the individual practically assert them against other individuals, or even States. Only individual States proclaim and concede these "human rights," and this only with considerable qualifications.

It should be noted that we have here mere proclamations like that expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights dated December 12, 1948, as a resolution of the UN General Assembly. This was no legalized act, and nobody can make realizable claims based upon it. It is a typical moralizing sermon without serious intention on the part of the preachers who practise these morals themselves. Of this everyone can be convinced who compares the practice of man — and even more — of the States with proclaimed "human rights."

Quite typical in the nebulousness of its premises is the verbose preamble. It speaks, for example, of a "conscience of mankind." Mankind, as an abstract and ideological concept, can have neither a will nor a conscience — apart from the insinuations of its self-appointed administrators. Mankind, as the sum of all individuals, has as many millions of different and mostly contrary consciences as there are millions of individual human beings.

This preamble, furthermore, declares that it is "essential" to protect human rights through the rule of law. "The law," however, does not exist as something which is already given in advance or even clearly definable. What has been

realized as "the law" up to now has always been only the power behind it, mostly representing an aggressive force —whenever it was not a question of rights based on a contract or agreement. The rule of "the law" has, hitherto, in practice, always meant only domination by force, since it was founded just on domination, even when this domination granted a few liberties. The "law" hitherto practised has been only the right of the dominating and the strongest. Whenever proclaimed a powerless ideal by dominated and weak people, it was merely a forlorn protest against domineering power. In neither case can the real existence of such an ideological concepts as "the law" be proven, far less can a concrete wording of its contents be verified. (Meant here is real existence in experienced reality, thus also outside the mind — in which the existence of corresponding concepts is, of course, not identical with real existence — for non-existing things can also be imagined.)

The preamble speaks further of "faith" in "fundamental human rights," whereby it indirectly admits that there neither is nor can be any knowledge of them. Article 1 begins with two untenable assertions at once: all human beings are born "equal in rights" and also "endowed with reason and conscience." It would be better to say that no man is born with privileges over others; unless one prefers a better wording expressing that by birth there are no rights at all to which one may reasonably lay claim but merely such rights as arise out of agreements. In contracts, as a rule, nobody will grant privileges to others and will endeavor to obtain not lesser rights, but instead, rights like those of the others.

Through appeals to "reason" — but always one's own reason, never that of others — very contrary opinions have often been uttered. Reviewing world history or merely daily experience, it becomes evident that only a small minority really have and use reason. Concerning "conscience," this first article (of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) obviously assumes that this voice is equal or similar in all men. This, however, is evidently not the case, nor can it be, since "conscience" is merely the sum of imposed or customary religious and moralistic concepts.

The equality before the law postulated in Article 7 justifies the unequal freedom of individuals vis-à-vis groups and their laws, without regard to whether these laws were passed by a totalitarian or a democratic regime. The latter is as much founded on the principle of domination as the former. Anatole France once quipped: "The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, beg in the streets or steal bread."

Article 13 limits the rights of freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State. As States are very different in size and natural conditions (e.g. natural resources), in constitutions and social relations, the equal freedom of all is limited again in the name of "human rights."

Article 17 guarantees quite summarily rights of property, without differentiating how this was acquired — whether, for instance, by legal or real privilege or by monopoly or by a privileged claim on something which nature

offers as a present (as with land and mineral resources) — and without stating whether the claim of property applies only to the product of one's own work.

In Article 21, the "authority" of government is justified by "the will of the people." This is just an abstraction which hides only the will of a group of individuals who are not bound to express and follow the "will of the people." Nor is this will identical with that of all the people. Here we have more coercion in the aggressive sense, that is, as intervention in the equal freedom of all. More on this will be said when considering the ideology of democracy and the majority principle.

In Article 22 "rights" are granted with regard to something really desirable — without the approval of those concerned — that means, claims and "rights" are granted against others at their cost and also against their will.

In Articles 23 and 25 the "right to work" as well as to "social protection" and "security in the event of unemployment" are formulated as "rights" and "claims." These desirable claims presuppose an authority which, because of these "rights," takes care of some with the money of others, although these services could be ensured by voluntary associations and, above all, by a genuine social order based on the principle of equal freedom for everyone.

The same applies to the "right to education" (Article 26), with its demand for free school instruction, at least in the elementary and basic stages. This includes — without mentioning it — compulsory school attendance and government determination of the curriculum and of educational aims. For, if someone has a "right," it brings along a corresponding "duty" for those who grant or respect this right. Moreover, according to the partly expressed and partly tacitly held views of the authors of this "Declaration of Human Rights," there are also such "duties" for those not recognizing such "rights," since they are inborn rights and as such stand outside all agreements and have precedence.

Article 29 likewise claims: "Everyone has duties towards the community, in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible." Apart from the fact that true duties can only be voluntarily accepted ones (for calling them "duties" when they are compulsory is merely an impudent masking of the aggressive force involved), we have here the substitution of the abstract concept of a community for the simple fact that each human being encounters and enters into relationships with a plurality of other individual human beings. Here one might let the concept "community" pass in the non-ideological sense, providing nothing more is meant than the sum of all mutual relations without any value judgments and provided the relationships of the individuals towards all others are based on the principle of equal freedom for all and on free contracts. But in reality the concept "community" stands for something quite different, namely for the State. While a true community is characterized by voluntary membership, the State is a coercive "community." This special form of a "community" — not at all the only possible one — is the most dangerous of all ideological abstractions. For it acts as something independent that is superior to

the individual. It claims "rights" and imposes "duties" on individuals whether they agree or not. The State is the modern form of a secularized god who demands absolute obedience to all his commandments.

Curiously, the absurdity of this situation has not, hitherto, occurred to people — a situation in which what only exists in minds as concepts, as mere thoughts, ranges equally with the real, even takes precedence. And this is still happening more than four generations after Stirner addressed his vehement attack against "fixed ideas." Fixed ideas as mere theories are quite tolerable — sometimes even acceptable — provided one remains conscious that they do not represent knowledge, but mere suppositions, opinions and beliefs. But they lead to danger-dangerous mental disturbance when consciousness of their mere suppositional character gets lost and the ideas harden into unshakable "fixed" ones. Then it is no longer the human being that has the idea or the particular thought, but the thought, his product, dominates the human being. Naturally, this applies likewise to thoughts accepted from others. Moreover, the fixed idea becomes something "superior" and "holy," something not at all to be doubted or shaken.

"Do not think that I am joking or imagining things," said Stirner, "when I consider as true fools, fools in a lunatic asylum, who are attached to ideals, i.e. the vast majority, almost the whole world of man."

The slightest attack on the fixed idea of such a fool and one immediately has to guard one's back from the fool's malice. The great madmen are like the so-called little madmen in that they ambush all who dare to doubt their fixed ideas."

N.B.: One is not "obsessed" when one merely believes in things or commandments the proof of which one lacks and even cannot offer due to their nature, but exclusively when one wants to spread one's belief in an aggressive manner beyond one's personal sphere and to force others to respect one's articles of faith as "holy" and "untouchable."

This does not apply only to the religious dogmas but also and especially to ideological beliefs, which are so firmly rooted and have become fixed ideas to such an extent that most people are no longer able to distinguish between them and reality. When otherwise intelligent people who expect to be taken seriously operate with concepts in which they do not distinguish between concrete and abstract things, reality and mere thought, provable and unprovable points, then, like Stirner, one must have the "horrifying conviction that one is imprisoned in an institution together with fools."

It is evident that, with such behaviour, people can only speak past each other and, moreover, cannot agree on a common basis. Such a basis can only be provable reality. (Then whatever goes beyond this, whether mere faith or more or less well-founded supposition, may take an appropriate place — but no more than that!) Within experienced reality there are no rights and duties except those freely agreed upon — or those established by a superior force, a force which does not openly manifest itself as such but hides behind pretended "higher" commandments. It is a mere assertion that these "superior" religiously or

ideologically founded commandments really exist. To effect proof for or against them is impossible. Since, however, he who asserts an opinion, or even derives claims from it, has generally also the duty to prove his assertion, the person concerned must realize that he is merely trying an empty bluff or is committing an aggressive act under false pretences whenever he compels others on the basis of his assertion.

Numerous allegedly "superior" beings — like God, mankind, truth, freedom, humanity, justice, the people, the fatherland, the nation, class consciousness and "the party which is always right"— make menacing and alluring claims on the individual, treat him only as a dependent part of a "greater being," and assign him corresponding "destinies," "tasks" or "duties," or persuade him that he has certain "rights" towards other individuals, rights which are unknown to or denied by them. Never do these "superior beings" speak for themselves. There are always other individuals or groups who appoint themselves spokesmen for the "superior" beings — without offering proof of their existence at all or for their authority as the mouthpieces of higher beings.

"You poor creatures," said Stirner, "you could live so happily if you were allowed to jump about as you like. Instead, you have to dance to the tune of the social masters and bear-trainers and perform tricks on which you would never waste your time. And you never resist the role imposed upon you. You never resist being treated as something other than the person you want to be. No, you mechanically repeat the given question yourself: 'What am I called to do?' 'What must I do?' In this way you only have to ask in order to be told and ordered what you should do."

Nearly all contemporary slogans are ideologically founded. They imply claims against and orders given to the individual. Existing institutions have no better basis, but because they are so accustomed to them we no longer notice their ideological foundation.

The Romantic, Friedrich Schlegel babbled about the "first unclear stirrings of the consciousness of mankind as a person," while his contemporaries raved in poetry and philosophy of a mystic worship of man and — as it was expressed then — of an incarnation of God or a deification of man. Nowadays, the sloganeering personification not only of collectives — which apart from their ideological distortion have at least a true content — but of concepts based on purely mental images, has become popular. This can partly be attributed to atavism: originally man believed that all he found in his consciousness (that means all his thoughts and concepts) corresponded to an outside reality. Thus he still believes in everything which, due to inside or outside inducements, he thinks, imagines or wants. He is not motivated to separate his concepts from reality and to compare them with reality — especially with external experience. The less content there is in human consciousness the stronger his uncritical impulse to believe.

Otherwise the dominant confusion of thought is based also on misunderstanding of what actually happens with value judgments which are always

always ideological: there indeed the feelings of persons towards an object are interpreted as properties of the object; the subjective sensation of "good" or "bad" towards an object or an action is not understood as a subjective sensation but misinterpreted as an objective characteristic of this object or action.

The effect is especially dangerous when such falsely objectified wishful concepts are established as the central contents of conscience. On them there is constructed an immense complex, according to the proven rules of formal logic. From an empirically unfounded determination of values a logically consistent structure is derived that has only one fault: the premises, as well as all derivations from it, are pure whims insofar as it is provable that, although they exist as mental concepts in the mind of the person concerned or possibly of others, it is likewise provable that it is impossible to demonstrate that these concepts correspond to reality, that they are more than arbitrary assumptions or impulsive, subjective sensations.

Unaffected by the statements of epistemologists, philosophers and sociologists — which indeed neither influence law studies nor promote one's career in law — the German Federal Court still stated in 1954 the view that there is an objective moral law, which e.g. "has established monogamy and family as a binding way of life for human beings and made this order the basis for the lives of peoples and States."

At least 99% of all human beings could neither say where this mysterious "moral law" originated nor what its actual content is, while the remaining one per cent do not really know anything about it but only believe that there is such a thing, without having any reasonable concept of it. It also appears in Article 2 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. Such a childlike and naive belief in something totally unproven and fundamentally unprovable justifies the "right" of the German Federal Court "according to the conviction of the Court" to mobilize all of the State's coercive powers against those who do not share such a belief. This court also has the right to interfere aggressively in the freedom of individuals or of whole groups. Yet the same Federal Court would laugh derisively if, in a legal dispute, one party declared before it that it did, indeed, believe itself to be right but could not prove it.

Not only the German Federal Court plays such jokes on common sense (which it praises on another occasion), but also Chancellor Brandt declared himself in favour of orienting social policies by "basic moral values" (according to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7.10.1972). Similar statements are continuously heard from all politicians, preachers, jurists and columnists, but always something quite different is meant. The alleged constraints of prevailing conditions upon the decisions of the dominators are, of course, always coloured by their subjective preferences and their own ideologies (unconsciously, since they do not consider their own ideology to be objective truth and reality).

The more warped feelings are, the more nebulous concepts are; and above all, the more "basic moral values" have been knocked into a person from childhood,

the more uncritically they are expressed: ".. . not our own happiness, but our fatherland's happiness is our happiness. We are not looking for our own freedom, but for our own subjection. We wait for the day of mobilization when a faithful youth may once again prove its loyalty. We stand ready with tensed muscles, each day ready to jump in and do Germany's work with our hands. The fire of readiness burns in us because we are prepared for Germany." —Thus wrote Hans Joachim Schoeps in 1933 — a Jew trying to enthuse the Jews for Hitler!

Recent sociological studies in Melanesia show more than 1,000 different ethnic cultures with a population of about three million people living under conditions like those of the Early Stone Age. The jungle, the island geography and headhunting have brought it about that each tribe of 2,000 members (on an average) differs fundamentally from the neighbouring tribes it fights against. This is, by the way, also a refutation of Marxist dogmatic faith in the determining influence of "conditions of production" on the "ideological superstructure" of sociological, religious, cultural and political circumstances. For the "conditions of production" in these 1,000 societies of hunters and food gatherers were completely identical! As in this example, the influence of religion, ideology, politics — that is, the conditions of domination — existed prior to what Marxism, at a later stage, understands by "conditions of production," hence they did not arise as their superstructure. Instead, religious and ideological concepts, and especially the conditions of domination which are closely connected with them, have always had — and still have — a decisive influence on the conditions of production and especially of property.

Something else, too, is proven by this endless variety which can be explored here almost in its natural circumstances: there is no higher purpose of a generally valid character to which all men have to bow. At least it is not recognizable by normal human senses and conceptual capacities. For if divine commandments or an impersonal moral law, obligatory for every human being, existed, then one would have to expect every man to be conscious of this ultimate aim and to recognize these commandments quite clearly as such — especially since the "word of God" as well as any other "higher" purpose imposed upon mankind — not by merely human words — should be quite clear and since nothing should be left to doubt or to various interpretations. The variety of mutually contradictory and often dark and ambiguous religions, morals and customs proves, however, that there is no agreement among the declarations and claims of all these doctrines which assert universal validity.

Even so-called conscience does not appear uniform, upon closer examination, but rather as the result of environmental influences, particularly of doctrines and values impressed upon the uncritical mind in early childhood. For instance, an ancient Egyptian who considered the crocodile holy, had pangs of conscience when he killed one in self-defence, while a European is not bothered by his conscience at all when killing a crocodile. The same applies to numerous other taboos. At present millions of "decent citizens" see merit in acts suppressing and

killing other people for religious, racial or national motives, as "class enemies" or as "enemies of law and order." The same acts, however, if directed against co-believers, are condemned with great indignation.

So-called "legal positivism" (that is, not only the dominating theory but especially its practice) declares as "right" whatever the government stipulates as right and realizes through coercive power. It states that "it is impossible to gain, through pure means of recognition, any consistent system of norms for correct behaviour that is evident for everybody." This is right insofar as the recognition refers to allegedly "higher" norms, but wrong insofar as the recognition of the impossibility of experiencing pretended "superior" norms offers in itself a sure basis for conclusions quite different from those drawn so far. Hitherto one has concluded: "Precisely because men do not agree in their views on right and wrong, on good and evil, and because they argue again and again about what is just, there must be someone simply to command what has to be done. Concepts about what is right or wrong form an inseparable knot that can only be solved by the sword" — Reinhard Zippelius, Das Wesen des Rechts (The Essence of Right), Munich, 1965, pp. 108-109. This amounts, basically, to nihilism, which only knows the logic of the right of the sword. This nihilism, with a great variety of conclusions, plays a large part in all calamities we are suffering under today. It can only be overcome by anarchism, i.e. by consistently practised non-domination.

We also have a case of the law of the strongest when, in an authoritarian way, values are fixed and forcefully realized merely on a basis of wide agreement among a certain group of people with certain morals and customs at a particular time — while criteria other than the customary ones (which are actually contradictory and impossible) are altogether denied. Not only are morals, customs and values greatly varied and even antagonistic among different groups of people at the same time or at different times, even within the same group, but opinions on values are also influenced and determined by the laws and the system of domination. If everything were "right" which a majority at a certain time considered "just" and "right," then the burning of witches, the inquisition, torture and slavery, as well as the persecution of the Jews by the National Socialist regime, would be "right" too. Zippelius (ibid. pp. 100-101) says, moreover: "There is no objective and coherent value system which corresponds to an agreed-upon value experience of all people." (In this context one should note the above-mentioned judgment of the German Federal Court of 1954.) "To apply the majority principle also in questions of justice means, undoubtedly, resignation before the task of finding a valid truth for all men and for all times, a resignation that is not only founded on philosophical reasoning but also on the bitter experiences of cultural history."

To believe in things that are unproven and not even provable; to esteem highly something which one erroneously assumes (just because one's environment happens to suggest it) that all others value or should value highly,

and then to use force against all those who do not share this faith or opinion — that is the practice of all our present so-called social "orders."

Behind all abstractions and collective notions, all "commands" and "rights," there is always a specific individual (or a group) who decides according to his personal interest or the inflexible ideas which direct his acts. Here are two typical examples for this.

Professor James Harvey Robinson in The Mind in the Making (1926) remembered the case of a U.S. Senator who once explained to him that even God the Almighty could not induce him to change his views on Latin-American politics,

Pope Pius XII once declared in a statement of tolerance (Salzburger Nachrichten, 24.12. 1953):

"Whatever does not correspond to objective truth and moral law has objectively no right. With principles it is absolute solidity that counts; principles cannot be shaken. No human authority can give a positive command or a positive authorization to teach or do something opposed to religious truth or moral goodness. Even God Himself could not issue such a positive command, since He is bound to the constitution once given by Him and since such a command would mean a contradiction of His absolute truthfulness and holiness."

"It is different in the reality of human, and public relations. Here the religious and moral principle of tolerance applies. If God permits an error, then the following statement is no longer absolutely valid: 'A religious or moral deviation must be hindered or suppressed whenever this can be done, unconditionally, because its toleration is immoral in itself."

"The duty to hinder or suppress religious or moral aberrations under any circumstances cannot therefore be a final norm for actions . . . Whether the conditions for the tolerance formula are fulfilled in a specific case is always a question of facts which first the Catholic statesman and, in the last and highest instance, the Pope himself must decide."

The Pope is, therefore, not only in the lucky position of knowing exactly what constitutes objective truth and moral law, but can also confine even God to the limits of a constitution of which the All-knowing knows nothing. For the Pope has declared — not in theory, but in practice — that the "common good" is a "higher norm" than religious and moral commandments (coming, in his opinion, from God).

REALISTIC STARTING POINT

In the confusion of non-existing (merely imagined), possibly existing (but not provable) and finally of provable (real) things — where so far the non-existing and non-provable have been ranked as not only equal but even as superior to provable facts — the first task is to find a solid base and starting point.

This can only be the actual mortal ego of each individual human being.

Stirner's historical achievement lies in the fact that he not only achieved this consciousness of his own person, but that in an exemplary way he demonstrated it with all its consequences for everybody.

In doing this, he was mostly thoroughly misunderstood. Some did not understand the exemplary character and the main aim of his statements. They imputed that he — like an arrogant person — merely wanted to realize his own ego, regardless of the interests of others, although he spoke against this quite distinctly. Others even mistook him as the creator of a new ideology and did not notice that — in order to destroy the domination of all ideologies and abstractions — he had to base his views on the only sure starting point, the only one which is provable as such by the criteria of experienced reality. Quite intentionally, he did not state what his ego was that he made the spokesman for the ego of all other people. (Such a statement would have led beyond the provable into metaphysics.) But, starting from his actual, mortal ego, which as with all other men is the starting point for all sensation, thinking and action, he analyzed the claims raised against and "tasks" imposed upon that ego from all sides. He clearly separated the provable from the imagined (non-existing) and from the possibly existing (but at any rate unprovable). It was not until Stirner that reasonable thinking in social relations properly began.

His measurable influence on the general consciousness has, up to now, remained regrettably small, since even the clearest of his statements was caught in the thickets of confusing prejudices and thousand-year-old custom, which did not know how to distinguish mere thoughts and images, from reality, abstractions from concrete facts. Nevertheless, the simple truth is making its way tenaciously and irresistibly, so that the following noteworthy statement appears in the recent work of a non-Stirnerian. (Gerhard Szcazesny,Das sogennante Gute. Vom Unvermoegen der Ideologen,—The So-Called Good. On the Incapacity of Ideologists, Hamburg, 1971) — of course, without drawing all the necessary conclusions.

"The elementary fact which we find when exploring our situation is the physiologically given priority of the actual individual human being over all groupings — which range from the marriage-partnership to the clan, from religions or political movements to the State and mankind. Measured against the reality of the living person, who alone can feel himself as such, all collectives are mere figments of the imagination which, again, exist only in the consciousness of the individual. Even the closest agreement between human beings does not result in their fusion into a new being with independent sensations and its own

intelligence. If one calls man an individual because he is only divisible as a corpse one must likewise consider it a characteristic of man that he cannot be multiplied.

"The world has as many central points as there are human beings. In their individual consciousness, the universe circles around each of them as around a unique and central point. Even in the most extreme situations of external involvement, the feelings and consciousness remain bound to the individual: in physical embrace just as in mass-actions.

"It seems that there is nothing more obvious and more important than the incomparable reality of the individual human being. But actually, history consists of ever-renewed attempts by men to deny their being-on-their-own or to let others deny it for them.

"Up to now man has been accustomed to ascribing 'feelings,' 'spirit' and 'soul' to family, class, nation, culture and every possible other grouping (small or large), and also to ascribing a greater degree of value of reality to them than to the 'unimportant' individual. It is as if the summing up of people under a certain historical or political aspect constituted a new, superhuman living being. But all these collective 'beings' live only through and in the individual: he conceives them, he makes them part of his feelings, and he turns them into motives for his deeds and crimes. When one speaks of the development of peoples, cultures, States or mankind towards good or evil, these are brought about only by single actors, and only individual human beings are involved.

"Even in those cases where some or many individuals feel, think and want the same thing, they do so as individuals. There exists no 'national consciousness,' no 'class consciousness,' no community 'mind,' no 'soul' of culture. One could agree with the allegorical use of such terms — if one did not overlook their analogical character when drawing conclusions from them. Precisely this, however, is what happens. Those demanding sacrifices from us in the name of people, party, class or a community of believers, begin consciously or unconsciously with the personal meaning of these concepts and ascribe to these collectives a higher form of life and a special value so that they may demand sacrifices for them.

"Since happiness and unhappiness only exist for the feeling individual, the splendor of a 'greater whole' cannot arise from the misery of many. No propagandistic, psychological or political manipulation can abolish the fact that human reality is always named Brown, Smith and Miller. With this we have expressed a second self-evident matter of importance. If only the individual with mind and feelings is real, then we are not concerned with a human being 'in principle' but with a particular person living in a certain place at a certain time. This fact compels us to look at specific human beings in a concrete social situation when establishing moral principles and political programs. It spares us the costly error of assuming that whatever is of use to particular men can be realized by means of a scheme that is obligatory for all human beings."

One man who claimed to be able to recognize the metaphysical reality beyond the experienced one, declared as a fruit of this perception:

"Every single human being is a unique emanation of the original creative will. He arose from the eternal 'unformed ocean of godhood' to reach his individual formal completion, different from all other co-emanations." (Bo Yin Ra, Das Buch vom Jenseits — The Book of the Other World, Basel, 1929, p. 144.)

"Bound to the power of the lords of this external physical cosmos by.your own will, a dependent of the 'Prince of this world,' you have become a victim of your own thoughts — you, who were formerly the lord of all thought! — Out of such dependency you must arise!..." (Bo Yin Ra, Das Geheimnis — The Secret, Basel, 1952, p. 244).

Without any metaphysics, beginning merely with experienced reality, we can also achieve the same results: Each individual is not only a provable fact but can also be sovereign — if he wants to be so, that is to say, if he does not make himself a "victim of his thinking" by letting himself be dominated by personified abstractions and collective notions, pretended commandments and "duties," all of which occur only in his mind, while their real existence is unprovable. In this, "sovereignty" is not to be understood as similar to that public "sovereignty" which is associated with arbitrariness (as far as the power of club law permits) and with the claim to domination over others. Here it means merely the refusal to be dominated by others, regardless of whether such domination derives only from the arbitrariness of persons or from allegedly existing "higher" beings, commands and "duties" — whose real existence is unprovable.

Contrary to the conclusion drawn above — which is wrongly thought to be the only one possible — that due to vast differences of opinions about the alleged "superior" commands, "rights" and "duties" it is necessary to establish and enforce them in an authoritarian and dictatorial manner through the State, there is, indeed, an alternative.

Since every human being is unique and different from all others, as Stirner first pointed out, and as has been confirmed by modern anthropology, it is already in principle nonsensical to attempt to apply one scheme to all men. Seeing that the existence of alleged "higher" norms for relationships between people is not only in doubt but at any rate unprovable, there are two possibilities for regulating these relationships. According to the one, the person concerned imposes his will by force upon the other or others, as far as he can do so. According to the other, individuals try to agree on a standard of behaviour — and on a mutually agreed guarantee of this behaviour. This standard is to leave each of the endlessly different individuals the greatest possible freedom from outside claims, especially from the forcefully imposed will of others. This is, indeed, in their mutual interest.

Later on it will be shown — with logical precision and on the unassailable found experienced reality — what specific forms of behaviour and institutions will result from such an endeavor. But first some concepts must be

clarified. Their confusion is today as dangerous as the rule of fixed ideas and of unproven and unprovable suppositions and concepts.

CONFUCIUS AGAINST CONFUSION

Confucius already pointed out the fundamental importance of clarifying and correcting these concepts which are used in arguments. Here we must first tackle the concepts of force, freedom and domination, while those of Marxism and democracy will be discussed in separate chapters.

As John Henry Mackay defines it in his Der Freiheitsucher (The Freedomseeker), Berlin, 1920:

"Force is the use of an outside physical (or also psychological) compulsion of any kind by one man against another, or by some men against others, exerted for the purpose of making him or them obey, tolerate or follow his or their will.

"The essence of force is thus compulsion, a compulsion exerted from the outside. Compulsion and voluntarism exclude each other. "Calling resistance to force also 'force' can only confuse terms. Force (coercion) can only be used in the sense of aggression. Thus the practice of force (coercion or violence) must always be preceded by aggression, exerted by a willing person against an unwilling one. "Force does not ask: 'Do you want?' — but it says: 'You must!' And it adds:'... as I wish!'

"Only one can be the aggressor. And aggression against aggression does

not exist; there is only defence against aggression.

"Thus, defence and aggression are completely different concepts, just as

force and aggression are identical or similar concepts."

This statement is of extraordinary and far-reaching importance. The constant confusion of two completely opposite concepts by giving them the same name is the reason for numerous and repeated conflicts and, at the same time, the reason for their insolubility up to now.

While what must be referred to as the true concept of force — namely, aggressive force — is rightly taboo for most people (since, quite instinctively, they see in aggressive force the main reason for all social disorder), the defensive force — i.e. protection against aggression — is quite evidently something completely different and diametrically opposite, even in those cases where the defender against aggression, like the aggressor, uses physical means, e.g. arms. It would therefore be right and reasonable to limit the concept of force to aggressive force (which begins not merely with the real use of physical force but with the threat of its immediate employment). One should then no longer designate any kind of defence against such aggression (including defence with physical means) as "force." However, since most people understand by the concept of "force" primarily any physically exerted compulsion (without

distinguishing whether it is used for aggression or defence) and since the defensive use of physical force is, indeed, always "justified," but not always opportune, we shall from now on designate true force pleonastically as aggressive force in order to distinguish it clearly from physical force used defensively against it.

The "justification" for such a defence results from the above-mentioned definition of genuine right as following exclusively from voluntary agreement, while all alleged "rights," imposed and enforced against the will of those concerned, are nothing other than false masks concealing aggressive force and, therefore, should only be called "aggression — and not "right." It is characteristic for the aggressive user of force that he refuses a negotiated agreement with his opposite party and, instead, wants to impose his own will dictatorially. Thus instead of genuine right he offers the right of the sword as his preferred form of relationship with others. Consequently, he cannot complain at all if this offer is accepted and he encounters the same "right" that he considers the only valid one.

It is, therefore, not decisive for the concept of aggressive force whether compulsion by physical means is used to subdue the will of the opponent — for this is sometimes unavoidable in defence against aggressive force. The important question is whether compulsion by physical means is exerted for aggressive or defensive purposes.

For this question, however, there is a definite criterion, one relying on the incontestable facts of experienced reality, not merely on unprovable assertions and ideological claims.

The conceptual confusion existing so far has not only clouded the distinction between aggression and defence. The observation that the use of physical means for defensive purposes is sometimes inevitable, has been perverted into the assertion that "force" (but this time genuinely aggressive force) is unavoidable and therefore acceptable.

The prevailing conceptual confusion was and is used primarily to declare those as aggressors and violators who, through defensive action, want to change conditions which arose and are maintained by force.

It is hypocrisy when someone who has created or maintained an institution or conditions by aggressive force (or is merely a parasite of such conditions maintained by others), anyone with a privilege or monopoly, raises an outcry against his victims when they defend themselves, if necessary, even with physical means and attempt to abolish these institutions or circumstances. It is hypocritical to call this a "use of force." It is comparable to a thief or robber complaining about "use of force" when his plunder is taken from him against his will.

The borderline between aggression and defence can be clearly seen only after clarification of the freedom concept, which is one of the most confused concepts today. When "freedom" is discussed today, one either means (1) that "freedom"

which claims unlimited authority for itself to interfere arbitrarily in the freedom of others or (2) at best, those miserable particular liberties graciously granted by the State to persons subject to its sovereign law (read: power of the State). But even these meager liberties are immediately limited by reservations in such a way that individuals, in practice, are in fact defencelessly exposed to the "authority of the State," which derives from the abstract "people," which specific people use to hide behind.

What, then, is Freedom (in a social sense); real and true freedom? Either my freedom is greater than that of another, or a group of others, at his or their expense, and my additional freedom is thus taken away from them against their will — then they are not free. Or, alternatively, my freedom is less than that of another or a group of others, whereby their additional freedom is taken away from me, and this against my will — then I am not free. In either case there is no state of freedom.

Freedom, therefore, can be nothing other than the state of equal freedom for all individuals. In this, no group can claim a greater degree of freedom for itself over individuals and against their will.

But this equality in freedom must not be confused with equality in general, and the concept of freedom must not be used vaguely as has commonly been the case so far.

Obviously, whoever possesses greater mental or physical capabilities than others, has also more "freedom" of action and more possessions resulting from his greater accomplishments. Those too have more freedom of action who have fewer self-imposed limits in their thinking and less faith in dogmas. But all this need never happen at the expense of others. It does not hinder others, nor does it take anything from them. So it does not touch on anything meant by the equal freedom of all.

Whoever, for instance, wants to equalize natural mental and physical differences, talents and abilities, differences of income and wealth — by various institutions or programs — wants to raise an ideological principle of equality (i.e. his concept of equality) to domination. It is different with differences in income and property based on privileges or monopolies; for these — like any privilege that is claimed against the will of those concerned — infringe on the state of equal freedom for all.

This state of equal freedom for all means, primarily, mutual freedom from aggressive coercive measures which — against the will of those concerned — enlarge the sphere of freedom of some at the expense of others, in such a way that, due to this compulsion, a state of unequal freedom arises.

Forceful measures which are not aggressive but purely defensive, by merely repelling aggression against the equal freedom of all, stay, therefore, within the framework of equal freedom for all. A purely protective organization on a voluntary basis and for the establishment and maintenance of this condition is a self-evident requirement.

When someone voluntarily restricts his own freedom in favour of the leadership or rule of another, be it for religious, ideological or practical purposes, then this voluntary unequal freedom also stays within the limits of what is to be understood by the state of equal freedom for all. This state includes the liberty of wanting to be a slave.

In this it is self-evident that someone can, of course, only limit his own freedom, not that of another against his will.

Equal freedom for all excludes any act or omission which enforces upon the persons concerned behaviour that is against their will and claims more freedom for one side at the expense of the freedom of the other side. It does not matter whether this is done in the personal interest of an individual or in the interest of a group or in the alleged "superior" interest of anything "higher," be it a religion, an ideology or anything alleged to be "obviously reasonable" or "evidently necessary."

What counts is the boundary between (aggressive) force and (defensive) freedom from this aggressive force, the limit consisting in the equal freedom of all. On this one may again quote John Henry Mackay (Der Freiheitsucher — The Freedomseeker, Berlin, 1920):

"There were cases where no doubt was possible: the robber or murderer who assaults me in order to take my property and my life is, undoubtedly, aggressive. If I get rid of him — and be it by force — I act in self-defense, protectively, and thus I am not aggressive. But there were cases which were not so blatant and evident. It was advisable to try to achieve the greatest possible clarity about these two concepts, seeing that they are hopelessly confused in the public mind, hardly ever discussed and nowhere clearly recognized.

"Some more examples, and again obvious ones: It was not aggressive to carry weapons, but it was aggressive to use them for purposes other than defence. Thus the prohibition against the bearing and possession of arms was aggressive, or rather the enforcement of this prohibition was.

"It was not aggressive to take land into one's personal possession and make use of it — if it was not already possessed and used by another. It was, however, aggressive to claim taxes for the use of this land and also of its natural resources, regardless of the form and purpose of such taxes. It was not aggressive to issue money and to pay with it those who wanted to accept it under the conditions offered and at their own risk. But it was aggressive to prohibit the issue and circulation of money and to enforce compliance while declaring one standard of value and one currency to be exclusively valid — under the pretence of possessing exclusive authority for the issue and circulation of money. "It was not aggressive not to work if one did not feel like it or had

other well-founded or implausible reasons for not wanting to work. But it was aggressive to keep others from the work they wanted to do.

"It was not aggressive to refuse taxes imposed by force, to refuse military service, to refuse inoculation and baptism, to sell one's body, to live in free love, to whore, and to drink; but it was aggressive to impose taxes upon others and to compel their payment, to force people to train with weapons and to use them, to inoculate and baptize them against their own or their parents' will, to 'regulate' prostitution and submit it to law, to persecute those living in free love: Every forceful suppression of vice was aggressive.

"It was not aggressive to practise medicine or any other profession. Everyone had to be free to attempt healing diseases if he believed he could do so; or free to choose the doctor in whom he had the greatest confidence. But it was aggressive to allow only 'certified' doctors to practise and to punish those exercising the profession without such approval. One may call aggressive cases of serious fraud, confidence tricks, and coercive seduction. But the extent to which they were really aggressive could only be decided in particular cases and only on the basis of the relevant facts.

"For, as was said before, there were certainly cases in which the

borderline between aggressiveness and passivity was drawn so fine

that it could be found only upon close examination, and even this

only with the aid of prolonged and rich experience, an experience

which is still far off nowadays, since the most naive ignorance still

prevails even towards the most obvious infringements of this limit."

The equal freedom of all is largely identical with the absence of privileges — unless someone has expressly granted another person, or group, a privilege over himself. The voluntary restriction of one's own freedom, as mentioned before, does not offend the principle of equal freedom for all.

Any legal or actual monopoly or oligopoly is also an aggressive infringement of the equal freedom of all, whenever it is not based on the voluntary consent or agreement of those concerned.

The most important application of this statement is with respect to land and natural resources. Mackay's example referred to a period more than fifty years ago when the world population was, approximately, only one third of today's. Then there was still some land — however little — available that was not yet used by others. Nowadays, it is no longer possible for someone to use land freely, for even the land not actually used has its "owners," too.

In the following we shall deal rather extensively with the hitherto overlooked consequences of this "ownership," which is of a quite special kind. Anarchism approves of property in the form of the products of one's own work and also in the form of the products of other people's work that have been freely exchanged. But

with "property" in land and natural resources we have a case of privilege with regard to something that was given, in its essence, by nature and whose utilization can therefore be equally claimed by every man. "Property" in land and natural resources is as absurd as would be a claim of property rights in the earth's air that we breathe, since land and natural resources are, in several respects, of no less importance for the existence of every man than the air we breathe. Equal exploitation rights to land and natural resources for everyone can now, without exception, be settled in such an appropriate form that actual landowners lose only an unfounded privilege but not the value of their property.

This example also demonstrates how far-reaching conclusions are to be drawn from the principle of equal freedom for all.

This principle declares murder, manslaughter, assault, rape, robbery, theft, extortion to be aggressive acts, like any claim of the "I may do what you may not do!" kind.

The principle of equal freedom for all (freedom from aggressive force) is a principle of strict mutuality and consistent equality of rights for all.

Above all, it is not based on an ideological claim or value judgment, but follows — as will be demonstrated in detail — as the only alternative to aggressive force, as the logically compelling conclusion from incontestable facts.

Since the principle acts like a set of scales, its non-observances can be determined accurately and at first sight in 99 per cent of all cases. It is evident that the murderer, killer, rapist, robber, thief and extortionist claims more freedom of action for himself, at the expense of his victims against their will. It is equally obvious — even if this point of view is unusual — that no one can claim the least privilege over what nature offers as a gift. (This, however, must be distinguished from what the user of land obtains from it through cultivation.)

One has merely to become accustomed to considering aggression not exclusively an act of force in which the aggressor takes the initiative. It may also consist, as mentioned earlier, in maintaining, by force and at the expense and against the will of those concerned, a situation which resulted from the non-observance of the freedom of all. Then the attempt to end previous interference in the equal freedom of all is falsified into aggression against the real aggressor or whoever profited from the aggression.

The equal freedom of all is a state of equilibrium which arises from the natural variety among individuals' talents, abilities, interests and desires. In this state, no attempt at air is made to equalize differences brought about by talents, abilities, interests and desires. For otherwise one would move out of the world of facts — of what is — into the ideological world of fantasy, of what allegedly should be, for which there is no criterion and on which, generally, one cannot agree at all.

Instead, we try to achieve the greatest possible privacy for each individual in his uniqueness by conceiving of a free-play-area around each individual, as concentric circles, as it were. These touch each other and find their limits where

any further expansion is possible only at the expense of another man's sphere of freedom. This would mean the deprivation of other spheres for the enrichment of one's own. Against the will of the persons concerned, this can happen only by means of aggressive force.

Our aim, therefore, is not equality itself but equality in liberty, in freedom from outside interference in equilibrium-borderlines arising from naturally given inequalities.

However, this does not at all exclude the possibility that free agreements between individuals concerned may establish conditions between them which aim at equality in economic relations and at equalization of natural differences in talents and abilities, as well as of interests and desires. "Volenti non fit injuria." The voluntary limitation of one's own sphere of freedom in favour of the increased freedom of other individuals or groups is thus not contrary to the principle of the equal freedom of all, but presupposes it.

If no individual or group subdues the will of another individual or group by aggressive force, then no enforced privilege, no exploitation and no oppression remain.

The equal freedom of all is identical with non-domination!

This is the opposite of arbitrariness, as it forbids not only the arbitrariness of others but also one's own, in one's own, well-understood self-interest.

The maintenance of the equilibrium of the freedom of all in all social relationships between individuals and groups will be achieved by a corresponding and purely defensive organization on a voluntary basis. It will not allow anyone to claim more freedom for himself at the expense and against the will of another. If this should, nevertheless, happen, intentionally or un-intentionally, then reparations must be made.

The equal freedom of all requires no questionable foundation upon the "inborn rights" or "duties" of those who should respect them. The clarification of the freedom concept yields only one reasonable and non-contradictory meaning and also reveals all people's mutual interest in establishing and preserving equal freedom for all.

The equal freedom of all includes all specific "freedoms" which remain within its framework. There is no objection to codifying these specific liberties which follow from the fundamental principle of the equal freedom of all. There is even less objection when those who unite for the recognition and preservation of the freedom of all speak of rights resulting from this recognition, as well as of duties arising from them. Then they are genuine rights and duties on the basis of a contract.

(J.Z.: Here he fully agrees, indirectly, with all those who, like myself, subscribe to [and thus contract to abide by) Kant's definition of "right" and, naturally, the subsequent divisions or listings of genuine rights logically derived from this concept as applicable to particular situations: "Right is the agreement of everybody's arbitrary actions with the arbitrary actions of everybody else - according to a general principle of freedom.")

The so-called "human rights" are partly one-sidedly dictated by acts of force by the State, decreed to maintain a condition of highly unequal freedom. They do not lose this fundamental character by the fact that some individual "human rights" are concessions wrung from the State's "sovereignty" and "public authority." It is, by the way, characteristic that, in spite of the common Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a number of countries have anchored in

law what other countries expose as violations of human rights.

Aggression against the equal freedom of all is undertaken not only to oppress and harm those concerned but often under the pretence and with the honest intention of furthering and helping those concerned. All measures, however, based on the alleged good of someone else, on protecting and caring for him — but this without his request and even against his will — must be recognized as subjection and aggressive intervention. The aggressor should remember not only the good old saying "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you," but also its wise completion by G. B. Shaw: "Do not do unto others as you would that they should do unto you. Their tastes may not be the same as yours."

With each concrete claim that one man raises against another, it can always be objectively determined whether it relies on a provable right based on voluntarily agreed-upon contracts or an alleged "right" in which he merely believes, whose existence, however, cannot be proven and whose forceful realization is aggression, if it goes beyond the limits of the equal freedom of all. It is, likewise, possible to determine in each concrete case whether, in the conditions existing or aimed at, anyone is claiming a larger sphere of free play at the expense of others and against their will (i.e. monopoly or oligopoly).

After this clarification of what freedom — in the social context — is and alone can be, the concept of aggressive force can also be precisely defined. Characteristic for this is not the use of physical means in order to bend the will of an opponent — for this may also take place in the case dramatically opposite to aggressive force, in defence against it. The decisive question is rather whether the "force" is exerted in an aggressive way, in order to overstep, or in a defensive way, in order to defend, the limit of the equal freedom of all. The criterion for aggression and force lies, therefore, in crossing this boundary against the will of those concerned. One should, once more, note that an existing condition also, one which arose in this way, is equal to aggression and force when it is maintained against the will of those concerned.

This offers, for the first time, a reliable and objective criterion, unaffected by all ideological confusion, for differentiating between aggression and defence. Moreover, confusion over the concept of force is also ended.

Coercive and aggressive is every enlargement of one's own sphere of free play (as well as that of others) undertaken at the expense of the equal freedom of others and against their will.

There are people who assert that aggression is a basic human urge. Even if this were the case (it is strongly contested by many and with good reason), it would make it all the more necessary and in the common interest to protect oneself against outside aggression. This can only succeed on a mutual basis — that is to say, when aggression is generally outlawed.

The concept of rule or domination is also often confused to an absurd degree, for instance when one speaks of freedom 'reigning' under certain conditions. Just as one must clearly distinguish aggressive force from defence which is only

answering such force, one must also draw a clear distinction between:

(1) domination in the proper sense (consisting in a state of unequal freedom caused by the aggressive and forceful subjugation of another's will or in defence of a situation caused this way) and

(2) that state of unequal freedom in which one can also speak of "domination" of the one by the other, but in which the disadvantaged freely accepts this situation and even wants it.

In the second case, one should speak of "leadership" rather than of "domination." We have already seen, when explaining the freedom concept, that unequal "freedom" resting on the free consent of the disadvantaged, is not opposed to what is meant by the equal freedom of all. The latter is in no way interfered with when individuals who, for example, subscribe to certain dogmas or beliefs, restrict their own freedom (but not the freedom of others) in favour of those they consider prophets or interpreters of those dogmas or beliefs. This also applies in other cases where the persons concerned seek a guardian or someone to relieve them of their own thinking and decisions.

One can speak of an infringement of the equal freedom for all only in cases of serious fraud by such "leaders." But even then the will of those concerned must be awakened through enlightenment and must resist this fraud before third persons intervene to restore the complete freedom of the victims. Otherwise, their help is uncalled for.

Domination is thus a state of unequal freedom, where the freedom of some is greater than the freedom of the others, at their expense and against their will. Here the result is the same whether such domination is practised on a basis of arbitrariness and the right of the sword, of an individual, or of a group, or in the name of an "ideal," an ideology or a religion (neither of which is recognized by those dominated), or whether it is practised in the name of an abstraction like people, class, State and humanity. For there are always specific individuals or groups who claim, over other individuals or groups, the privilege of giving orders and enforcing their execution. They do this usually "in the name" of "ideals," ideologies, religions or abstractions like those mentioned above.

Anarchism only aims at liberation from such domination. There are, however, people who (because of their own conceptual confusion or willingness to further this confusion) say, "Domination is legitimate when based on the consent of those ruled." Judging by this principle, at least any domination not based on consent would be "illegitimate" — whatever one may understand by this elastic concept which compromises "moral" as well as "legal" condemnation. But we have seen above that guardianship and leadership which meet with the approval of those concerned, and which they themselves desire, have nothing in common with domination in the proper sense. They are completely different concepts. Mixing them up can only result in nonsense.

THE FIXED IDEA OF DOMINATION

Whoever bends another's will by aggressive force in order to establish or maintain a state of unequal freedom, is a practitioner of domination, regardless of whether this happens in his own name and interest, in that of a majority or another collective, or in the name of something allegedly "higher," be it religion, ideology, customs, morals or whatever else. Through this guardianship and violation, he becomes guilty of infringing the equal freedom of all, no matter whether he acted for the purpose of oppression and exploitation or to promote the alleged welfare and interests of those that he coerced.

Imagine a person who shares the opinion, based on deep-rooted habits, that "one should" — even against the will of those concerned and sometimes by force — do whatever corresponds to their "own good" or is "reasonable" (as he imagines this good or reason to be, while the others have quite different opinions on what is good or reasonable for them). This person must also admit that others may dictate and prescribe to him what is strictly opposed to his own wishes and aims, based on exactly the same argument. So he must get it absolutely clear in his mind that he must respect the equal freedom of all others, even in his own interest.

It is therefore merely a fixed idea that social order is possible only through superior (that is to say, dominating) compulsion and force. In this, aggression and defence are confused. Aggressive force disturbs that order which alone can be enduring. True order is possible only in freedom, in the equal freedom of all, for this freedom is not the daughter but the mother of order.

Instead of mutual meddling in the business of others, based on the absurd concepts of unprovable claims, there is only one way of behaviour (which, although not absolutely without conflict, at least does not provoke lasting conflicts): the general prohibition of aggressive force. This is identical with the principle of equal freedom for all — and with non-domination. For in each particular case it can be determined, absolutely value-free and thus objectively, whether or not someone is claiming more freedom of action at the expense of others and against their will.

There are only two kinds of relationships between human beings: one entered into freely, and one coercively enforced. Only the latter violates the borders of equal freedom and disturbs order, whenever, against the will of the person concerned, his equal freedom is restricted, the same freedom as is claimed by the aggressor himself.

Respect for another's will, and refusal to use force against him, admit of only two exceptions: (1) where this will is aggressively directed against the boundaries of the equal freedom of all and (2) where it is a case of incapacity for responsible action, as can happen with children and sick persons, especially the mentally disturbed.

Of course, one may not arbitrarily declare someone a minor or use an

unfounded assumption of irresponsibility as an excuse for aggressive acts.

As for the rest, it is not so important always and absolutely to avoid any aggressive behaviour which may also occur by error or negligence. It is more important that the principle of equal freedom of all should be recognized and that reparations should be made when this principle is broken due to error or neglect. The reaction towards those unwilling to recognize this principle is simple: he who wishes to rely on aggressive force and the right of the sword cannot complain when he gets his just desserts according to his "right."

Domination is an enduring state of aggressive force. It rests on primitive instincts reaching back to the beginnings of human civilization. With primitive peoples one often finds a predominant desire to use force against their fellow creatures and to dominate them. This happens most to achieve domination as an end in itself and often only secondly to gain economic advantages.

Hordes, clans, tribes and peoples live in continuous feuds. Ruling peoples and classes usually combined economic interests with their domination. But their main aspiration was directed towards a social organization that was most effective for political and judicial domination — not towards the economically most effective arrangement of the relations between the ruling and the serving people, the ruling class and the subjected class. The relationship between Spartans and Helotes may serve here as an example. Craving after power often predominated at the price of economic efficiency.

In prehistoric ages and in antiquity it was considered more important to dominate and destroy than to be economical, to produce and to save. This fact, too, must lead to a correction of the one-sided view of Marxism: economic conditions are more the superstructure of the conditions of domination than the reverse.

In particular persons the urge to dominate is strong even today. It is related to, the desire for power and prestige. Its counterpart is the little (or not at all) noticed urge of at least as many people for whom sacrifice and submission have become overwhelming needs. It is primarily they who are supporters of the belief that existing traditional or legal conditions are the only possible and correct ones.

Between these two opposite types stand those who are as unwilling to rule as they unwilling to be ruled. Their motto is: "I belong to nobody but myself and am my own master. I recognize neither a duty to subordinate myself to the will of another nor any kind of right to impose upon the will of another."

Concerning the obsession with power and domination, Dr. Walter Borgius wrote in Radikaler Geist (Radical Spirit), Vol. 1, Berlin, 1930:

"He who remembers this or that teacher of his youth, and how he stood before the motionless class as a cane-wielding dictator on his rostrum; whoever experienced as a soldier the visible pleasure with which the sergeant tormented the recruits delivered over to him; whoever has been dependent on the bureaucracy and has had to suffer the chicanery

of an almighty official and has observed with what blustering and arrogance (especially before the Weimar Republic) many a policeman regulated a crowd of people — that man knows what an intense and immediate pleasure it is for a true power-addict merely to exercise dominating power (even without economic advantage) in the rapturous knowledge: 'I may give you orders, and all of you have to obey me!' "Note, for instance, with what tenacity of purpose most people know how to create or find a position of power from which they may command. The one rules over his family ('Unfortunately, most children under the pretence of a good education become victims of these inevitable impulses to dominate. "Good education" often serves as a pretence to prove one's power", says the renowned psychoanalyst Dr. W. Stekel, quite correctly, in Das liebe Ich — The Beloved Ego, Berlin, 1913, p. 17. He who can't — for example, because his wife is even more domineering than he is — stands over subordinates in his office. Or he may join a club and then fight bitter as well as ridiculous battles as a chairman or treasurer, or against such people. If he succeeds in obtaining a minor position or a small honorary position somehow, even if only as a tramway conductor or ticket collector on the subway, he torments people. If there is no other opportunity he can at least exercise his greed for power on the waiter of his favourite restaurant, or he may get himself a dog. (It is quite probable that the first domestication of animals — which are not always useful — was not motivated by economic or rational considerations, but by the first stirrings of the power impulse.) The pupil, then, who was mistreated by his teachers, mistreats his younger fellows in his turn, as is well known from boarding schools. Leopold von Wiese has described his experiences in military school quite impressively, as has, even more movingly, Major General Dr. Paul Freiherr von Schoenaich:

"... The peculiarity of this impulse is — as with most emotional factors — that its nature is ambivalent and bipolar. Thus it also has its opposite, an urge to submit, to obey, to humiliate oneself. Its physical-sexual basis, sadism, too, is always paired with an undercurrent masochism (and vice versa). Thus, even with expressly domineering and power-hungry persons., we find a parallel current — a tendency to submission and servility — as if the energy used in one direction called for compensation in the other direction.

"It happens quite often that the strict colonel whose frown makes even the higher officers tremble, is an obedient and henpecked husband, or alternatively, the home tyrant plays the role of submissive yes-man at the office.

"Psychologically, the essence of hierarchy lies

in this two-facedness of the power urge: we

know that wherever in social life an institution is

based on the power urge, it always brings a submissive reaction with it. 'Obedience shall be your distinction! Your commanding itself is obedience! To a good soldier, "you shall" sounds more agreeable than "I will." And everything you like, you should do under orders,' said Friedrich Nietzsche, who had a truly deep insight into the power urge. "Thus we find that the most intensive substrata of the impulse to dominate — the armed forces and the Roman Catholic Church — are based on the two-fold demand: whoever wants to exert power most ruthlessly must, at the same time, obey most humbly. This is the type of man that people nowadays mock as a 'bicyclist': he kicks downward while at the same time bowing deeply.

"This type of man — I call him 'archidulic' (worshipping rule) — is the type who is systematically cultivated by the State. He moves into all those professions which allow him to exercise these urges as a direct or indirect State official, in state service proper, mainly in the armed forces, the police and the bureaucracy, but also in schools, the national church, in certain areas of the judiciary, and in such institutions and establishments as assume a similar character because of their size and organization, like large transport enterprises, major banks or big industries."

To the self-evident statements by Dr. Borgius, which an unprejudiced observer can and must confirm with numerous details from his own experience, one must merely add: nobody who is eager to dominate ever fails to support his aggressive actions by his alleged "rights," in a process which psychology calls rationalization. He acquires a suitable ideology which serves as justification for himself and, especially, others. It always makes a great impression on those incapable of judgment when such a man, obsessed by the power mania and addicted to domination, calls himself "the first servant of the State," like Frederick the Great did, and he may honestly feel himself to be such because he has successfully talked himself into the respective ideology. This was also the self-image of Hitler and Stalin (with whom Frederick, who showed several pleasant traits, should not be identified). The one felt called in the name of "destiny," the other as executor of the "goal of world history"; both felt "legitimized" by their ideology as "agents" of a "higher" mission and lacked any sense of responsibility of their own. The same can be said for the henchmen of such bureaucratic murders: they merely carried out something which, in their opinion, their victims were too stupid to realize or incapable of realizing as "necessary." By the autocrats in the chair of the Popes and by the Inquisitors, who humbled themselves in prayers before God and Saints, ideology was "rationalized" by asserting that those sent to the stake were only burnt in their own interest — in order to save their eternal souls and to keep them from further sins. When such people, obsessed by power madness, lived personally in a modest

way because for them not the economic advantage of their power was important but only the satisfaction of the power urge itself, then they were considered idealists or even saints. (One admired, for example, that Hitler did not eat meat, did not smoke or drink, and even sacrificed his family life in order to "serve the people and the State.") Idealism of this kind, however, never made sacrifices for others but rather sacrificed others to a fixed idea. Hitler looked for and found greater satisfaction precisely in quenching his thirst for power in the halo of idealism than in material advantages (which were not too far behind, anyhow). So it was, in reality, not a question of sacrifices but of striving for self-development, an urge inherent in every living being, an urge to gain pleasure through satisfaction of one's strongest impulses.

Those foolish sayings about "benevolent" and "ideal" rulers were originated by the opposite types, those addicted to submission, as well as by collaborators with and profiteers of the obsession with power.

The fixed idea of domination is rooted, indeed, in the impulse of the power urge and in its negative counterpart, but its nourishment and strength are always drawn from a suitable ideology.

Chapter 3

Ideology and Reality of the State

The concept most people have of the State is as unclear and vague as their concept of God. For the majority today the State is, indeed, nothing other than the expression of God in material form.

In the past all church dogmas and claims were accepted without complaint as being self-evident. Likewise, no doubt was permitted concerning the divine right of kings and emperors. Similarly, the State, for the majority today, represents something of such necessity, even holiness, that criticism is directed only against the form of the State, not against its essence — that is, not against the institution itself.

When analyzing the naive as well as blind trust in the State, which is considered the epitome of omnipotence, justice and good will, and when listening to the continuously repeated cry of the many: "The government should do something! The government should help! This should be prohibited!" — one notes that modern mass-man expects a great deal more from the State than even from a loving God. His trust in the State is far more extensive than his confidence in God.

This is based on the following quite simple fact: those who speak of the State do not, usually, think of what the State actually is (of which they have, moreover, only a hazy notion). Neither do they think of the historical reality of the State. From its growth one could conclude its origin from Satan rather than from God. Instead, they always think only of what the State should be, according to the mostly very subjective wishes of those concerned. There are numerous more or less contradictory ideologies concerning the State, i.e. mental images of what the person concerned desires as an ideal social order, a sort of desired heavenly state. These are mostly rather foggy notions and usually do not take into consideration what the State actually can be and can do. A parliamentarian once commented on this problem: "Everybody wants to live at the expense of the State, and nobody thinks of the fact that the State lives at the expense of everyone."

The State is a typical example of an institution which developed its ideological character out of its religiously-based origins. This is shown by the reliance of absolute monarchs on the "divine right of kings" and, likewise, by the claims of popes to supremacy over monarchs. The same applies to democracies with their claim to governmental power "deriving from the people," once "people," "nation" and "fatherland" succeeded the monarchs and the other feudal lords, who all claimed divine "rights." These new concepts thus became gods and idols,

demanding many millions of human sacrifices — infinitely more than the greatest idolatry of the barbarians, which only demanded an individual human occasionally. The "sovereignty" and "holiness" of the "people" (whoever doubts them is a traitor to his fatherland!) is nowadays far more uncontested than the holiness of religion once was. Today, "in the service of the people," property, blood and life are continuously demanded as sacrifices, while only occasionally is such a demand still made in the name of religion. The "people" are here equated with the State, by means of a horse dealer's trick performed by those who act as the executives of this abstraction. In this, the State claims "holiness" (inviolability) for itself. What, then, is the State really?

"The State is the guardian of the order established by God. The worldly task of a man is to preserve it" — was still the comment of the supreme court judge Fabian von Schlabrendorff, as late as 1972.

Tolstoi once said: "The most gruesome and dangerous superstition is the fatherland, the State."

Even the Father of the Church, Augustine, described the State as a gang of robbers, and although the Roman Catholic Church has often made pacts with the State, it has never submitted to it.

It is well known that Nietzsche called the State the most cold-blooded of all monsters, but it is only little known that the former president of the United States, Herbert Hoover, in a speech made in 1956, declared it to be the most dangerous threat to mankind, not only in countries with a totalitarian State but also in countries with a formal democracy!

"A herd of blond beasts of prey," said Nietzsche," a race of conquerors and lords, trained for war and with superior organizational ability, lays its terrible claws on a population that may be far superior in numbers but is yet formless and indecisive. This is the beginning of the 'State' on earth."

"The State, as distinct from the tribe," said Lester Ward, "begins with the conquest of one race by another one."

"Everywhere," says Franz Oppenheimer, "a war-like barbaric tribe breaks through the borders of a less martial people, settles as its aristocracy and establishes its State."

"Forces," says Ratzenhofer, "founded the State."

"The State," says Gumplowicz, "is the result of conquest, the establishment of the victors as the dominating class over the defeated."

"The State," says Sumner," is the result of force and is maintained by force." This is the judgment of sociologists and historians.

As a member of the German Parliament, Richard von Weizsaecker, remarked on this in Die Zeit (The Times) of October 27,1972: "The State is not the only order and by no means total order. It is no consecrated super-ego and does not possess the power of final appeal. However, in all preliminary matters in this world, it has the task to serve man as a supportive power and to make self-realization and freedom, especially the freedom of the weak, possible."

One can and must agree with his first two sentences. Freedom, however, can be nothing other than equal freedom for all (as we have already seen in the previous chapter). One cannot speak of freedom when the freedom of one man is larger than the freedom of others, at their expense and against their will. A

condition of equal freedom for all is the only alternative to aggressive force. In order to achieve and maintain this condition, only a purely defensive organization is needed, one that only outlaws any aggressive force and strictly abstains from it. Such an organization does not need any supreme ruler, who would be a contradiction and antithesis to this.

Richard von Weizsaecker failed to recognize that the State does not at all wish to be a servant but rather a master. It claims for itself a privilege of aggressive force (which he calls "monopoly of force") for the realization of all the ideologies and oppressive, as well as patronizing intentions, cherished by those manipulating the levers of the machinery of the State, or rather, of those who give them instructions. Usually they do not know what they are really doing — for their ideological blindness deprives them of a clear perspective.

Through its laws the State legitimizes numerous aggressive and violent acts. In other words, these acts overstep the borders of equal freedom for all and are applied against the will of those concerned. Its aggression — carried out for its own advantage and the advantage of particular groups, against other groups and also against all individuals — is called the "rule of law." At the same time the State describes mere defence against such violent acts (i.e. the defence of the equal freedom of all) as "violence" and prosecutes it, supported by its monopoly of force.

The State never confines itself exclusively to the role of a servant of individuals, to the defence of the equal freedom of all. It does this only as a sideline in special cases which follow directly from the principle of the equal freedom of all (e.g. murder, manslaughter, bodily injury, rape, robbery, theft, extortion) and this, so to speak, only as a cover. For primarily, it establishes and maintains itself in a position of usurped over-lordship — through enlarging the liberties of some at the expense of the freedom of others and against their will and by limiting everybody's freedom for its own advantage.

Since von Weizsaecker recognized quite correctly that the State is not the only form of social order, he should have informed himself about other forms, e.g. in the works of John Henry Mackay, who explains in Der Freiheitsucher (The Freedomseeker), Berlin, 1920:

"What is the State? — A number of people declare a piece of the earth's

surface — a certain area — including all that exists above and beneath to be

their property and give it the name of a State.

"The inhabitants of this area are called 'nation' or 'people' and it

surrounds them with its borders, making a 'fatherland.'

"All people living within these borders, i.e. the citizens or subjects, are

subordinated to whatever laws are, for the time being, applied in this State.

Whoever does not respect these laws voluntarily, is compelled to do so

through the use of force. Accordingly, the State is based on force. "The State is not the only form of human association. There are others

which can be summed up under the name 'society.'

"Now, what is 'society?'

"As its name already expresses, it is an 'association,' the union of a smaller or larger number of people for a certain purpose — basically nothing other than a club. Where two people come together, even if simply for a conversation, they form a society. The forms of these societies and associations are as different as their purposes can be.

"But what is the difference between State and society?

"It is this: that the latter is a free association while the former is not.