From: "John Zube" To: "Thomas H. Greco, Jr." References: <01f701c234f3$9f144c00$d650c043@v4dq1> <000701c24f3c$40a85180$553ecacb@e1d9k7> <008a01c252ae$24f63ea0$399db3d1@v4dq1> Subject: 020909 Greco - Batch 4 of 7 of FB notes & copy of e-mail re terrorism and counter-terrorism Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2002 18:43:06 +1000 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0006_01C25830.BC95BEC0" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2600.0000 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2600.0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0006_01C25830.BC95BEC0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Dear Thomas, another correction chore is over, in its first stage. Result attached. And appended is an e-mail on the current international crisis for which territorial governments have only the usual non-solution. PIOT, John. ========================================================================= Dear fellow freedom, peace and justice lovers, it hardly matters WHO was the main organizer of this terrorist attack. What matters is WHY was it undertaken at all, even in a suicidal way, by its activists? Both, terrorism and counter-terrorism are still motivated by the immoral principles and practices of: 1.) "collective responsibility" as opposed to "individual responsibility 2.) territorialism", as opposed to exterritorial autonomy for all volunteer communities 3.) of monetary & financial despotism as opposed to monetary freedom and of the consequences of this despotism. Firstly, Under "collective responsibility" non-thinking - now a large scale military attack on Iraq or Bagdad or the people or all armed forces of Saddam Hussein's regime is planned, rather than a tyrannicide or police action against a criminal or an execution attempt, commando-style, against S.H. A billion on his head or $ 2 billion (if he can be captured alive and brought before an international court of justice) would be a bargain compared with the financial and blood costs of a war. See the proposals of the former Chancellor of England, Sir Thomas Moore, in his chapter On War, in his famous Utopia, 1516. - If Lenin, Stalin, Mussolini, Hitler, Mao etc. had been executed in time ... O's head or capture would probably be "worth" much less. Did anyone open a subscription list? Compare also the ancient tradition of "outlawry" and that of Vhemic courts in that connection. Yes, to that extent I do also favour going after the main culprits. In response, the lives of some of our republican and democratic politicians might also be more endangered by terrorist attacks, in these cases more aptly termed assassination attempts, than they were before. Who cares? Such risks come as part of their jobs. I do care more about soldiers and officers unnecessarily killed upon both sidesm, as mere pawns, and about the still larger numbers of civilian victims of wars (collateral damages etc.) - and of continuing oppressive regimes. See the researches and publications of Prof. Rummel, who, by the way, needs help in publishing his voluminous outputon this on a CD-ROM. Secondly, the regime of S.H., and those of others, could be much easier overthrown if exterritorial autonomy for all volunteer communities were our rightful war or rather liberation aim, part of our well developed and publicized libertarian revolution platform and also our daily demonstrated self-governmental practice. It could come to release all decentralist forces against S.H. and combine them upon a common and rightful platform, one that would give no one and no group any moral or utilitarian reason to complain. Non-criminal supporters of his regime should also be free to set up their own volunteer community, only exterritorially autonomous, but after the experience with his regime they ought to be deprived, at least for many years, of all military weapons, not only mass murder devices. Alas, this wasn't even our and the U.S. government's platform for Afghanistan, which is still more obviously split into numerous warring factions. Thirdly, How many terrorists would exist if full monetary and financial freedom were introduced, initially only somewhere in the world, intelligently used and publicized and thereby rapidly spread, achieving soon full employment, even for millions of refugees and displaced persons, and an end to deflations, inflations, stagflations, depressions and crises and all the poverty they cause? The collapse of monetary despotism - and of its consequences - might then occur even more rapidly than the final breakdown of the Berlin Wall and of the Iron Curtain did. - How long could, e.g., the Red Chinese regime remain in power - if its up to 200 million unemployed and under-employed engaged in a peaceful monetary freedom revolution and thus supplied themselves with productive and paid work and solved the sales problem not only for labor but also for services and goods and produce in the process? Monetary disobedience has an ancient tradition in China. A properly financed revolution or military insurrection in China, with a comprehensive libertarian program, for the financing of such actions as well, could lead to a bloodless or almost bloodless overthrow of the regime. However, among its platform points must also be: Any form of communism and socialism may be continued - but only among their voluntary supporters and at their expense. Otherwise: capitalism for consenting aduls and any other ism etc., likewise. Could e.g. the North Korean regime and Castro's withstand such a liberation program? Need I stress that these 3 points would also offer the major solution to the remaining problems in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Africa etc., etc.? How come that libertarians have so far not yet fully and systematically tackled them and published their findings and proposals, with all the required technical details? This in spite of e.g. CD-ROM blanks being offered for as little as 39 cents and CD-ROM drives for as little as $ 149? Please, do consider all the radical libertarian alternatives, quite seriously and tolerantly. And do help assembling and publishing all of them, via a libertarian encyclopedia and ideas archive, using all the strengths and advantages of alternative media. I see our job as libertarians not in seeking and blaming culprits but in offering libertarian solutions to acute problems. This requires the use of affordable and efficient alternative media, like microfiche, floppy disks and CD-ROMs, in addition to prints, tapes, e-mail and websites. PIOT, John Zube. (Panarchy In Our Time or: To each the government or non-governmental society of his or her dreams. There are now 24 microfiche in the subseries ON PANARCHY and a relevant website has been established: www.panarchy.org.) P.S.: I have not counted how many monetary freedom texts have been reproduced in my series. They and others should also be combined on one or several CD-ROMs. However, I have so far found only all too few texts against the notions and practices of "collective responsibility". - J.Z. ========================================================================== Alas, my list of interested people and groups comes so far only to 134 entries and it seems that it has still not been placed on a popular website. ========================================================================= ----- Original Message ----- From: Nizam Ahmad To: jzube@acenet.com.au ; jwd3@dehnbase.org ; catallaxy@yahoo.com ; mfarac@tin.it ; hq@lp.org ; louiejack1@netzero.net ; offshore@costarica.net ; goldengroup@racsa.co.cr ; pokret@eunet.yu ; amogu51@hotmail.com ; fatalbeat@netzero.net ; pregentil@aol.com ; steve@kubby.com ; hecnau@yahoo.com ; wildwoman1@compuserve.com ; rest@earthlink.net ; d_f_rhodes@hotmail.com ; cnsyeager@juno.com ; Howard R Olson Sent: Sunday, September 08, 2002 3:28 PM Subject: Re: Taliban warned Bush about 9/11 Informative reading. However, liberal Muslims in Bangladesh, do not at all believe Osama as the 9-11 culprit because that savage attack was too sophisticated beyond a cave dweller to mastermind and execute from Afghanistan. The resource and the ability for such precision terrorist attack is possessed, in our reasoning, by the Western world intelligence agencies including Israel's Mossad. Osama, like Saddam are the scapegoats for these powerful States to become super-states. Regards, Nizam ----- Original Message ----- From: Howard R Olson To: nizam@bdmail.net ; jzube@acenet.com.au ; jwd3@dehnbase.org ; catallaxy@yahoo.com ; mfarac@tin.it ; hq@lp.org ; louiejack1@netzero.net ; offshore@costarica.net ; goldengroup@racsa.co.cr ; pokret@eunet.yu ; amogu51@hotmail.com ; fatalbeat@netzero.net ; pregentil@aol.com ; steve@kubby.com ; hecnau@yahoo.com ; wildwoman1@compuserve.com ; rest@earthlink.net ; d_f_rhodes@hotmail.com ; cnsyeager@juno.com Sent: Sunday, September 08, 2002 2:17 AM Subject: Taliban warned Bush about 9/11 Bush was warned weeks before the 9/11 attack.See the enclosed file! H =========== I got only code on trying to open the attachment and wasn't anyhow, much interest in such news.When did governments ever act rightfully and sensibly on correct information? That would be rather the exception than the rule. Nevertheless, statism persists as a religion. - John. ------=_NextPart_000_0006_01C25830.BC95BEC0 Content-Type: application/msword; name="fbcompi4SorRTF.rtf" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="fbcompi4SorRTF.rtf" {\rtf1\ansi\ansicpg1252\uc1 = \deff0\deflang1033\deflangfe1033{\fonttbl{\f0\froman\fcharset0\fprq2{\*\p= anose 02020603050405020304}Times New = Roman;}{\f2\fmodern\fcharset0\fprq1{\*\panose = 02070309020205020404}Courier New;} {\f16\froman\fcharset238\fprq2 Times New Roman = CE;}{\f17\froman\fcharset204\fprq2 Times New Roman = Cyr;}{\f19\froman\fcharset161\fprq2 Times New Roman = Greek;}{\f20\froman\fcharset162\fprq2 Times New Roman Tur;} {\f21\froman\fcharset186\fprq2 Times New Roman = Baltic;}{\f28\fmodern\fcharset238\fprq1 Courier New = CE;}{\f29\fmodern\fcharset204\fprq1 Courier New = Cyr;}{\f31\fmodern\fcharset161\fprq1 Courier New = Greek;}{\f32\fmodern\fcharset162\fprq1 Courier New Tur;} {\f33\fmodern\fcharset186\fprq1 Courier New = Baltic;}}{\colortbl;\red0\green0\blue0;\red0\green0\blue255;\red0\green25= 5\blue255;\red0\green255\blue0;\red255\green0\blue255;\red255\green0\blue= 0;\red255\green255\blue0;\red255\green255\blue255; \red0\green0\blue128;\red0\green128\blue128;\red0\green128\blue0;\red128\= green0\blue128;\red128\green0\blue0;\red128\green128\blue0;\red128\green1= 28\blue128;\red192\green192\blue192;}{\stylesheet{\nowidctlpar\widctlpar\= adjustright \fs20\lang2057\cgrid=20 \snext0 Normal;}{\*\cs10 \additive Default Paragraph = Font;}{\s15\nowidctlpar\widctlpar\adjustright \f2\fs20\lang2057\cgrid = \sbasedon0 \snext15 Plain Text;}}{\info{\author John Zube}{\operator = John Zube}{\creatim\yr2002\mo9\dy9\hr18\min21} {\revtim\yr2002\mo9\dy9\hr18\min27}{\version2}{\edmins6}{\nofpages68}{\no= fwords57898}{\nofchars330020}{\*\company Libertarian Microfiche = Publ.}{\nofcharsws405287}{\vern71}}\paperw11906\paperh16838\margl397\marg= r397\margt397\margb397=20 \widowctrl\ftnbj\aenddoc\makebackup\formshade\viewkind4\viewscale101\view= zk2\pgbrdrhead\pgbrdrfoot \fet0\sectd = \linex0\headery1440\footery1440\colsx709\sectdefaultcl = {\*\pnseclvl1\pnucrm\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxta = .}}{\*\pnseclvl2 \pnucltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxta = .}}{\*\pnseclvl3\pndec\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxta = .}}{\*\pnseclvl4\pnlcltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxta = )}}{\*\pnseclvl5\pndec\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxtb (}{\pntxta = )}}{\*\pnseclvl6 \pnlcltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxtb (}{\pntxta = )}}{\*\pnseclvl7\pnlcrm\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxtb (}{\pntxta = )}}{\*\pnseclvl8\pnlcltr\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang{\pntxtb (}{\pntxta = )}}{\*\pnseclvl9\pnlcrm\pnstart1\pnindent720\pnhang {\pntxtb (}{\pntxta )}}\pard\plain = \sb120\sa120\nowidctlpar\widctlpar\adjustright \fs20\lang2057\cgrid { \par }\pard\plain \s15\qj\sb120\sa120\nowidctlpar\widctlpar\adjustright = \f2\fs20\lang2057\cgrid {\f0\fs24 AAA fbcompi4.}{\f0\fs24 = SORrtf}{\f0\fs24=20 \par AAA Introduction: The accumulated wisdom, experiences with,\- = arguments, refutations of arguments and proposals and ideas and = \-theories, speculations, hypotheses etc. on money cannot be\- sufficiently expressed in a few pages or, sufficiently, in short = dogmatic\- statements. Here only a few personal notes and selected = quotes on \-monetary freedom and monetary despotism are offered, \- alphabetized, appealing for corrections and supplementation by anyone = interested, p}{\f0\fs24 re}{\f0\fs24 ferably via disked entries in RTF = or e-mail. - My\- memory and attention span are rather limited. I can't = easily or \- at all remember the ideas and arguments of previous pages,\- chapters or = of whole books. But what I can remembers, dissect and \-reassemble, = sometimes in a different way and meaning, are \-particular points of = view, terms, ideas and arguments. These I \- can somewhat deal with, piecemeal, point by point. Their \-alphabetical = arrangement, under catchwords, for reference \-purposes and later = re-writing or editing, correction and supplementation, whenever I feel = like it, is a help intended \- primarily for myself. If, alternatively, they remain spread,\- unsorted = and forgotten for years, over hundreds to thousands of\- slips of paper, = and in numerous manila files, then their thought contents is not as = accessible \- to myself, for my own purposes, as I would wish it to be. \-Secondly, I = do hope that such an arrangement, rather than a\- systematic treatise, = which I have only rarely tried to provide, \- will help others, too. They do not have to remember the whole monetary = freedom\- system or read and study a whole and systematic book on it. = They can tackle entries that \-interest them and follow up related = points, if they want to,\- without having to read the whole book, laboriously, page by page,\- = chapter by chapter, thus possibly getting turned of}{\f0\fs24 = f}{\f0\fs24 and \-forgetting most of what they have read, because it = was not of \-p rimary interest to them. Moreover, I intend to offer this book \-as an = unfinished work, one to be gradually improved and\- supplemented by any = of its readers who have something to\- contribute to it or believe that = they do. The errors on money and \- related subjects are almost as important as the truths are, for \-so far = they have dominated our beliefs and actions in this sphere. So all of = them should be registered and refuted, as best\- as we can at present. That is a job much too large for a single = \-person to tackle. But, it does not matter how many pages the \-total = effort will take. The more people participate in this \- co-writing and co-editing, the better. Microfiche, floppy disks,\- text = only CD-ROMs and other modern media have all the pages and\- volume = space required, and this at prices almost everyone could\- afford. If = the publication would have to be done by a\- conventional publisher, at his risk and expense, then, if\- interested = in this work at all, he would, probably, have to \-insist that it be = confined to no more than 500 pages. - In this\- open and participatory format it might finally come to 5,000 or even = 50,000 pages. Never mind. Not all would want to possess and use the = unabridged version. But everyone would be\- free to offer his own = abridged version, if he likes to do so. - \- No one has the time and energy to read all the writings on money. = \-There are endless repetitions of basic truths and, still more = \-numerous, endless repetition of basic errors in them. Here the \-basic = truths can be gradually proven=20 and popularised and the\- basic errors stated and gradually be = confronted with the best \-refutations so far found for them. - For = style and good English \-and always correct spelling and punctuation = look somewhere else. \- Likewise, for a comprehensive handbook on banking and finance and \-all = their terms and practices. This effort is confined to monetary\- and = financial freedom notions, ideas, proposals and practices and errors on = these subjects. -\- Help me, please, to catch most of these truths and refute most of = \-these errors, in as concise, convincing, popular and interesting\- way = as you can manage. If you have some relevant jokes to offer, \- to lighten the reading load, by all means, do so to. If you can\- chop = up my often all to long sentences into clearer and shorter\- ones, by = all means, do so, under your own name, or offer clear\- abstracts of what I tried to say. Never mind repetitions on this = \-subject. They are as likely to occur as they occur in oral\- = discussions. Any truth needs repeated statements to finally sink into = enough heads. And refutations need also frequent\- repetitions, since errors are almost forever repeated, again and = \-again. Fiche etc. have space for numerous repetitions. Easy \-reading = and concise versions can be provided later by anyone who \-can and will = do so. - J. Z., 23.4.97. \par AAA TITLE SUGGESTION: A - Z of FREE BANKING. Attempts to define = \-and explain aspects of monetary freedom and monetary despotism\- = alphabetically, with some cross references. An open book, not\- copyrighted, inviting and welcoming corrections and supplements\- from = anyone. Also a list of literature and addresses of interested = individuals and organizations. To serve as a handbook \-and clearing = centre for views on this subject. Ultimately, to \- include ideas, plans and projects on how to best and most easily = \-introduce monetary freedom for all who desire it for themselves. \-- = J. Z., n.d., 28.4.97. \par AAA TITLE SUGGESTIONS: Talking to myself and to imaginary = \-discussion partners about monetary freedom in attempts to clarify\- = doubtful points and counteract popular errors, absorbing as much = \-wisdom as possible from others on this, through quoting them \-e extensively and ordering this compilation merely by\- = alphabetisation under catchwords. \par ABILITY TO PAY & INABILITY TO PAY, BOTH UNDER MONETARY FREEDOM\- = AND UNDER MONETARY DESPOTISM, SHOULD BE SEPARATELY CONSIDERED: \-... \par ABILITY TO PAY & INTEREST RATES: The ability to pay ANY interest = \-rates or not is often more important than the fact of either \-high or = low interest rates. High interest rates do not matter as \- much when sales are easy to achieve, profit margins are high and\- do = not merely represent, to a large extent, high inflation rates. \-Low = interest rates are not an encouragement to take up loans and to\- increase production when customers are missing, sales are low and = \-factories work only at a fraction of their potential, while = \-unemployment is high. Nor do low interest rates CAUSE inflation \-or = do=20 high interest rates CAUSE a deflation. To judge the economy\- and = economic developments only by interest rates, especially only \-the = interest rates for monopoly and forced currencies, is almost \- as one-sided as is phrenology, in trying to determine a person's\- = capabilities and character merely from the shape of his skull. -\- J. = Z., 22.4.97. \par ABILITY TO PAY, IOU'S & CLEARING: Pay your debts with = \-acknowledgments of your debts. And back up your debt certificates\- = with your ability and readiness to supply goods, services and \-labour = for them. Fully acknowledge your own debt certificates \- when offered to you in payment by anyone, at any time (when they \-are = currency, not capital debt certificates). Choose whatever\- value = standard unit is acceptable to you and your creditors and do \-price all = your offers in these units. Then, by accepting your\- IOUs back, from anyone, you will have = cleared what you owed to\- others against what some others owed to you. = And neither of you\- will have had to own or use a single gold or = silver-coin in the\- process - as a means of payment or cover or guarantee. Such coins,\- in = the hands of others, freely rated and traded, would just be \-your = reckoning units, for your means of payment, not your means \- of payment themselves. To that extent you would be independent of = \-their availability to you, in coin form. - J. Z., 30.9.94, 17.4.97. \par AIRLINE MONEY: Air transport, at least in some countries, and\- = internationally, is to a large extent replacing shipping, railway\- and = road transport. Thus it could, like other transport \-facilities, issue = its own competing currencies, mobilising more\- of its so far unused capacity, while helping to provide sound\- = supplementary currencies. - Air lines are considered as rich and \- powerful but, under monetary despotism they are still struggling and = many have failed, if not government subsidised or granted\- privileges. = Nevertheless, so far and as faras I know, no struggling airline has = seriously con sidered becoming a note or service \-certificate issuer and used its = influence upon government\- legislators to permit such self-help = actions. - J. Z., 22.4.97, J.Z., 7.9.02.. \par AMERICAN OPINION, June 1983, contains an article of free banking = \-interest, critical of Social Credit. \par As a facilitator of exchanges and of sound value reckoning, it\- = would not be neutral at all but the most essential factor in all\- = economies based on division of labour and free exchange. - As \- opposed to this, the monies of monetary despotism are not neutral \-but = oppressive, distorting, interventionist, expropriating and\- destructive = and preventative of many peaceful and productive\- exchanges, definitely = not "neutral" o r helpful. - J. Z., 28.6.94,\-22.4. 97. \par ASSET CURRENCIES: Assets have no real currency - except e.g.\-, = among brokers, financiers and real estate agencies - and those\- who = happen to be in the market for some assets, for a while and to some = extent, with a fraction of their earnings. -\- J. Z., 23.4.97. \par ASSET CURRENCIES: The only assets which asset currencies could\- = effectively move are capital assets and capital securities. E.g., = \-mortgage letters can move large mortgages, which otherwise would\- not be as easily transferable. But asset currencies do not \-represent = and cannot, therefore, easily transfer ready for sale\- goods, services = and labour. These require currencies based upon\- them. - Only when all other currencies are effectively outlawed \-can = any monopolistic asset currency somewhat replace them, in\- spite of its = unsound foundation for currency purposes. Rather \-than doing without monetary exchanges altogether, people would \-then even = accept an asset currency - up to a fraction of all the \-capital assets, = without responding to the asset currency issue \-with inflated price and = wage demands. (These price and wage\- increases would not indicate a dearness of goods and labour but a = depreciation of the forced and exclusive "asset currency" imposed \-upon = them. - J. Z., 6.4.94, 24.4.97. \par AUDITOR, Periodical published by WESTRUP, ALFRED B., for free = \-banking. At least 2 issues appeared. I have not seen any yet. -\- J. = Z., 28.4.97. \par AUSTRALIAN MADE, BUY AUSTRALIAN: Permit the owners of all\- = "Australian Made" goods to issue goods-warrants and purchasing = \-certificates as well as clearing certificates based upon combined\- = goods and service offers, for goods and services that are=20 in daily \-demand by consumers, and allow wages, salaries and other = debts to\- be paid in them, if the acceptance is voluntary and then, to = the\- extent that such alternative monies will be readily accepted, the = \- purchasers will buy goods made in Australia with money freely \-made and = freely valued, accepted and spent in Australia. To the extent that = such\- private vouchers, in money denominations, can be freely issued,\- they will stream back with much greater certainty to the issuer \-and = his debtors, for their goods and services and labour, than \-any rare = metal coins or legal tender money spent by them. They \- will be busy and employed and achieve sales to the extent that\- they = can issue their "tickets" and get them readily accepted.\- Moreover, = they are morally entitled to thus offer their own \-property in a = monetised form. No government owns them and their=20 \-property and stocks and services and labour for sale. Thus no = \-government is morally authorised to issue assignments upon their = \-property, for which, in the act of issue, it has to give nothing\- in return but a scrap of printed paper and the option to use this \-in = payment of tax tributes which it extorts from its tax slaves. = \-Government cannot provide such a soundly based money. It can only = \-requisition, with i ts paper money, the real redemption fund for \-any currency in any = country, one that belongs to the producers\- and traders themselves: the = ready for sale goods, services and \-labour. - The Australian = nationalists should seriously consider \- how free and independent they are when they are only allowed to buy = their goods, services and labour provided by Australians with \-the = monopolised and forced paper money by a single privileged and \- legalized despotic institution in Australia, its central bank,\- called = the Reserve Bank. - Why should all Australians, for all\- their economic = activities, have to depend upon its good will and\- abilities - if any - and this in spite of all the evidence that\- = speaks against any central bank? - When and to the extent that\- = Australians can issue their own competing and optional \- currencies, they will, inevitably, "buy Australian!" - The same applies = for competitively issued international clearing\- certificates that can = only be used, after imports have been paid\- for with them, to pur chase Australian export goods. - With government paper money, often = under a controlled exchange rate,\- and with foreign central banks mad = enough to hoard such notes, as "\-foreign exchange reserves" or foreign = private citizens being \- inclined to hoard such notes, because they are better than the \-still = more inflated paper currency of the own government, the \-reflux of such = paper money as purchasing certificates for\- Australian goods, is much = less certain. - To speed up the reflux\- and make it more regular, all internal and external clearing\- = certificates and goods and service-warrants should also be given\- a = limited life span only, for 3 months to 12 months at most, thus \- appealing to the self-interest of the holders to redeem them in\- = Australian goods, services and labour within that period. -Alas, \-this = kind of "buy Australian" with competing Australian monies,\- is not yet popular. - Help to make it so. - J. Z., 5.10.93,\- 24.4.97. \par BANKERS & MONETARY FREEDOM OR FREE BANKING: You can no longer\- = bank on bankers. They will neither give you the highest interest \-nor = credit when you need it most, nor can they protect you from inflation or = from credit restrictions and deflations, nor \- from direct tax raids by governments, nor from the prying eyes of = bureaucrats. They have let themselves be deprived of the business\- of = note issue and have let the capital market become \-over-regulated. They = know by now almost nothing about sound note=20 \-issue techniques nor do they show any interest in them. They help = \-the government to "invest" part of your savings in governmental\- = "insecurities", which you or your children and grandchildren then have = the honour, \-later on, to repay in parts, out of your taxes, or in depreciated \-currency. = They have become mere agents for the government's \-despotic monetary = policy. You can rely on them only in one respect: They \-will firmly = resist, together with the government, all your \- attempts to go into competition with them, opening competitive \-and = note-issuing banks and clearing centres, practising sound \-free banking = principles and all aspects of financial freedom. - J. Z., 12.7.78, = \-24.4.97, 8.9.02. \par BANKERS, CREDIT & MORAL CHARACTER: Bankers perform the function\- = of the commercial virtues by demonstrating and advancing the \-pecuniary = value of a good moral character. - Henry Meulen, THE \-INDIVIDUALIST, = 10/75. - With their demand for securities or=20 \-guarantors for loans, governmental guarantees and deposit \-insurance, = bankers have either betted only on a sure thing or\- have become so = careless to lend=20 even to despotic foreign governments, not only some wasteful and = inefficient large private corporations. Their own government would not = allow them to fail, regardless of the huge number of bad debts they = managed to "expertly" acquire. They do no\- longer have to be good judges of business opportunities or of good\- = moral character. A successful fraud was a often a better investment for = \-them, at least temporarily, even if, finally, he cheated the bank = itself. Personal loans have \- become only a very small fraction of the total loan accounts. In judging = their security the assessors of personal loan\- companies were, for many = decades and probably still, much more competent. Bankers also refused = the mini-development loans now \- becoming popular in underdeveloped countries, although they have\- a = very low risk. The student loans, while self-administered, had\- also a = better chance of being repaid than most bank loans had and\- have. - The number of bankers who really understood the note \-issue = business and who conducted their deposit and savings \-accounts quite = honestly has always been rather small. They were \-mostly more gamblers = and high risk taking speculators than sound \- investors, at the expense of their note holders, depositors - or = \-the taxpayers. - The insistence of bankers on securities for\- loans = has been satirised by the remark: "Bankers lend money only \- to those who can prove that they do not need it". - Moreover, the \-fact = that a special insurance is required for cashiers does also \-seem to = indicate that those who employ them are not good in\- assessing their moral characters, either. - And how many bankers \-do = you know who have anything sensible to say on inflation,\- deflation, = stagflation, legal tender, the money monopoly,\- devaluation or = re-valuation? - Mostl y the good reputation of bankers is as unearned as that of politicians = is. - J. Z., 18. 4.\-97. \par BANKING PRINCIPLE: For me it is hard to comprehend how long two = \-(or more) different scientific schools of thought can co-exist, \-side = by side, without their differences becoming settled, or,\- worse still, how representatives of especially the ruling school\- of = thought can simply ignore the facts and arguments advanced by\- their = critics, as the currency school did, largely, versus the\- banking school and as is still being done today by various groups of = "gold bugs" or "100% dollars". - Admittedly, much of the thinking of the = free banking \-school was flawed, too. E.g., many of its members did, = unnecessarily and without\- sufficient justification, adopt the obligation for rare metal = convertibility for the issuer, although the banking principle or the = real bills\- doctrine indicated already the real cover involved as the = only\- cover required. - It is often not just one or two different views\- = that are mostly or habitually ignored but sometimes hundreds, if\- not = thousands. E.g., there are hundreds of different crisis \-theories and = typ es of socialism. Nevertheless, most write on\- crises and socialism as = if only their own favourite example of \-them did exist and were = possible or worth talking and writing\- about. How often have primitive notions on trust or confidence in = currencies, as one of their basic requirements, been\- thoughtlessly = repeated, without mentioning the reflux and clearing foundation that is = involved in short-term turnover \- loans, which do not have to be covered by gold stocks at all but \-are, = like all debts and credits, clearable. There remain so many \-unsettled = questions among freedom lovers, e.g. limited\- governments vs. = anarchism, territorialism vs. exterritorialism,=20 \-abortion vs. right to life, mercenary defence vs. militia\- defence, = nuclear weapons strength and deterrence, vs. nuclear \-weakness and all = the possible failures of nuclear deterrence. The \- money, currency, credit, clearing and value standard discussion \-is = full of arguments still unsettled by libertarians and\- anarchists. - = J. Z., 31.7.82, 24.4.97. - It i s high time to tackle all these differences of opinion fully and = systematically and draw their balance sheets. - Our very survival may = depend upon it. - J. Z., 8.9.02. \par BANKRUPTCY LAWS: "Would BANKRUPTCY LAWS be permissible in a = \-libertarian legal system? Clearly not, for bankruptcy laws compel\- = the discharge of a debtor's voluntarily contracted debts, and\- thereby invade the property rights of the creditors. The debtor\- who = refuses to pay his debt has stolen the property of the \-creditor. If = the debtor is able to pay but conceals his assets, \- then his clear act of theft is compounded by fraud. But if the = \-defaulting debtor is not able to pay, he has STILL stolen the = \-property of the creditor by not making his agreed-upon delivery of the = creditor's property. The function of the legal system\- should then be to enforce payment upon the debtor through, e.g.,\- = forced attachment of the debtor's future income for the debt \-plus the = damages and interest on the continuing debt. Bankruptcy\- laws, which discharge the debt in defiance of the property rights\- of = the creditor, virtually confer a license to steal upon the\- debtor. In = the pre-modern era, the defaulting debtor was \-generally treated as a = thief and forced to pay as he acquired=20 \-income. Doubtless, the penalty of imprisonment went far beyond = \-proportional punishment and hence was excessive;" (even when he was a = fraudulent debtor and cheated people for millions? - J. Z.)\- "but at = least the old legal ways placed responsibility where it \-belonged : on the debtor to fulfil his = contractual obligations \-and to make the transfer of the property owed = to the\- creditor-owner. One historian of American bankruptcy law, = though a \- supporter of these laws, has conceded that they trample on the = \-property rights of the creditors." - Murray N. Rothbard, The\- Ethics = of Liberty, 142. - Here is Rothbard at his best, in \-exposing a wrong. = Alas, he does not conclude that the willing\- debtor ought to be enabled, as far as possible, to clear his debt by = clearing, in the interest of the debtor and the creditor alike, even = \-if, for this purpose, he could offer nothing but his own monetised = IOU's,\- based upon his own continued goods and service offers and even if = \-these would suffer a considerable discount, so that he would have \- to offer correspondingly more of them to make up the total debt, = accounted in a sound value standard. - Rothbard would be likely to\- = condemn such issues as mere fraudulent "fiat money" issues, even\- if = such=20 a payment were acceptable to the creditor or to an\- arbitrator that = debtor and creditor had agreed upon. Thus,\- Rothbard, instead of making = debt settlement easier via the right \-to clearing debts, would make the = debt settlement harder to \- impossible to achieve, by insisting upon debt payment only in \-gold = metal or 100% gold-metal-covered gold certificates. These the debtors = are often \-unable to obtain at all or in the required quantities and = whenever needed and that \- would apply also to his own debtors. Thus the debt settlement is \- prevented rather than promoted. (To a large extent the bankruptcy laws = were passed in recognition of such facts, such payment difficulties, = even for quite honest and efficient debtors. - J. Z., 8.902.) Indeed, = Rothbard assumes that, in\- case of a shortage of gold, all prices, expressed in the exclusive = \-gold currency, would immediately fall correspondingly, so that\- gold = payments would continue to be as easy as before, due to the fallen = gold\- prices. Here he overlooks the often poi nted out "stickiness" of \-prices and wages and the fact that in prior = centuries and in some respects even in our century, barter transactions = still persisted\- because gold prices never fell far enough to mediate = all\- exchanges monetarily. Moreover, he overlooked, like most other\- = economists, the different psychological effect of falling prices\- vs. = fallen prices upon potential buyers who do have some money \- reserves which they do not have to spend immediately to survive. Falling = prices\- discourage buyers. Only fallen prices encourage them. Thus\- = falling prices lead to further falling prices, preventing for a\- long time the price adaptation that Rothbard expected and predicted. In = the meantime millions of unemployed and\- ten-thousands of bankrupt = employers ask themselves: How did we \-get into this? Has Rothbard any = sound advice to offer to use? All\- he would tell us is: Reduce your wages and prices further. He \-wants = to confine our exchanges to his favourite exclusive and\- forced = currency, which we are short of, precisely at a time when\- there is an = abundance of real cover: consumer goods and\- services, ready for sale, for alternative optional and market-\-rated = currencies of our own, which we might even, to do ourselves\- and = Rothbard a favour, denominate in gold weight units as their \-value = standards and would readily accept as if they were \- corresponding gold coins. But such self-help steps would be\- = condemned as fraudulent by Rothbard and as an unjustified\- "expansion = of fiat money". - He was a radical and helpful thinker, \- in many respects, but not in all. Regarding money, he remained a = \-monopolist by prescribing "only gold" (or 100% gold covered = certificates) instead of "only government\- paper money". - In other = words, Rothbard's ruling on bankruptcy\- and on a n exclusive gold currency (however competitively\- supplied), would = assure more bankruptcies and would not help\- debtors and creditors to = get the remaining debts settled, unless\- they can manage to settle them = in gold metal or 100% covered gold-\- metal certificates. - Nor does Rothbard offer clearing as a\- solution. = Mutual debts that can be cancelled, cleared or settled, \-obviously do = not require, for this kind of non-cash payment, any\- gold coins or gold = certificates, except for the balances=20 \-remaining. And the settlement of these can be postponed. - The = clearing might well use a gold weight unit as a standard of\- value for = accounting purposes. But that was not considered by\- Rothbard or would not have satisfied him. He went on insisting on = \-gold coin or 100% covered gold certificate payments. - Or did I miss = some of his writings? Did he anywhere concede the \-possibility of = non-cash gold value payments (using all kinds of=20 \-other means of exchange at their gold weight market rating) in = \-settlement of debts expressed in gold weight units? Sometimes\- e.g., = custom duties were so fixed and so paid. - Did he report any \- complaints by debtors and creditors about such gold weight unit\- = accounting and clearing and payment transactions that made the \-means = of payment used optional? - He fruitfully pondered most\- aspects of liberty but did not spend sufficient time and = thought-energy\- on this one. - J. Z., 25.4.97 \par BANKS, CREDIT OR LOAN POLICY & THEIR DEMAND FOR SECURITY: A\- = Banker is a fellow who lends his umbrella when the sun is shining\- and = wants it back the minute it begins to rain. - Mark Twain,\- 1835-1910. \par BANKS: Apart from the Central Bank all banks are now reduced to\- = being merely dealers in the nationalised exchange medium and its = \-forced paper "standard". Even in these limited dealings they are \- highly regulated. Likewise, in their options to issue and deal\- with = capital securities. They are mere shadows of free banks. But, \-at the = same time, they are privileged banks, insofar as entry into \- the business of banking is also highly restricted by legislation \-and = governmental compulsory licensing schemes. They and the note\- acceptors = are kept in a monetary kindergarten and thus are kept\- ignorant and irresponsible in monetary matters. - J. Z., 4.9.86,\- = 29.4.97. \par BARTER IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR FREE CLEARING & FREE MONETARY = \-EXCHANGES: Only free clearing and full monetary freedom can \-fully = employ all people willing to work, at their highest \-capacity and = skills and can make them prosperous and independent.\- - J. Z., 27.7.83, 17.4.97. \par BRECKENRIDGE, R.M., The Canadian Banking System, 1871-1890, N.Y., = \-MacMillan, 1895, defended the right to issue as the common right\- of = all. - According to Wells/Scruggs, Towards Free Banking, p. 1. \-- = Westrup may also refe r to him. Alas, I have not yet been able\- to obtain this book by = Breckenridge for microfiching in my\- monetary freedom series. - J. Z., = 26.4.97. \par BUDGETS OF GOVERNMENTS: They indicate how the loot is to be = \-increased, at the expense of the tax slaves and how it is to be = \-distributed among the politicians, the bureaucratic empires and\- = their favourites. - The whole tragicomedy is treated not as a \-farce or a crime but put on the same moral level as a private or\- = company budget that only honestly disposes of the own and honest = earnings. \-Calling a wolf a sheep does not turn him into a sheep. = Calling a\- robber a benefactor does not turn him into a benefactor. One can = \-rightfully distribute handouts, investments and subsidies and\- loans = only from the own property. We should as much as possible \- avoid using the misleading or cover-up or obviously dishonest and\- = false terms that governments want us to use to be able to continue = fleecing their victims with their consent. - J.Z.,\-25.9.91, 27.4.97. \par BUY AUSTRALIAN (GERMAN, ENGLISH, AMERICAN, etc.): If \-Australian = money consisted of a number of competing Australian \-currencies, all of = them truly based on Australian goods and\- services, then and = automatically, all spending of it would lead\- to corresponding sales of Australian goods and services, by \-redeeming = this money in the Australian goods and services it is \-based upon. Even = if some bought only imported goods with such\- currencies, they would inevitably stream back to pay for the same = \-amount of Australian exports. - It is also true that even the central = bank's State paper money, when used in paying for \- imports, has ultimately no value for the foreigner than by being = \-returned to pay for Australian exports. But there is not time \-limit = on this kind of paper money, as is on private "ticket" \-money. Mor eover, foreign central banks, in their foolish grasp \-for and = accumulation of "reserve currencies", might retain a not\- yet too = depreciated state paper money for years to decades. This \-would mean = that for these periods we would have got the imports \- as interest-free loans. But our central bank might not\- sufficiently = replace these notes, hoarded in foreign countries,\- perhaps also by = private citizens, which may have reasons to trust their own government's = paper money even less. Consequently, the\- own circulation of exclusive and forced currency might become\- = correspondingly deflated. Such a diminished reflux of Australian notes = might also \-boost the primitive notion of "buy Australian!" - Compare = also a \- hypothetical payment of imports with gold coins. They would not = \-necessarily or at all return to us for Australian exports, immediately = or soon. The whole world market would be open for \-them. Only according = to the "law of fluctuating gold quantities"\- would they ultimately tend to return to an Australia whose gold = \-prices for goods would have become lower than those on the world\- = market, because of a gold deflation (assuming gold to be an \- exclusive currency). If, however, we are free to issue at any time as = many exchange media as we need for our transactions and \-also free to = choose e.g. a gold weight unit as our value \-standard, then, although = our gold stock would be reduced, our\- gold weight unit prices would not be. Only actual payments in \-gold = coins would become rarer. - Anyhow, this kind of model of an\- exclusive = gold currency, that once spent does not return\- automatically to the spender, still spooks in the heads of people\- = long after gold coin circulation has disappeared and makes people \-jump = to wrong and protectionist conclusions like: "Buy\- Austra lian!" - J. Z., 29.9.93, 25.5.97. - Did you ever hear or see a good = refutation of this stupid little slogan, from any Dr. or Prof. of = economics or any commentator in the mass media? It is endlessly repeated = in advertisements - without being accompanied or followed by any criticism that I am aware of. Oh the power of the great = lies, myths and prejudices - while there exists no encyclopaedia to = systematically collect and publish their best refutations sufficiently. = - J. Z., 8.9.02. \par BUY AUSTRALIAN, AUSTRALIAN MADE: If Australian consumers were\- = free to accept and spend, rate or refuse and also, as producers\- and = traders, to issue and offer and pay with their own printed or \- coined assignments upon their own goods- and service offers, in\- their = own tokens, in standardised and convenient money \-denominations = (different in appearance from any other money \-issues), and using for = these alternative exchange and clearing\- media any value standard that pleases them, as long as it does, \-then = they would come to automatically buy Australian goods and\- services to = a large extent. Their money would have no other value \- or use for them. Moreover, it would often enable them, in the \-first = place, to do so, by this very freedom to issue and use their issues as = their means of payment. Moreover,\- then they would be able to obtain or = issue just as many sound\-=20 means of payment as they would need for all their transactions \-and = would no longer be misled, defrauded or cheated, exploited\- and taxed, = restricted and held back by the despotic monetary\- policies of the central bank: the Reserve Bank, with its forces \-and = exclusive paper currency, given legal tender powers (\-compulsory = acceptance and compulsory value, no matter how much \-it has been = depreciated). Nor would they be rendered unemployed \- by being forced to sell or work only for this exclusive and\- forced = currency, although it has often been inflated, deflated or \-stagflated = and has never managed to supply all of them with\- exactly the quantity of sound exchange media that they do need\- for = their purposes. No central bank can achieve that. Free\- competition and = free cooperation would work its wonders, here, too, if allowed to do so. = Under freedom the good money would \- drive out the bad, as it should, by rights. - J. Z., 19.11.93,\- = 24.4.97. - By the way, any private currencies, redeemable in Australian = goods an d services only, if they were used to pay for imports would, in the = hands of any foreigners, have no other value than as a purchasing medium = in Australia. Thus, these imports would also lead to the purchase of = Australian goods. With government legal tende r getting into the hands of foreign merchants this return is less = certain. They might then end up, for many years, in the safes of foreign = central banks, as "foreign exchange reserves". - J. Z., 7.9.02. \par BUY AUSTRALIAN: Australians would inevitably buy largely\- = Australian made goods if only they were free to issue and accept = \-alternative and competing local, private, cooperative and\- optional = currencies that are based on local goods and services\- ready for sale. - A cinema owner who can pay for all his expenses\- = with tickets will have no trouble getting his seats "sold", simply by = the \- return of the tickets to him, in payment for the seats he offers for his = performances. - Why bother to export anything at\- all when we are only = willing to buy Australian goods? - What, then, could we do with the = sales proceeds from our exports? - J. Z., \- 27.9.93, 29.9.93 & 24.4.97. 8.9.02 \par BUY AUSTRALIAN: This popular slogan makes sense only as an\- advice = to let all national and local purchasing power be directly\- based upon = Australian labour, services and goods, in the form of\- competitively issued alternative currencies, optional and = market-\-rated, which the issuers would merely have to convert into = their\- goods and services, upon demand. - As for external trading: Once = Australian clearing \-cert ificates, redeemable only in standard Australian export\- goods, like = wool, liquid gas, coal, wheat, meat, etc., are freely\- used and = accepted, to pay for imports, then, indirectly, they buy, through the\- foreign buyers and consumers, Australian goods and services, when these = clearing\- certificates are returned to Australia in payment. They have = no other value and thus will be used in this way. - Generally,\- I would say: Buy Australian goods only if they are cheaper or \-better = or do, for some other and personal reasons suit you more. Otherwise, = buy\- foreign goods that suit you. Sooner or later, even the\- Australian government's paper money will return to Australia to \-pay = for its exports. It has not other value for foreigners. (Apart from = being hoarded as "f oreign exchange" in some central bank. Sooner or later most foreign = governments will spend that foreign exchange reserve as well. But the = time delay involved may be considerable. But then and to that extent, = and for this time, Australia would actually hav e been able to buy and use foreign goods and services - just for the = price of getting deposited in the vaults of these banks some scraps or = printed paper. Thus it would have received a foreign loan, interest = free, in goods and services for this period. A r eal disaster this! - J.Z., 8.9.02.) So\- when you buy imported goods = you do buy Australian goods }{\b\f0\fs24 indirectly}{\f0\fs24 . \-To = that extent the slogan is senseless. But when your A $ is not \- as much depreciated as the currency in a foreign country then \-private = persons there and its central bank might use it to hoard, \- thus introducing a time delay, in which no corresponding demand for = Australian goods and services arises. This is one of the many\- defects = of forced and exclusive currencies. Their hoarded notes are not easi ly, fast and efficiently replaced by new issues. This is already a\- = sufficient reason to exclude them for import payments. Private, = competitively \-and cooperatively issued international clearing = certificates are\- a good substitute for them. Professor E. Milhaud and Ulrich von\- = Beckerath have described their principles and practices. - Buy\- = Australian is just a modern version of mercantilism and of the\- dogmatic statement that the own money should stay in the own\- country, = before the truths of Free Trade were at least somewhat\- realized for a = few decades. Now, with such notions, we are back to the wrongful, = harmful and expensive\- morass of protectionism. - J. Z., 27.7.93, 24.4.97, 8.9.02. \par CENTRAL BANKING & NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE: National independence = \-does not mean e.g. a national central bank or currency board but, = rather, the independence of a nation and of all its citizens from \- any central bank and any other centralistic, monopolistic,\- despotic = and territorial institutions. - J. Z., 5.9.92, 22.4.97. \par CENTRAL BANKING & THE REDUCTION OF ITS FORCED & EXCLUSIVE\- = CURRENCY TO A COMPETITIVE & OPTIONAL TAX FOUNDATION MONEY ONLY\-: How = fast would the central bank's forced and monopolised\- currency = disappear or become reduced to a relatively harmless and\- even (to the tax slaves) somewhat helpful tax foundation money\- (while = these tribute payments are still tolerated), once it\- were subjected to = free competition from several sound, private \-and alternative = currencies that are optional and market rated \- against sound alternative value standards, freely chosen, too?\- How = fast could the State paper money be abolished or so reduced?\- - Almost = overnight, if this monetary revolution is well thought\- out and prepared by enough people. The sooner the better. - J. = Z.,\-19.8.92., 23.4.97. \par CENTRAL BANKING, EURO-CURRENCY, WORLD BANKING, INTERNATIONAL\- = MONETARY FUND (IMF) & MARXISM, COMMUNISM, STATE SOCIALISM OR STATE\- = CAPITALISM, MONOPOLISM & ANTI-MONOPOLISM: Central Banking, in \- its national, Euro-currency and World Banking ideas and practices, = exemplifies of the central Marxist error that to defeat "monopolies"\- = (usually quite wrongly defined) you ought to establish,\- instead, a nation-wide, European or even world-wide monopoly,\- rather = than abolish all monopolies and introduce free\- competition for all = productive, creative and free exchange\- activities. - J. Z., 14.8.89, = 29.4.97. \par CENTRAL BANKING, LENIN & COMMUNISM: Lenin knew it. He said that\- = establishing a central bank was 90% of taking over a country. - \-James = P. Hogan, Mirror Maze, 315. \par CENTRAL BANKING, REDUCTION OR INCREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS, = \-THEIR TRANSFORMATION FROM GIFTS INTO CREDITS & THE DEGREE OF = \-UNEMPLOYMENT: The Reserve Bank (central bank of Australia) \-proposed = to reduce unemployment benefits in order to reduce\- unemployment. While it is true that one can get almost any degree\- of = unemployment that one is able and willing to pay for, the abolition of = involuntary unemployment, in total, should remain\- the aim. But, the = central bank i s the main culprit with regard to \-unemployment although subsidies, = price controls, wage controls, \-coercive unionism, collective = bargaining, etc., do also play a \-role here. Typically, the Reserve = Bank did not propose the \- reduction or abolition of its monopoly, privileges and regulatory = \-powers, as means towards the abolition of unemployment. Most of \-its = directors and employees probably still imagine that it could\- reduce rather than cause and increase unemployment. Nor did it\- = propose the transformation of the unemployment benefits from\- gifts = into credits, a thought which ought not to be way-out for \- any bank. But then only the central banks have access to the note\- = printing presses for their exclusive and forced currency. With \-that = power, they do not seriously consider the alternative of\- permitting = employers to pay and employees to be paid in\- alternative and competing currencies. - To sort out the moochers from = the genuinely unemployed, I would rather propose an \-increase in = unemployment benefits but, at the same time, make \-them repayable by = the unemployed, even if he might have to sell \- his house and car for this purpose. Moreover, he should see to it \-that = his family members and friends do guaranty his repayment, if = \-necessary. That will tend to spur them into accepting almost any \- job they can get and looking for any job opening. That would also induce = them to accept lower wages or salaries. But it would\- still not suffice = to induce most of them to ponder monetary and\- financial freedom as the = main cure for unemployment. With the \-gambling spirit probably still rather = large among the unemployed, \-too, perhaps it might be worthwhile to get = them involved in a\- prize competition for the best ideas, not so far = refuted in\- literature and practice, to end unemployment. Let them seriously\- = search for such ideas and practices. Let us say that there are 1\- = million unemployed in Australia (there may be, governments tend\- to understate the case). Then, if every unemployed just \-contributed 1 = dollar a month, there could be monthly prizes\- of 1 million for the = best idea of the month. The scheme could\- even be judged by the = unemployed themselves, voting on each\- scheme, with its pro and con, as compiled by them. To simplify \-the = voting process, one could use the jury system. 12 of them\- would have = to agree, unanimously, on the best proposal for the\- month. Such jury = sessions should be publicised as much as \- possible. Let the finding and proving the cure for unemployment \-be the = job, as far as possible, of the unemployed themselves -\- and of anyone = really interested in this question. - The news on \- the Reserve Bank proposal was aired on radio news on 13 Dec.\-1993. - J. = Z., 23.4.97. - I may be the only surviving member of \-the Berlin = Society of 1952 to Fight the Causes of Unemployment. \-It had much to = say on this subject which is new still to most \- people, even to those who consider themselves to be experts on \-this = subject. See the details in my PEACE PLANS series, all on\- microfiche. = - J. Z. - Later I suggested somew here that half of the money so collected should be used for the prize = money for the best proposal and the other half for the collection, = ordering and publishing of all these ideas and opinions in the cheapest = media, e.g. on microfiche, floppy disks and CD - ROMs, even paying some of the unemployed for full-time work on this = library, archiving, editing and publishing project. As Ulrich von = Beckerath frequently remarked: Combined purchasing power is one of the = greatest and also one of the least utilised forces in the world. - J. Z., 7.9.02. \par CENTRAL BANKING: "Small is beautiful, wrote Prof. Schumacher, and = \-by this three-word aphorism, acquired more fame than by his big = \-books. Cannot our politicians and economists see that the \-principle = applies=20 to banks as well? When this truth glimmers in on \-them, they may = discover that it was state interference that gave \-us bank monopoly, = and so gave rise to all the other monopolies." - \-Henry Meulen, THE = INDIVIDUALIST, 6/78, p. 27. - See: \- DECENTRALISATION, MONEY MONOPOLY, NOTE ISSUE MONOPOLY. \par CENTRAL BANKING: A central bank, like a monarchy or a monopoly = \-post office, may, sometimes, be reasonably well run for a while,\- = within its inherent limitations. However, in the long run and for \- most cases and times, it is a recipe for planned or unintended = disasters. -\- See e.g. Kurt Schuler's writing on the Currency Board = version of\- a central bank and Prof. Heinrich Rittershausen's attempt = to make \- the best of this evil through his teachings in his work: Die = \-Zentralnotenbank. - J. Z., 30.8.93. \par CENTRAL BANKING: Central banking is the Golden Calf worship of = \-today. It offers no benefits but only disasters. But when has \-that = ever deterred any worshippers anywhere? - J. Z., 29.12.92.\- - See: = MONETARY RELIGION, MONETARY DESPOTISM. \par CENTRAL BANKING: Do nothing, be nothing & dissolution are the = \-best 3 policies for any central bank. However, they still have\- some = penalty lessons to teach to their VOLUNTARY victims and we\- should give = them that chance. - J. Z., 7.4.94, 24.4.97. \par CENTRAL BANKING: It is based on self-interest of governments,\- = that of politicians, bureaucrats and their lobbyist favourites, \-very = contrary to the public interest. Otherwise the victims would\- not put up with its powers, monopoly, coercion, meddling, fraud \-and false = pretences. It is the most powerful economic institution \-in every = country. However, since it is legalized and has a whole \- statist faith as its backing, it goes on and on and is not judged \-on = its merits or rather demerits but upon the utopian and State\- = socialistic dreams that are involved in it. To this faith it does\- not matter that almost all facts speak against it, since central = \-banking was established. It even allows totalitarians like Lenin \-to = gain power and maintain themselves in power. It even allowed a \- madman like the German emperor Wilhelm II to start and continue WW \-I = and allowed Hitler to finance WW II. - Nevertheless, we are not = \-supposed to criticise this "holy" institutions and to try to \- replace it by free, cooperative and competitive ones. Nay, rather \-have = WW III & IV & V and more totalitarian regimes for further\- decades. = That, in the minds of most people, seems easier to bear \-than the job = of tackling the problems created by monetary despotism and studying the \-solutions of monetary = freedom. - If I were a visiting alien and\- looked at this all too = wide-spread mentality, I could understand\- if such an alien would say = to himself: I have the power to wipe out\- this insect pest on Earth - why shouldn't I use it? Perhaps,\- after a = few million years, the cockroaches or butterflies might \- turn into something better! - J. Z., 19.8.92, 23.4.97. - But then this = would apply "collective responsibility" on an even larger scale t han the present war on "Iraq" does, rather than holding Saddam Hussein = individually responsible for his government's actions. For the latter = approach one does not need any large military forces or any war. - J.Z., = 7.9.02. \par CENTRAL BANKING: National central banks have led to as many\- = disappointments as national governments have, national post\- offices, = national railways and national roads. Have any \-nationalised industries = been successful under their motto: "Not\- for profit but for use"? Have they achieved consumer satisfaction \-at = less than market prices? Their subsidised prices should not be \-quoted = here - without adding the subsidies that are involved. \- How many centuries of central bank failures do we have to suffer\- under = before we finally abolish central banks? Price controls\- were tried, = again and again, quite in vain, for 4,000 years. So \-were inflationary = and deflationary policies by monetary\- despotism. One feature, the suppression of all kinds of = truck-\-payments and truck payment notes, was applied over at least 4\- = centuries and in emergencies, caused by the government's monetary\- = despotism and in spite of numerous legal and juridical\- prohibitions, employers and employees had to resort to this \-self-help = means again and again. - If politicians, their experts\- and the whole = community will not learn sufficiently from such \-failures, then at leas t we should set free all the minorities of\- people who believe that = they have and can apply a better system,\- at their own expense and = risk. We should grant them the same \-experimental freedom that we grant = to scientists, artists, \- technicians, biologists, agriculturists etc. Otherwise monetary = \-science and practice will stagnate under the rule of monetary = \-despotism, possibly for further centuries, if not thousands of\- = years. - J. Z., 19.8.92, 23.4.97. \par CENTRAL BANKING: The very cheek of the central banks of\- = governments, forcing themselves as a monopoly mediators into every = \-monetary exchange transaction and into every value standard = \-measurement within a country and this with a very inferior and\- fast depreciating means of exchange and a rubber band and\- manipulated = value standard that is close to the worst of all\- which have ever been = imagined and practised. And with all this \-they still pretend to be = able and willing to sufficiently supply\- the market with exchange media and with a sound currency. It is \-like = a highwayman monopolising crime in a country and then\- pretending to be = a crime fighter. Could anyone possibly have\- accumulated more disqualifications for the job of supplying a sound = value standard and sufficient exchange media, than have the\- central = banks, in every country? - J. Z., 19.8.92, 23.4.97. \par CENTRAL BANKS, INFLATIONS, DEFLATIONS & STAGFLATIONS: Is there\- = any central bank that has existed for several years or decades,\- and = that has not yet caused inflations, deflations and\- stagflations = several times - while blaming others for its actions\- and their consequences? - J. Z., 19.8.92, 23.4.97. \par CIRCULATION, PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION, CONSUMPTION, MONEY, TURNOVER = \-CREDIT & TURNOVER CLEARING OR TURNOVER EXCHANGE MEDIA, CAPITAL & \-THE = ECONOMIC PROBLEM OR CRISES: "The economic problem is in\- reality not a = problem of consumption or=20 of production but a \-problem of circulation." - Dr. Bank. Date? Source? = See: EXCHANGE \- MEDIA, FREE EXCHANGE, MONETARY FREEDOM, FREE BANKING. - Which economic = problem? Are consumption and production really problematical? Does money = really have to circulate permanently? What does have to circulate? Are economic crises due to = insufficient "circulation" of capital or of exchange media? Doesn't = during an inflation at least one thing circulate too extensively, namely = the government's forced currency? All such g eneral phrases and explanation attempts do not sufficiently explain the = realities but rather distract from them. - J. Z., 9.9.02. \par CLEARING A clearing transaction does not need ANY quantity of\- = exchange media nor ANY quantity of value standard units, beyond \-the = one unit adopted, e.g., an ounce of gold. It can operate well\- enough with book keeping and electronic accounting only, in\- figures, = expressing purchasing power in multiples or fractions of \-the adopted = value standard units, e.g. of an ounce of gold. The\- value of the value = standard chosen is in no way changed by changes in the number of clearing transactions, = in the same way\- as the sizes of the meter, the weight of 1 kg, the = volume of 1 \-litre, are not changed at all with the number of = transactions \- that use these measures. To affect the purchasing power of a \-medium of = exchange its nature of exchange medium must be legally\- and coercively = combined with a fictitious abstract or paper value\- "standard", the exchange medium and this value standard must be = \-exclusive and forced ones (compulsory acceptance AND compulsory = \-value, at its nominal value) and people must not be free to\- express their prices, wages, salaries etc. in sound alternative \-value = units. Then, indeed, quantity changes in such forced \-currencies do = affect prices, wages etc., which have to be priced \- out in this "standard" and have to pay paid in this "exchange\- medium". = - J. Z., 4.1.0.91, 27.4.97. \par CLEARING AND MONEY & THE QUANTITY THEORY OF MONEY, MONETARY = \-DESPOTISM & TICKET MONEY: When you consider money merely as a\- = clearing facilitator, not as a commodity, then the quantity of\- goods, labour and services that people possess or can will offer, in = exchange for the goods, services and labour of others, has no other = limit than these goods, labour and service readiness themselves and = the\- quantity of "money" available becomes irrelevant, because under fully = developed and free clearing no money would be required at all. Only for = \-some minor payments would some form of physical clearing = \-certificates, which might be called money, still be convenient,\- more convenient than formal non-cash transactions, no = matter how\- computerized. Under free clearing, essentially not needing = any\- money tokens or money commodity at all, in quantities \- corresponding to the sum total of the cleared goods and services, \-but = possibly using e.g. a gold weight unit as a value standard to \- price all goods, services, labours and contracts. The value standard = unit that might be used in all the accounting and clearing of the free = exchanges might not even exist at all o r might not be traded at all within that clearing community. E.g., gold = value trading in Sydney might use\- the market price of that gold weight = unit in London, Zuerich or\- N.Y. for its own value measuring purposes. = Some clearing or payment \- communities might be satisfied with a value standard less stable \-than = gold or discover and use one that is even more stable. \-Freedom of = choice, here, too. No exclusive and forced value\- standard (except by = private contracts, binding only the\- contractors) and no exclusive and forced exchange media and\- clearing = avenues (except within voluntary payment communities).\-Under free = clearing the number of transactions might increase or\- decrease. The = total value of transactions might increase or \- decrease. This would not influence the standard of value used or\- = depreciate or increase the value of the clearing avenue - or of = \-clearing certificates. To try to put a quantitative limit on\- clearing certificates or mere turnover credit notes would amount to = \-forcing people to limit their production and their exchanges when\- = there is no justification or need for this at all. An issue or \- circulation limit would then amount to a rationing system for the = \-whole community for goods, services and jobs. No more could then be\- = offered and traded than is prescribed or permitted by the monetary = despotism involved. - The \- quantity theory of money makes only some sense for an exclusive \-and = forced currency that is issued beyond the limit at which, \-under = freedom, it would have been accepted at par with a sound\- value standard. Then it can be arbitrarily multiplied and thus\- = depreciated, while the goods and services at the same time cannot \-be = as much multiplied and would, even by multiplication, not\- necessarily = be depreciated in their value, eit her. For instance, \-if a baker bakes 10,000 loaves of bread instead of = merely 1,000 a \-day, and if he finds buyers for all of them, then the = value of the \-bread for each of the buyers would not be depreciated. = Nor would\- the money or clearing medium be depreciated because at least for = \-these turnovers ten times as many money tokens or clearing = \-certificates would have to be used. The need for monetary\- exchanges = is, essentially, a need for clearing exchanges in a\- very convenient form. If that is kept in mind, then we will avoid wrong = conclusions on varying quantities. A community is enriched,\- not = impoverished, when its money and clearing system enable it to \- exchange more goods, services and labour efforts, quite freely\- and = easily. The money and clearing transactions would be increased - and so = \-would be the goods, services and labour turned over. - The best \- method would be to transform, as far as possible, all ready-for-\-sale = goods, services and labour into exchange media or clearing\- = certificates or cle aring accounts (using sound value standards), to the extent that this = can be done without turning the par-value of such shop currency into a = deterring discount. (If one can judge by the experience with sound tax = foundation money then shops might even be a ble to monetise not only their current stocks but their turnover for the = next 1-3 months. Much would depend on current terms for earnings and = timing habits for consumer spending.) \-Then any quantity of goods, = services and labour could, with their \- help, be easily exchanged for those of others, in a division of labour\- = and free exchange process - in a free market that would include\- monetary and clearing freedom. The need for money is merely a need for = clearing or for complete freedom to exchange, using the\- best and = easiest available means, those accessible, in self-help \- steps, to every productive and honest persons. As Ulrich von\- Beckerath = used to say: Allow people to transform their NEEDS \-into effective = monetary DEMAND, but only to the extent that they \-are prepared to = supply, ready for sale, goods, services and\- labour. - Then and with their "ticket-money" (or goods, labour or = service warrants), they can satisfy their \-needs, to this extent and = the others can use these tickets\- against him as an issuer, to the = extent that he is able to supply \- their needs. That would amount to production for use and profit \-at the = same time. Useless tickets would be refused. Tickets that are only = marginally useful would be discounted or refused, thus limiting their = circulation. The tickets would \- have an automatic reflux to the issuer - and would serve as\- = advertisements at the same time. Ticket money! That's the \-ticket! - J. = Z., 26.4.97, 8.9.02. \par CLEARING: Clearing needs no official organization or regulation = \-nor any official or private funding - no more so than e.g., \-postage = stamp or coin exchanges for collectors do. But what it\- does need is freedom to organise itself under its own statutes,\- = independent of all repressive legislation, regulation & jurisdiction. - = J. Z., 19.7.91,\-26.4.97. \par CLEARING: We are all each other's debtors and creditors, with\- the = totals of debts and credits exactly balancing each other.\- = Consequently, if only we organized a perfect clearing system \-between = us, one not disturbed by any legally or juridically\- authorised demands for rare metal cash or monopoly\- paper money that = is legal tender, then we could clear all our transactions. All the = notes\- we would still use for the sake of convenience need be nothing\- more than clearing certificates to facilitate this free exchange \-via = free clearing. We should no longer tolerate any law, regulation, = juridical decision or administrative authority which \-prevents this = from happening freely, naturally and fast, doing \- away with and preventing all monetary crises, especially inflations, = \-deflations, st agflations, with their involuntary mass unemployment, expropriations, = bankruptcies due to this despotism, general impoverishment and their = trends towards despotism, terrorism, civil wars, and wars. - J. Z., = 24.7.93,\- 24.4.97, 8.9.02. \par COMMODITY MONEY, REDEMPTION, COVER & CONVERTIBILITY TERMS SHOULD\- = NOT ONLY BE APPLIED TO RARE METAL CURRENCIES: These commodities \-are = not the ones consumers usually want but only in-between\- commodities or arrangements in attempts to assure that their \-holders = or claimants can get the satisfaction in the commodities \-and services = they really want. Originally, there seemed to be no \- better way, than this important step-up from primitive barter. \-But = since then, in millions of transactions easier, cheaper and \-more = direct means have been found and used, illegally or legally, \-to = achieve consumer satisfac tion, to balance the variety of\- commodities and services with a = variety of commodity and service\- vouchers, and in thousands of cases = the interest in value \-preservation has also been served by rare metal = commodities not\- serving as exclusive or even frequent means of exchange but,\- merely, = as value standards, by weight, in more or less free\- exchanges. For = free transactions the barter value of gold can be\- abstracted whilst = the reckoning or accounting value of gold\- -weight units can be preserved. For this purpose gold does not\- have to = be physically present. Nor does it have to physically back up each = transaction, nor do even gold certificates have to be \- backed or covered by gold or be redeemable or convertible by the = \-issuer himself. He has only to see to it that his "paper gold"\- = remains at par with its nominal gold weight value. Then the\- convertibility of his notes or certificates can then be transferred = to\- the world wide gold market, embracing all gold stocks and all\- = current gold production. Most of the commodity money advocates \- never dreamt of such a huge redemption fund for their supposedly\- ideal = gold standard currency. They considered only the tiny \-fraction of the = total which their kind of commodity currency \-issuers could mobilise = for their purposes. Goods warrants with=20 \-local shop foundation could liquidify most currently wanted goods\- = and services while still preserving gold weight pricing and\- reckoning, = independent of the local supply of gold. When private, no-exclusive or = forced paper mone y has been supplied, which is optional and free market rated but kept at = par with its nominal gold weigh value, then it is "as \-good as gold" = and it was usually preferred to gold as long as\- people expected this = goodness of paper money to be continued. \- Monetary freedom would permit gold coin and gold certificates,\- = whether 100% or fractionally covered, for all voluntary payment \- communities and at their risk and expense. After having been long = outlawed, they would probably blossom for a while but then shrink in = their occurrence and volume, \-in free competition with cheaper and = better alternatives, which \- would preserve what is good in rare metal currencies and certificates = but would eliminate their drawbacks. Say's Law would\- then get fully = realized: All suppliers of daily wanted goods and services, suitably = associated, could then \- issue the required purchasing power for them to achieve the sale\- of = their goods and services within a normal consumption period. - J. Z., = \-22.4.97, 7.9.02. \par COMMODITY MONEY: Commodity money, as usually understood, in form\- = of gold, silver, platinum or copper coins and of certificates\- that are = 100 % or, quite openly, only fractionally covered by\- them (preferably with precautionary redemption clauses that would\- = cover the risk of sudden redemption demands), represents just a \-few of = the numerous opt ions for monetary freedom. Sometimes and quite without justification or = necessity, such issues would be granted legal tender status. - If it is = so \- good, why insist upon it being legal tender? And it would still = constitute an exclusive or monopoly currency, unless freedom to issue & = use other kinds of exchange media and value standards is introduced. If = it is so good,\- why insist upon such a privilege? It would limit value accounting \-to = these standards and this in the face of hundreds of different\- value = standards that have been proposed and that are believed in\- - at least by some. It would also limit exchanges to those that can = \-be covered by ready availability of these commodities. It would mean = that a few or even one selected commodity only would have to \- cover the exchanges of all other commodities, as well as of all = services, not\- merely as mere standards of value but as means of = payment, too.\- This means the establishment of a very tight bottleneck = for all\- transactions. Prices in exclusive rare meta l currencies went\- never so low that the available rare metal coins = sufficed to make \-monetary transactions penetrate universally, = everywhere. Even \- primitive barter continued to exist, to a considerable extent, even in = developed countries, even into the 20th century, at least in some\- = spheres, with e.g. some agricultural workers being partly paid in\- wheat, potatoes and firewood. Under monetary freedom the ultimate\- = redemption fund that most currency holders are interested in, \-namely, = ready for sale goods and services, in millions of\- varieties, would be = the kind of }{\b\f0\fs24 commodities}{ \f0\fs24 that would back and redeem or\- provide the convertibility for = the most common, competitive and optional monies of monetary freedom. = Once these have been \-widely issued and accepted,=20 rapidly streaming back and being replaced by new issues, and when they = have a relationship to commodities like gold, or other rare metal weigh = units, only as their accounting\- and clearing value units, in the = competitive notes and\- certificates of private currencies and in the prices of all goods,\- = services and labours, then the idea of confining all exchanges to those = coverable by rare metal commodities will come to appear ridiculous. To = take an example from today: Do you \- imagine that railway, bus-, cinema or lottery tickets or postage = \-stamp, to preserve their value and to measure it accurately, would = \-have to be convertible, by the issuer, at any time and upon \- demand, into a rare metal? Neither does a shop foundation money\- need = such a cover to give it value - measured e.g. in gold grams\- and = keeping it at par, in a free market, with such a value,\- perhaps even above par (among those who do not want to carry gold\- = coins around or do not want to confine their earnings to those \-that = can be paid in 100% covered gold certificates). All other \- ready for sale consumer goods (commodities) and even daily wanted = consumer services should be considered \-as suitable "commodities" for = redemption, cover & convertibility,\- by those desiring it. And the = specialized convertibility desires\- of some, who do want to turn their "tickets" into rare metals, should = be referred to the greatest \-redemption and convertibility fund of all, = namely the free and\- world-wide market for gold and other rare metals. = Notes that are\- locall y accepted at par with their nominal gold weight value can\- also be = used to purchase gold metal from a local representative\- of the = world-wide gold market. Even now most banks do also sell\- gold coins to investors or collectors, but not because they are legally = or juridically obliged to do so. They are not. - 1.8.94, 17.4.97, = 7.9.02. \par CONFIDENCE: An honest currency is not a confidence game or \-trick. = It can be as honestly offered and accepted as goods and\- labour = services can be. - And its quality could be as rapidly\- checked: E.g., = would it be accepted as "as good as gold", or at \- its other par value, to a different standard used in it, in the\- = next shop or service station? If it is, any suspicion, distrust\- and = lack of confidence would be rapidly dispelled. - One might \- even say that it is a self-interested confidence game of \-advocates of = an exclusive and either 100% or fractionally covered\- gold certificate = currency, to insist that "confidence" would be \-required fo r banknotes. Such nonsense is simply thoughtlessly copied, from one = author or lecturer to another, over generations. - J. Z.,\- 61.11.91, = 26.4.97. \par CONVERTIBILITY: Convertibility is a safeguard necessary to \-impose = upon a MONOPOLIST, but unnecessary with COMPETING \-suppliers who cannot = maintain themselves in the business unless \-they provide money at least = as advantageous to the user as anybody\- else. - Hayek, Denationalisation of money, 84. - Some have argued = \-that there would be a competition to provide the best possible\- = convertibility and that would be a 100% convertibility by the issuer = upon demand of the note holder. But, under free\- competition it would surely revealed that the ultimate liquidity\- or = guaranty that people would like to receive upon failure of a \-bank of = issue is less important to the current value and use of a\- currency than is its acceptability for goods and services in \-daily = demand. Consequently, and in order to save the outlay for a \-gold = redemption fund, many issuer would proclaim merely that they \- are always ready to provide for convertibility of their notes \-into = goods and services that are in daily demand but that they would not = supply themselves their equivalent value in gold\- weights, too. = Instead, they would merely price their goods and\- services and their debts in gold weight units and accept their \-own = notes at par with their nominal gold weight value (and other \-notes = only at their gold weight value in a free market). In\- other words, they would only try to preserve the par value of \-their = own notes with gold weight units but without obliging \-themselves to = supply the gold weights. Those who would then rather \-than collect = their goods and services=20 at par with them, purchase \-gold with them, would be referred not to = any stocks of gold\- that the issuer might posses, for other than = currency purposes,\- but, instead, to the greatest gold reserve & = redemption fund of all, that of the\- whole world, of all of mankind, the one available to all buyers of\- = gold, to all fans of convertibility, metal cover, gold value guaranties = and redemption, namely to the free gold market. They cannot demand more = than that \- the notes which they hold of any issuer are accepted there at par (or as = good as gold). With\- the maintenance of that par value the rightful = obligation of the \-issuer would be ended. Nor would the issuer be = obliged to\- maintain the par value of his notes outside the locality where he\- = issues them as turnover or clearing media. He is not under any = \-obligation to maintain them at par in the whole world. At the\- place of issue no only the issuer but most of the whole local \-trading = community would treat his notes as good as gold and so\- would the local = gold sell ers. But, ultimately, only he would be obliged to accept them at par = from anyone and that would tend to keep it locally at par in other = transactions as well. What more can one rightly ask for \-from any as = convenient paper means of exchange than \- its local purchasing power and value being at par with its nominal = value? It would\- then be considered as superfluous and unnecessarily = expensive to \-try to provide each note holder with a 100% or fractional = gold metal redemption \- fund as well. Those who do not offer it and declare that they will not = so \-cover their notes, would win out in free competition. Their = \-prices will be lower and their exchange media and their value \- standard will be just as good or even better and less subject to fraud = and deception and runs upon the remaining gold hoard of an issuer. - J. = Z., 18.4.97. \par COST-PUSH INFLATION: In the strict sense, there is simply no \-such = thing as a 'cost-push' inflation. Neither higher wages nor \-higher = prices of oil, or perhaps of imports generally, can drive \- up the aggregate price of all goods UNLESS THE PURCHASERS ARE \-GIVEN = MORE MONEY TO BUY THEM. What is called a cost-push inflation is merely = the effect of increases in the quantity of \-money which governments = feel forced to provide in order to \- prevent the unemployment resulting from a rise in wages (or\- other = costs), which preceded it and which was conceded in the\- expectation = that governments would increase the quantity of\- money. They mean = thereby to make it possible for all workers to\- find employment through a rise in the demand for their products. \-If = government did not increase the quantity of money, such a rise \-in the = wages of a group of workers would not lead to a rise in \-the general = price level but simply to a reduction in=20 sales and\- therefore to unemployment.- Hayek, Denationalisation of = money, 75.\-- See : WAGES, PRICES, QUANTITY THEORY, INFLATION. \par COUNTERFEITING The biggest counterfeiters have been\- governments. = - Jack Allen Horrigan, article "Inflation Island",\- 10/1971. - One can = hardly "forge" one's own notes but, under \-legal tender and the money = monopoly, one can multiply them, still \- force these multiples into circulation and thus depreciate them\- and = drive up all prices expressed in them. In each transaction \-the = creditors are not cheated out of the whole value, as by the \- use of a forged note, i.e. an entirely invalid payment, but\- instead, = merely by the inflation percentage. - Advocates of \-monetary freedom = should try to avoid inaccurate terms. They\- should leave=20 that activity, as a monopoly, to the advocates of monetary despotism and = attack these lies and false pretences with\- properly expressed truths = and correct terms. - J. Z., 18.4.97. \par COUNTERFEITING & INFLATION OF LEGAL TENDER PAPER MONEY: If you\- do = it it's illegal. - From a Workers Party leaflet: Something's\- Wrong in = Australia. - A forger does not forge his own notes but \- those of others. At most he could water down his stock or issue \-more = of his own notes secretly than he has promised to do or recorded as = having done. But all his notes would still be \-genuine. Only their = value would be reduced. Not a single one of\- them could be declared to be a total forgery and quite invalid,\- = although the purchasing power of all of them would be reduced. -\-J. Z., = 19.4.97. - Alas, I had subscribed to the same error myself,\- when I = wrote on 14.11.73 : If you want to engage in\- counterfeiting legally, join the central bank. \par COUNTERFEITING, FORGERIES: Counterfeiting is a crime which = politicians \-monopolise. - Stormy Mon, TC121, 29.7.84. - CAN one = "counterfeit"\- one's own notes? - The issue-monopoly of central banks = and the \- legal tender coercion and monopoly of its nominal paper "value\- = standard" are by themselves criminally wrong and harmful enough\- = without adding the false charge of "counterfeiting" the own \- notes. - When other governments counterfeit the notes of the own = \-governments, or when private forgers do so, or when private banknotes = are forged by criminals, then that is\- counterfeiting. - J. Z., 2.8.89, 29.4.97. - The wide circulation area = and long circulation period as well as the uniform appearance of = government paper money makes large-scale and prolonged forgery of it = easier and more difficult and slower to find=20 out. - Thus some people predicted that some day government currencies = might become destroyed through forgery. Usually they manage = self-destruction well enough on their own. - J. Z., 9.9.02. \par COUNTERFEITING: When Block discusses counterfeiters, even his\- = economic arguments falls apart. His protestation that paper money \-is = already counterfeit is irrelevant. The counterfeiter, whether \- government or private, is an aggressor, defrauding others of \-rightful = value. The real crime of the counterfeiter is not that\- he copies = worthless government notes but that he passes on his \- own worthless notes to innocent victims. To say that government \-theft = justifies private theft is an argument worthy or the New\- Left, not a = self-styled defender of liberty. - Sharon Presley,\- where? when? \par COVER & RESERVES: Security provisions or guaranties in case of\- = bankruptcies, when the circulation efforts of banks of issues \-have = failed, should be distinguished from securities, safeguards,\- covers, = re serves, clearing and reflux arrangements that limit\- the quantity of = exchange media issued, assure demand for them,\- make certain that they = stream back to the issuer and preserve, as \-far as humanly possible, = the par-value of the notes with a sound\- and acceptable value standard. These latter precautions are \- necessary to the sound functioning of alternative, optional, privately = or cooperatively issued local currencies. When these precautions have = all been taken, then the former precautions for the day of liquidation = of the note issue \- business, would not be necessary at all - at least not for such sound = banks \-of issue. (What kind of "securities" would be necessary for = banks \-that issue capital securities is another question. Some might = \-merely issue securi ties to make the real capital assets - as well\- as capital expectations = of their customers - more liquid and\- transferable, as liquid as one = can make capital securities. They can't be made as liquid as currencies = have to be - upon this\- foundation alone.) - Back to note issuing banks and e.g. shop = \-associations issuing local currencies with shop foundation: = \-Unlimited liability for the directors of such banks would not cost\- anything, could not do much harm and might do some good. Also \-some = common sense rules, like a limited area for loans and\- circulation, a = limited circulation period, the obligation to use \- other exchange media received to purchase the own notes at par, \-the = acceptance of other exchange media only upon payment of a\- small fee, = whenever the own notes have suffered a small discount, \- publicity for all issues, the stopping of further issues upon any \-but = a trivial and temporary discount, contracts with the debtors \-of the = issuing bank that bind them to acceptance at par, the \-discounting wit h notes only of "real bills" (sound commercial bills) or their = equivalents, \-that are short-term and do represent goods already = produced and sold\- and on the road to the retailers, if not already in = the\- retailers' shops. - A currency is accepted as a "current" \-currency, = at least as a local currency, not because in case of a\- bankruptcy the = creditors would be able to resort to a guaranty \- fund but because there is a current use for it, either for the \-note = holder himself, or indirectly, through a current demand for \-it by = others, for their consumer satisfactions and other debt \- obligations. This and the final readiness to accept them, in debt = \-repayments to the bank of issue, and its debtors, who would\- mainly = be suppliers of goods and services in daily demand, and \- the demand for the notes to pay wages, salaries, and one's own \-profits = etc. with them, constitutes the essential debt, demand, clearing, = \-reflux or shop foundation for sound local currencies. Without it\- = even gold coins would only be of some use to some. If these few \-could not convert some of their gold coins = readily into food,\- drink and shelter, they would perish. Without this = shop \-foundation small money tokens would be no more useful than e.g., = \- shares are as means of payment. - Which other local covers \-than shop = foundation could and should be mobilised by a single or\- competing = local currencies? E.g. the services of professionals \-and tradesmen, = also that of local restaurants, pubs, coffee\- -shops, all kinds of eateries, entertainment centres, bus\- companies, = taxi services, the local rail connection, and the local rate \-credits, = and fees, legally granted to or extorted by the local government, the = local\- suppliers of gas, electricity, water, sewage and garbage disposal = \-services. As long as any shortage of exchange media is still\- = perceived or expressed in a premium for local exchange media over \- their value standard, no monetary payment sphere, which could \-issue = its own sound exchange media, should "poach" all its means of \-exchange = requirements from those who have provided their own\- media of exchange for their own purposes. Custom and ethics on \-this = might, one day, become as strong as e.g. the condemnations of \-cheating = are, when gambling. If you can help yourself in this respect, \-then yo u ought to help yourself in this respect. Mature adults\- mostly feel = strongly the urge to become self-supporting, not a burden \- upon anyone else, if they can help it at all. (Welfare States have = greatly diminished that feeling for self-support and = self-responsibility. - J.Z., 8.9.02.) That aspiration\- should become = extended to becoming monetarily independent as far\- as possible and convenient to do so. Naturally, nobody would be = \-obliged to issue personal notes that could have only a limited\- local = circulation among a few and that only at a considerable\- discount. But = as soon as proper discounting facilities are \- locally established, combined with proper clearing services, then\- = even individual issuers of IOUs, known to be honest, industrious and = productive, could issue their own IOUs, in standardised\- denomination, not for general circulation, but bring them to a \-local = discount or exchange office to get them there exchanged into one\- of = the local currencies. That discount or exchange office would\- then have the task to put these IOUs into the hands of the few\- who, with them, = would want to purchase the goods and services of \-the issuer of these = IOUs. Upon purchase, they could then present \- these IOU's in full payment at their par value to the issuer, themselves = or through their bank - for at least\- towards the issuer any note must = have, juridically, a full legal\- tender, i.e. debt-dissolving power at = its nominal value. The\- issuer cannot rightfully and unilaterally repudiate such a debt. If he = tried to\-, then he could be criminally prosecuted for fraud. - J. = Z.,\-25.4.97. \par CREATION OF CREDIT: If banks could create money and credit out\- of = nothing, I would like to be a banker under these conditions,\- and so = would almost everybody else. Why doesn't everybody make use of \- this opportunity? An Aladdin's Lamp for everybody! Nobody need to = \-produce or sell anything any more to acquire purchasing power. We\- = could simply multiply it at will and live all from \-the proceeds, a = form of unearned income! Please, tell me, why do the banks still ask you to\- supply them with your savings, to = deposits them with them and why do they mind if you withdraw them from = them? Under the asserted\- conditions they would not need you and your = savings at all. They could e.g. input\- a single dollar of their own and multiply it endlessly, with\- only the = trouble of spending the riches thus gained by them. - \-That such = beliefs can still be widely held in our century is almost unbelievable. = - J. Z., 5.7.94, 18.4.97. \par CREATION OF MONEY & CREDIT: De nihilo nihil. Lucretius, Ueber\- die = Natur, I/149. (Aus nichts wird nichts. Nothing grows from \-nothing.) \par CREATION OF MONEY: But you can't MAKE purchasing power. You can\- = only TRANSFER it. - Terry Arthur, 95% Is Crap, 209. \par CREDIT & BANKERS: Credit is extended only to 90 year olds who come = \-accompanied by their grandparents. - Note I saw years ago on a \-cash = register. - J.Z. - Have our present banks really practised the common sense rule: No credit to = those who are not credit-worthy and credit to all who are? - Have they = managed to utilising the "banking principle" to properly finance = turn-over credits with their own banknotes? At=20 p resent they seem even unable or unwilling to incorporate all kinds of = fees and insurance premiums in a single interest rate. Moreover, even = their extensive use of computers has not enabled them to reduced their = charges and fees but has rather driven them=20 u p. - They still take 5 days to credit you with the sums of a cheque you = deposit with them. - Even small credit unions are often able to undercut = the service charges of large banks or to pay higher interest to = depositors. - Their inabilities, unwillingness or bureaucracy has also been a great aid in the growth of numerous = other kinds of finance companies. - J. Z., 7.9.02. \par CREDIT CONTROL: Credit control by governments? The sheer = \-impertinence of it: A robber organization setting itself up as\- = controller over something as voluntaristic and productive as\- credit! - = J. Z., 12/84, 18.4.97. - I would like to control the\- credit of governments - and have the right to control my own \-credit = and accept the private credit arrangements I like. - J. Z.,\- 12/74. - = Credit control is in principle as much an interference \- with individual liberty as sex control would be. - J. Z., 30.5.75.\- - = The use of the term "control" in the expressions of "experts" \-and of = the man in the street is OUT OF CONTROL. It serves as a\- cover for almost any kind of despotic meddling and mismanagement, = \-always under the pretence that thereby "everything is under control!" = -\- Only self-control is real control. Human beings that are\- cont rolled by others are no longer free men but puppets or \-marionettes = that dance more or less to the tunes of their \-masters. - Granting them = what is supposed to be "THE" vote, but\- which disfranchises them in = most important respects, does not\- change the situation much. - Without full monetary freedom and of the = \-right to secede from the State and to become exterritorially\- = autonomous, together with other secessionists, also the right to bear \- rightful arms for rightful self-defence and to organise in\- volunteer = militias for the protection of individual rights, and the full spectrum = of the other basic individual rights, man is not enough in control \- of his own fate. - Monetary emancipation is a very good starting = \-point. Let us individually vote government paper money out of\- = existince and sound alternative currencies and value standards \-in! - = J. Z., 18.4.97. \par CREDIT CREATION OR SOUND BILL DISCOUNTING OR CLEARING?: What is = usually called "credit creation" is \-nothing but false pretence, fraud = or robbery." - J. Z., 5/73. - When \-only short term credits are = involved, that are self-liquidating, \- like in the discounting of real bills, then merely an advanced \-form of = clearing takes place, spread over a short period, in\- which the IOU of = the buyer, being unsuitable for general\- circulation, is "cut up" or = temporarily replaced by small bills, \- suitable for circulation, with which workers, retailers and, \-finally, = wholesale buyers are paid, who redeem with them their \-IOU or real = bill, which they gave to the manufacturer and which \- the manufacturer got discounted at a sound bank of issue. Who really = gave the credit here was the manufacturer, for the payment\- of the = goods he delivered to the wholesaler, products that are thus on their = road to the \- retailers and the consumers. He merely got the IOU or the bill of = exchange, he drew upon the wholesaler, TRANSFORMED, by the bank, \-into = a more suitable means of payment, especially for paying his\- wage and other suppliers' bills for his production. That = \-transformation is "creative" only insofar as any artist \-transforms = some materials in one way or the other, \-to make them more suitable and = attractive. It is in neither case\- of a "creation out of nothing". - To say that it is "created out of\- = thin air" is misleading, insofar that valuable elements, like oxygen, = \-nitrogen and helium are precisely thus produced . - J. Z., 18.4.97. - Not is the term "thin" being appropriate in this = connection, since neither mountain or near-space nor sea-level air is = used for this purpose. - J. Z., 7.9.02. \par CREDIT, HONESTY, GOOD & BAD MONEY: No man's credit is as good as = \-his money. - Ed. Howe, 1855-1937. - A man's credit may actually\- be = much better than the scarce and exclusive currency that he is\- forced = to use. - Alas, he is s o far not free to express his good \-credit in his own exchange media, = nor are honest alternative note \-issuing banks at liberty to do this = for him. - The saying applies\- only to good money cash, which is = usually, but not always, preferred to credit \- arrangements. - J. Z., 18.4.97. \par CREDIT: You should not be surprised when not getting credit in = \-this world. Credit is monopolised and tied to an exclusive and = \-forced currency, beyond which it cannot be much extended upon a\- free = clearing basis as long as this=20 monetary despotism remains in\- existence. As long as creditors are = authorised to demand payment \- in legal tender cash, it cannot be extended as far as free clearing = transactions could and should be, to multiply production and exchange, = using sound value standards for honest accounting of\- the values of all trades. Under completely free clearing neither = \-inflation nor deflation nor stagflation would be possible. All \-debts = and credits would be only different sides of the same\- coin. All could = be settled agai nst each other, for all turnover\- transactions, for which payment is = immediately due or within a short period. - J. Z.,\- 22.8.76, 18.4.97. \par CRISES & MICRO-ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING & MONETARY FREEDOM: = Micro-economic\- decision-making is the primary device for keeping = crises on a \-micro-level. - Gary North, THE FREEMAN, 2/74. - Especially = the \- micro-economic decision-making of monetary freedom! - J. Z.,\-7.7.94. \par CRISES, GOVERNMENT & MARKETS: Crises, as opposed to simple\- = scarcity, result from market disruptions; and the only sector of\- = society which possesses the power to disrupt a large market is \-the = government. - Henry G. Manne, REASON 4/74. - Crises are=20 \-unknown in an unhampered free market economy. - Dick Sabroff, = THE\-FREEMAN, May 74. \par CRISIS MANAGEMENT: To most of the ruling bastards this seems to = \-amount to: Manage affairs in a way that the crisis is kept going\- or = even increased. - J. Z., 3.4.95. - Not only communists have\- often tried to make an existing crisis worse and to prevent\- genuine = reforms, in an attempt to gain or maintain power thereby. -\- = Politicians are always ready to declare an emergency and then to = \-demand emergency powers for themselves, to deal with the crisis.\- (Compare Pres. Bush's "war on terrorism" then extended to "war against = the Taliban forces in Afghanistan" and now to the planned "war against = Iraq", not against its despotic ruler, after the 9/11/01 terrorist atta ck on N.Y.C. and Washington, an always upon the same wrongful principle = that the terrorists apply in their actions, namely: collective = responsibility, and upon the same "ideal" that they hold, namely = exclusive territorial rule.) As a rule the crisis persi sts, in spite or because of their \-efforts, even much longer, as a = result of their "counter-measures" - and the emergency powers tend to be = continued afterwards or not completely abolished. The extreme \- case of this is indicated by Randolph Bourne's statement: "War is the\- = Health of the State". Compare the growth of the "New Deal"\- statism = under D. Roosevelt, which was extended, at least in\- parts, from the Great Depression to today. - In most instances = \-"crisis management" means "crisis mismanagement" and "crisis\- = prolongation", largely through prevention of common sense and \- economically effective and morally justified self-help steps. - \-The = only thing that monetary and financial despotism, in \-combination with = other forms of central planning and dirigism or \- dictocracy, can manage to supply is - one crisis after the other, \-in = which they can always demand and all too often are all too\-readily = granted, more power to themselves, in spite of a \-continuing record of = failures for all their A-Z "reforms" and "m easures" and "plans", which repeat all the old wrongs and\- mistakes = over and over again - but under ever new cover-up names \-and = propagandist "justifications" and "explanations". But\- sometimes they = do reveal their empty-headedness, e.g. when they\- merely hope to reduce mass unemployment and rapid inflations by a\- few = degrees in a few years, or when they have nothing else to \-propose but = changes in the budget and in the official interest \- rates. Thus, obviously, they neither see nor admit the real causes \-and = possible cures. - J. Z., 25.4.97, 8.9.02. \par CRISIS: A Greek work for judgement or penalty of nature. - Dr. \-H. = G. Pearce, one of the few Georgists who was a clear advocate of = \-monetary freedom, too. I reproduced some of his writings but not \- yet the manuscript of his Introduction to Economics, being the \-notes = to his lectures at the Aquinas Academy in Sydney, for a few\- years. - I = still seek the hand-written final notes for this book\- manuscript, which was incompletely duplicated without them. -\-J. Z., = 18.4.97. \par CURRENCIES & GOVERNMENTS: The dishonesty, coercive and = \-monopolistic nature and the vested interests of governments are = \-today largely expressed also in their forced and exclusive\- = currencies, their depreciations, stagnations and manipulations. -\- J. Z., 25.1.90, 29.4.97. \par CURRENCY BOARDS: I see in them only a variation of central\- = banking. They may be the best form that central banking can take \-but = that would not be enough for me. Morally and economically \- acceptable to dissenters would be only such currency boards which = \-confined their activities to the voluntary payment communities\- which = believed in them. Since the faith in monetary despotism is\- still very popular this would give them a very wide sphere to \-act in, = at least for a while. More and more the successful \-monetary freedom = activities would deprive them of their followers\- and participants - = through one-man monetary "revolution s" or secessions. - \-J. Z., 22.4.97. - The statutes for any competitive = and\- voluntaristic currency board should carry a preamble like the = \-following: We do no longer recognize the rightfulness of \- monetary despotism via any central bank over any groups of\- dissenters. = We do not claim a territorial monopoly for our \-transactions and = powers. Our uniform exchange media will \- be exclusive only for our members (provided they agreed on this) and = accepted at their face value\- only by contract. And these contracts can = be terminated, at least\- at frequent intervals. Our exchange medium and = value standard is\- legal tender only within our payment community and towards its issue = centre. - J. Z., 22.8.93,\- 22.4.97, 7.9.02. - See ON PANARCHY in the = LMP PEACE PLANS series. See: \-CENTRAL BANKING, MONETARY DESPOTISM, = TOLERANCE, MONETARY FREEDOM, \-FREE BANKING.=20 \par CURRENCY MANAGEMENT & CENTRAL BANKING, MONETARY POLICY, MANAGED\- = CURRENCIES: Whether inflation, deflation or stagflation or a = \-temporary and relative boom prevails, it always means merely that the = government or its central bank is still in char ge of the\- controlling position in the economy and that, sooner or = later, it\- can and will mismanage it even more, although, perhaps, = otherwise \-than it did before. Mismanagement is inevitable in any = system \- that is not foolproof, that is monopolised, coercive and without \-free = pricing or the discounting and rejection option of competing currencies, = one that has no \- competition among different note issuers and no stable standard to = measure its exchange media\- against it. It might try to impose = circulation limits - that are ever increased, again and again. It might = try to counter an evil \- like inflation with deflation - only to arrive, most of the time, \-at a = degree of stagflation. It has not inherent limitations. It is, in this = respect, like\- an unlimited government. To be fully limited, all = government\- services and disservices and charges for them must be refusable \-by = individuals. The same applies to the money of monetary \-freedom. All = but the issuers themselves must be free to refuse it\-, as well as free = t o issue (print) and offer alternative exchange media \-and value = standards, if they can find any takers for them. Only \-monetary freedom = can provide sufficient quantities of exchange \-media and sufficiently = stable currencies. To each the exchange \- media and value standards of his or her dreams and to each the = \-government or free society of his or her dreams. Central\- management = of an exclusive and forced currency means mismanagement most of the time = in most countries. Only \- accidentally and then only for short periods, does it hit upon \-the = supplies that are correct, at least for its particular \-circulation = channels. (Not necessarily for all of a national economy.) Others it = cannot correctly supply at all.\- Imagine trying to supply everyone with sufficient fresh water from a = single dam in a large country, or with sufficient electric \-power from = a single electric power station. Similar difficulties\- exist for any centrally managed currency and it is high time that\- = they are recognised and abolished together with the whole central = banking as an imposition upon a whole country and all its people and all = its trading. However, \- central banking would not have to be prohibited or outlawed. It\- would = be enough to open it up to fully free competition or to reduce it to the = members of a volunteer community that is only exterritorially = autonomous. \- - J. Z., 14.12.92, 29.4.97, 9.9.01. \par CURRENCY REFORMERS, INTOLERANCE & MONETARY DESPOTISM: Most are = \-like statist tax reformers, i.e., they just want to replace \-one = monopolistic and despotic evil by another. - J. Z., 19.8.92. \par CYCLES, ECONOMIC, CRISES, BOOM AND BUST PERIODS, INSTABILITIES, = \-FLUCTUATIONS, IMBALANCES: Economic cycles are largely the result \-of = economic interventionism, especially monetary despotism. In\- former centuries, without a world market and abundant transport\- = facilities, natural catastrophes could lead to local starvation. \-Now = only economic, political and military or revolutionary\- interventionism = can provide for such artificial poverty and \- starvation periods, keep them up and prevent their abolition, = \-sometimes at the price of the lives of millions. Under true free = \-market conditions, including full monetary and financial freedom, free = tra de, free property rights and free enterprise, economic\- cycles would = largely disappear and natural catastrophes could soon be overcome for = their survivors. Only price fluctuations \-would remain, e.g. = corresponding to harvest or demand \- fluctuations, e.g. due to fashions. Nature as an enemy becomes \-more = and more bearable. But when one's own government and foreign = \-governments and all their military, education and tax slaves and \- all their bureaucrats are turned into enemies of peaceful and = \-productive persons - then the situation of the latter becomes often\- = desperate. Once they come to realize that monetary and financial\- freedom can be used as their Archimedean leverage, then they could\- = soon emancipate themselves from all internal and external\- oppressors = and exploiters. E.g., then they could make their \-separate peace with = millions of military slaves sent against \- them, setting them free to support themselves productively,\- within a = short time, in the country against which they were conscripted, much = against their will, in order to conquer it for their masters. Monetary = and\- financial freedom ideas could be exported into the heads of = \-revolutionaries everywhere, who do fight any despotic government. = But\- first we have to come to generally realize that monetary and \- financial freedom options and techniques are rightful and valuable = services \-and also an exportable or commmunicable ones. - J. Z., = 4.12.92,\-29.4.97. \par DEBTS, DEBTORS & THEIR ABILITY TO PAY OFF THEIR DEBTS: Having a\- = debt that is payable in the own notes or clearing certificates, \-i.e., = lastly in the own products, services or labour, is\- very different from being forced, by law, to pay one's debts in the = \-notes issued by others, which one had to earn first. If at least \-the = others were competitively supplied with notes or free to \- issue them themselves, then the situation of a debtor would not\- be too = bad but he still would not be monetarily quite independent\- or quite = free to clear. His situation becomes very different and\- sometimes desperate when the notes of others are monopoly notes,\- = issued only by a central bank, subject to its policies, interest rates = \-and manipulations. Any central bank may officially AIM at \-supplying = each individual with sufficient and sound exchange \-media for his purposes but that does not mean that it is = ABLE to\- do so or actually follows such a legally declared program. = Politicians and a monopoly post office may AIM at providing all kind of = good, wanted and competitive services, but \- that still does not mean that they are ABLE to do so. Obviously, \-a = Minister for Health cannot supply every individual with Health \-nor can = a minister for economics supply us with wealth or a \- minister for employment, supply us with full employment. And the = \-transport services that a minister for transport services could\- = supply would be limited to giving lifts to friends or hitchhikers \- or to e.g. to a taxi or bus service service that he might run = \-privately, or, at last, "generously" allow to be established. = Ministers for trade have no goods or services to trade\- with. Who would buy their knowledge and skills in an open market? At = most they can officially or unofficially trade with favours or = disfavours. And no minister for defence or deterrence \-has so far = delivered peace, security or effective and affordable=20 \-defence in the long run. At least governments were not cheeky\- enough = to appoint a minister for peace, too. - So why should we \-assume that = any central bank CAN do what ALL central banks ASSERT \-to be ab le and WILLING to do - but which they have never as yet\- delivered? - - = - Debts in inflated money are not as much of a\- burden to a debtor as = are debts payable in notes of a deflated \-currency. For the creditor = the reverse applies: He hates being \- under the legal and juridical presumption to have been fully paid when = \-he has only received a nominal payment of his debt in a much = depreciated paper money. And he is unfairly advantaged, during a\- deflation, when a debtor has to pay up the full nominal amount of\- his = debt and this in money that has been severely deflated, i.e., whose\- = purchasing power, on the deflated market, has been greatly \- increased. - - - The debtor's position is often rather \-unsatisfactory, = too, when both, inflation and deflation occur at \-the same time, as = happens always more or less under a forced and\- exclusive currency - and sometimes quite obviously and severely so.\- = He could pay off his creditors more easily, in inflated money, if\- only = at least part of the economy would not be deflated at the \- same time, so that he may not be able to earn enough of the\- stagflated = currency. The most severe stagflation occurs towards \-the end of a = galloping inflation, when goods and service prices \-have raced far = ahead of the capacity of the capacity o f the note printing\- presses. - Debtors and creditors can be fully and = easily\- satisfied only once both are quite free to clear, including the = \-freedom to issue, accept and use notes & clearing certificates in\- convenient denominations and both are also free to choose value\- = standards they do trust and free to refuse or discount any\- exchange = media or clearing certificates that they have not issued \- themselves. - J. Z., 19.5.90, 27.4.97. - See: MONETARY FREEDOM, MONETARY = DESPOTISM, FREE \-BANKING.=20 \par DEBTS: Debts must be normally - that is, reserving exceptional\- = cases due to passing circumstances - paid in goods or services. - \-E. = Milhaud, A Gold Truce, 46. (More entries can be found in the \-SLOGANS = FOR LIBERTY, file D1.) \par DEFLATIONARY DEPRESSIONS: See: DEPRESSIONS & CAPITAL; EMPLOYERS = \-UNDER MONETARY DESPOTISM, TURNOVER CREDIT, DEPRESSIONS,\- DEFLATIONS, = MONETARY DESPOTISM, PURCHASING POWER, QUANTITY\- THEORY. \par DEMAND & DEBT- OR REFLUX OR READINESS TO ACCEPT FOUNDATION FOR\- = CURRENCIES: The demand expressed in ready-for-sale goods, \-services and = labour - for any kind of competing and freely issued \- and otherwise refusable and not convertible currency, can give it\- a = value that is precisely at par with the nominal value,\- expressed in = one of the other value standard, for a currency. The \-most suitable = issuers for such currencies are the owners and \- providers of these goods and services, including employees. This\- = demand ought to be expressed in sound value standards, used in\- free = market pricing of the goods and services. The readiness to\- accept must be at par for the issuers themselves or for the\- members = of an issuing association, e.g. the shops of a shop \-association that = issues its own shop currency. They issuers must\- also be prepared to = accept it in all other payments due to them. E.g., when they have given a short term = loan with their goods and\- service vouchers or shop foundation = currency, for the payment of \-local wages and salaries, then they must = not only immediately \- accept their own IOUs at par from the thus employed and paid = \-employees, but must also accept the repayment of that loan in\- these = private exchange media, at par with their nominal value.\- When they let out premises, then they must accept their own "rent = money" in payment of \-rents, etc. - When an institution and a service, = as important as \-a local shopping centre, does issue its own currency, = then it\- becomes voluntarily accepted and this at par not only at that\- = shopping centre but among most other local businesses, e.g. \-hotels and = restaurants, too. As service providers they other acceptors might be \- included in the local shopping centre's issuing association, but \-they = need not be. They could also issue their own currency. All local debts = could be voluntarily settled\- with a local cur rency - or, possibly, one of several local currencies, if there is an = issue and reflux opportunity for several of them.\- If the community is = large enough, it might also find acceptable e,g., a\- transport and petrol money, an electricity money and a gas money,\- = perhaps even an entertainment service money and one for its education\- services. They market, i.e., sovereign entrepreneurs, traders, = consumers and free acceptors and issuers would have to decide their = currency issues between \-them. As long as they feel that their local = communities are not \- already sufficiently supplied with exchange media, they will attempt to = issue \-more. As soon as they feel that there is an abundant supply of = sound exchange media already, additional issue attempts or\- attempts of = e xisting issuers for higher circulations, will not\- succeed but be = rejected instead. - Demand and supply will \-regulate each other = automatically, here, too, by free pricing \-being applied to exchange = media - and their value standards. Only\- those supplying real values, at acceptable market prices and = transaction costs, will succeed. Others will fail. Good monies\- will be = free to drive out bad ones. - An occasional or panicky \-conversion of = convertible banknotes into gold coins would not \- regularly supply as strong a demand for them, as the daily demand\- = does which arises from a) the readiness of local suppliers who \-offer = their goods, services and labour for them, and b) the need\- for the local consumers for an exchange medium to acquire their\- daily = needs for consumer goods and services, added c) by the \-demand of local = debtors for an exchange or clearing medium to pay \- their debts with. - Free market rating of competing exchange media \-is = the essential indicator for any need of further issues or for \-stopping = issues and acceptances. Such exchange media could then\- not rise far above their par values nor far below them. That \-becomes = easier to understand if one considers them as a form of\- ticket money. = Who would accept more tickets than he wants to use? \-Who=20 would sell more tickets than he can supply seating for? \-Publicity, = sound value standards and free rating against them \-would be essential, = as well as the right to refuse acceptance. -\- That latter right should = now be especially practised against \- government paper money - as long as we are ready to immediately \-issue = sound alternative private or cooperative \-currencies, in free = competition with each other issuers, thus supplying the exchange media = and value standards \- required by the market for an almost friction-less turnover of\- all its = wanted consumer goods and services and the utilization of all its = underutilised or unused labour power. As long as \-unemployed would then = persist in being paid only in the money of=20 \-monetary despotism, they would have to accept the continuing\- = unemployment which results from this demand for all too many of\- them = and for all too long. Freedom for employees and their \- representatives and the employers and their representatives to agree = upon other and better \-means of payment, of the kind that can always be = kept sound and\- abundantly supplied, so that wages can always be paid = and goods \- and services always be readily sold, both at market prices. -\-J. Z., = 7.12.92, 29.4.97. \par DEMAND MANIPULATION: "Shave the top off demand." - Prime = Minister\-Keating, on interest rate rise, 14.12.94. - I would rather = have \-had the top shaved of this impertinent meddler. - What little is = left of our e arnings, after direct and indirect taxation and inflation, deflation or = stagflation, after exploitation by xyz \-government legislated = monopolies and restrictions, is then to be \-further reduced by = artificially increased interest charges! - \- Only extreme ignorance and prejudice can permit such mismanagers \-to = get away with it for years. - No matter how wastefully and = \-self-interested this great "leader" (he called himself, when he was \- treasurer, the greatest treasurer ever!) acted, he was allowed to\- stay = in power for years and years. Has any criminal ever done as\- much = damage as some of these "great leaders" have done? - First \- they inflate their monopoly money. Then, when some of this money, = \-after taxes, remained in your pockets, they introduce credit\- = restrictions, deprive potential debtors of the chance for credit \- for productive investments, thus throw people out of work,\- deprive = them of earnings, all, supposedly, in the interest of the \-public but = in reality merely in an attempt to permit them to persist with their = misconceived and misguided\- policies for a while longer, under the pretence that they would\- be = doing something positive. - No one has the right to coercively \-or = deceptively "shave off" anyone's earnings, property, \-purchasing power = or dem and, not by interest rate manipulation, by\- devaluation, by inflation, = by credit restrictions, by forced loans, artificial interest rates = ("discount policy") by "open market" sales of government\- securities, to reduce the circulation of its paper money, or by = "covering" exclusive and forced paper\- currencies, additionally issued, = with government "assets". - Not only bad debts (\-investments in tax = slaves, under inflation risk) of the own \- government are sometimes used as "cover" for further issues of \-legal = tender money but even bad debts of foreign governments, even despotic, = dishonest ones, that are already in an economic\- crisis, as a result. - = At the same time, those who treat us and \- shear us like sheep, prevent sound tax foundation from\- immediately = withdrawing tax foundation notes from circulation \-again, shortly after = they have been spent, so that they help to \-honestly clear government = spending against government tax claims. \- They commit immense crimes and then try to cover them up with \-some = "smart Aleck" remarks which the media simply report without \-tearing = them apart and refuting them. And the man in the street\- and voter and victim and even most of the supposed experts, meekly and = thoughtlessly accept them, for all too long, without any \-protest.=20 - J. Z., 14.12.94, 25.4.97. - I still remember a public and = uncontradicted remark by another former ALP Prime Minister of Australia, = Gough Whitlam, in which he declared his readiness to reduce all = Australian to recipients of pocket-money, with all other " n ecessary" goods and services becoming allocated as hand-outs by his = socialist government, a situation which also implied forced labour for = all Australians and 100% taxation for their output. In other words, he = wanted to treat all Australians like convicte d criminals, kept in a nation-wide prison. And I did not hear or read = even one word of protest about this utterance! A nation of sheep, = indeed! Just one anecdotal evidence on this: During one election and not = far away from the election urns, I had once a s h ort discussion with an old and long term Labor Party supporter. His envy = of higher earnings than his own made him favour highly progressive = taxation. So I asked him, would he oppose 80& taxation? No! 90% = taxation? No! 100% taxation? No! - So at least he w as explicitly ready to vote himself into 100 % enslavement to a = territorial government. - J. Z., 98.9.02. \par DEMAND: Liberate demand and make it monetarily and financially\- = effective - through monetary-, clearing-, and financial freedom, based = also upon free choice \-of value-standards. - J. Z., 7.12.93, 26.497, = 8.9.02. \par DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY & CIVILISATION: The reform proposed\- is = not a minor technicality of finance but a crucial issue which\- may = decide the fate of free civilisation. What is proposed here \-seems to = me the only discernible way of comp leting the market \-order and freeing it from its main defect and the = cause of the \-chief reproaches directed against it. - Hayek, = Denationalisation\- of Money, 100. \par DENOMINATIONS, APPEARANCE, SIZE & MATERIALS OF COMPETING\- = CURRENCIES: The choice of the most suitable denominations, sizes\- of = notes, appearances, designs, numbering, texts, paper or other \- materials used and steps to prevent forgery and to achieve a fast = \-reflux - can also be left to the free market, its competitors and\- = consumers to decide upon, and this with much more certainty of = successful\- outcomes than when they are decided by the central bank or \-treasury = as monopolists and coercers - if experience is a \-reliable enough = guide. - J. Z., 24.4.97. \par DEPRESSIONS & CAPITAL: During a depression it is not more \-capital = that is required to end the depression but a better \-condition for the = existing capital. In the main, the normal \-turnover of daily wanted and = needed consumer goods and services \- has to be restored to normal by free clearing or alternative \-sound = exchange media, used and issued just to the extent required \-to mediate = the turnover of all the goods, services and labour\- that, due to the depression, remain unsold. The same amount of\- = capital is about that existed before and will appear again, quite openly = and effectively, when really needed, after the depression. \-During a = depression capital still exists but it is no longer as\- extensively used as before and = after the depression in \-turnover-credits. It is there, but not used as = before. It is \-hoarded or kept in highly liquid accounts only, because = of them \- depression. Worst of all, there is no freedom for or knowledge of\- or = interest in - overcoming this turnover credit shortage through\- = monetary freedom. Capital is then kept rather unproductively in\- cash or in short term money market speculations, as liquid as\- = possible. (Capital will not b e invested in turnover credits, either, while turnovers are hard to = achieve, due to a deflation. Anyhow, saved up capital should not be used = for turnover credit but rather for productive investments. - J. Z., = 8.9.02.) It does then not make sense to invest it in loans for\- wage and salary payments, in productive industries = that would\- further increase the seeming glut (hard to difficult to = sell\- goods) in the market, due to the deflationary conditions. Penal = measures for such capital (as e.g. Gesell's stamp scrip) are \-neither = justified or necessary. Rather make the use of capital \- for turn-over credit unnecessary. Allow all turnover-transactions \-to = be mediated by special self-liquidating banknotes, on the \-banking = principle or real bills doctrine, instead, or via\- clearing house = certificates, with both expressing a sound value \- standard rather than the forced paper standard of legal tender. = \-Precisely the unsold goods, services and labour are needed and\- are = all that is needed to make these alternative turn-over loans\- and clearing arrangements. They are their "redemption fund",\- cover or = reserve - under monetary freedom. - Don't blame, expropriate, prosecute = or hang the "capitalist". Rather, make\- yourself independent of them. = Workers largely associated in\-=20 consumer cooperatives, for instance, could then appear as bankers\- = towards their employers, granting them wage payment loans and\- giving = them orders for further supplies of consumer goods. They\- would no longer insist that their bosses somehow come up with\- the = required ready cash, even under monetary despotism, which \-puts this = supply largely out of their hands. By this action they\- would enable the employers to act as employers towards them,\- rather = than rejecting them as job applicants. - J. Z., 24.9.91,\- 28.4.97. \par DEPRESSIONS, FREE BANKING & UNEMPLOYMENT: End all depressions\- = through the introduction of full monetary and financial freedom, \-as = most important parts of freedom of contract, free enterprise,\- free trade, freedom to exchange, and of the right to supply \-oneself = with work, without depriving anyone else of it - in order \-to support = oneself and one's dependants, honestly & productively.\- - Once that = freedom and its techn ical details are fully understood, by a sufficient number of activists, = then it could be\- realised within hours to days at most. - Governments, = on the \-other hand, do not know how to end any economic crises within = \- months, years, or sometimes even decades. They can only enlarge\- or = prolong them and hope for the best. Within the system of\- monetary = despotism there is no cure for depressions or \-inflations. It is the = cause. And markets that are distorted by \- this despotism can only very slowly and painfully and, to a \-limited = degree, adapt to it. And even in this they are hindered,\- as a rule, by = further economic interventionism. No rulers or \-their advisors have any = solution to offer - only false promises \- and hopes or measures or further restrictions. Sometimes they do\- = even admit this. But even then they are still not prepared to get \-out = of the way after first having removed all legal obstacles to = \-self-help. - J. Z., 19.12.92, 29.4.97 \par DEPRESSIONS: Many thoughtful people are more and more aware that\- = industrial depressions are caused chiefly by faulty control of\- money = and credit. Most "reformers", or those who recommend\- measures to remedy this, turn to government for issue and control\- of = money. It is my purpose here to briefly present an analysis\- and "cure" = in the light of economic liberty. - Laurance Labadie,\- The Money Question in the Light of Liberty, in THE STORM, 4 & 5, = \-1977. \par DISCOUNT OR DISAGIO OF PRIVATE NOTES & THEIR EFFECTS UPON FURTHER = \-ISSUES & ACCEPTANCES: Obviously, an issuer would not have to or want = to\- issue his notes at 10% discount and the next moment have to accept = them at\- 100% from one of his debtors. Some percentage of discount for his note = issues exists, that HE would be willing to put \-up with, during their = issue, seeing the normal profit margins he has when someone\- buys goods = or services from him, provided only that such\- discounts do not reduce the number of acceptors for his = issues \-and his chances for future issues. But it takes two to \-tango. = His potential acceptors have another opinion towards his\- discounted notes. Thus, as a prudent issuer, not wanting to lose = \-face, risk the reputation of his business and his ability as an = \-issuer, he would stop further issues at the first discount\- occurring and take up further issues only once the discount has\- = disappeared (together with the discounted notes, because he has accepted = \-them at par in payments due to him and cancelled them or has not \- re-issued them). Potential acceptors, unless they are among the \-few = who immediately could use them against the issuer at par, \-would = hesitate to accept any notes not standing at par. They\- would rather = accept notes by his competitors, as long as they \- remain at par. Thus, even if the issuer were prepared to issue\- more = of his notes, while they have a discount, he would find only a\- limited = market for them. - Then there are the media and his\- competitors, eager to point out such discounted notes. And note = exchanges and clearing centres would fast\- discover any real = over-issues if they had caused a justified discount - \-instead of = merely a temporary discount expressing an unwarra nted distrust towards his \-notes. The note exchanges would have more = notes by this issuer \-than he could offer in exchange in form of the = notes of others. \-The same applies to clearing accounts. Others would = have a \- clearing credit with him, in balance. He could not settle it with \-his = clearing claims against them. That would not only be fast\- noticed but = also fast publicised by the others. However, if only a mere small and = temporary discount for other reasons, \- although his goods and service cover are still sound, i.e., his goods = \-and services are still wanted, at their prices, then this fact would = tend to\- bring the discounted notes very fast back to his shop, for\- redemption in his goods and services at par. Thus, some "smart"\- = businessmen, not yet satisfied with the speed of the reflux of\- their = notes to them, might try to decry them, to speed up their \- return. But however unfounded the resulting and merely temporary = \-suspicions might really be, repeated experiences of this kind\- would = stick in the memory of many people and lead to refusals to\- accept his notes or to more wide-spread discounts and, perhaps, = ultimately, to\- a total rejection of his notes. People would tend to = prefer notes \-that do not depreciate below their par values even if = only upon \-rum ours, not real inability to cover them with fully with the goods\- and = services of the issuer. People prefer stable values, to the\- extent = that they can get them. They do not want to be fearful or\- panicky regarding the means of payment in their hands. Even upon = unfounded suspicious, they will tend to reject exchange media of = \-others and this is their right. An issuer would be foolish to \- upset and lose many to most of his potential customers just to provide a = \-few of them with bargain opportunities at his shop. - With stable = \-currencies having driven out most unstable ones fast, prices\- would tend to be more stable, too and represent, due to easier\- and = more certain sales, a lower price level, too. Thus we should expect less = discount sales than now, and lesser profit margins \- in sales. When profit margin are low then issuers could even\- less = afford to issue his notes at a discount, even if he were to \-find = enough ready acceptors for them under this condition. - \-J. Z., = 16.6.94, 17.4.97. - According to some re ports, some supermarkets are so efficiently run and have such a large = turnover that their profit represents only 1/2 to 1 1/2 % of the retail = prices and, nevertheless, the total amount of their profits is large. = But, obviously, at such profit rates they c ould not afford to issue their shop currency at a considerable discount. = - J. Z., 7.9.02. \par DISHONESTY OF GOVERNMENTS: The dishonesty of governments can be\- = best seen in their laws on coinage, exchange media, value\- standards, = credit, clearing, banking, exchanges and securities.\- Almost no government has ever remained honest in these respects \-for = very long. See : MONETARY DESPOTISM. - J. Z., 6.7.91, 26.4.97. \par DISTRIBUTIONISM, PURCHASING POWER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, = \-MONETATARY FREEDOM & MONETARY DESPOTISM: "Einstein's biographer\- = reports that Einstein regarded it as obvious that 'human reason must be = capable of finding a method of distribution which would\- work as effectively as that of production.' (Clark, 1971:559).... - ... = even a sensible philosopher .... stated approvingly that \-"Einstein is = clearly aware that the present economic crisis is\- due to our system of production for profit rather than for use,\- to = the fact that our tremendous increase of productive power is \-not = actually followed by a corresponding increase in the purchasing \- power of the great masses.' (M. R. Cohen, 1931:119) - We also find\- = Einstein repeating (in the essay cited) familiar phrases of socialist = agitation about the 'economic anarchy of capitalist\- society' in which 'the payment of the workers is not determined \-by = the value of the product', while 'a planned economy... would\- = distribute the work to be done among all those able to work', and\- su ch like." - Hayek, The Fatal Conceit, 59. - Almost all, here \-Einstein, = Hayek and some reviewers, and the main schools of \-economic, or rather = anti-economic thoughts fail to distinguish between supposed free = market\- and propertarian distribution under monetary despotism and the\- real = free market and propertarian distribution under monetary\- freedom. In = the former case they come, therefore, to demand even\- the abolition of the more obvious property rights and rights to = \-freely exchange products. The second case would help to enlighten = \-them but it is not freely practised and not even freely and \- widely taught, because it is outlawed. - Shop foundation and\- service = foundation money, ticket money and clearing certificates \-would, much = more obviously and quite sufficiently, distribute\- goods, services and labour but upon property, free trade and free = enterprise \-principles, giving everybody the chance to use his = capabilities,\- education, training and resources productively, to the = own advantage and that of his fe llow citizens, with each being\- rewarded in accordance to his = contribution to the total wealth. -\-J. Z., 30.3.94, 26.4.97. \par DIVORCE, FROM MONETARY DESPOTISM: Let us have freedom to divorce = ourselves from the\- government's monetary despotism, i.e., especially = its monetary \- legislation, its central bank with its issue monopoly power and = regulatory powers, , its legal tender paper money, but also e.g.\-, from = its compulsory taxation, protectionist policies, post\- office, railway = and road monopoly, its wars against=20 the poor and\- on drugs, its police and prison and jurisdiction = monopolies etc. \-Let everyone be free to opt out of any or all of them = - without \-being prosecuted for this, and let him then act at his own = risk \- and expense - for his own benefit, in every sphere. Starting\- = exterritorial autonomy for volunteers in the monetary sphere,\- during a = severe crisis, might be a good start towards a general liberation = effort. - J. Z., 18.4.97. \par During a rapid inflation people will often find that sufficient = notes of the inflated currency are not easy to get - they might have to = line up for them at the printin g presses - and not easily spent, at high purchasing power, because = holders of real values become reluctant to accept such notes, since they = deteriorate fast. When it comes to deflation, the government, as the = monopoly issuer, can easily achieve it and ma i ntain it but then it does not become easy for a debtor to obtain it and = for a creditor to get it back from a debtor. The term "fast" is also = misleading when one has to wait a long time before e.g. a credit = application is dealt with, or before one can sell =20 one's goods, labour or services for the "fast" money during a deflation. = Legal tender money becomes "softer" during an inflation and "harder" = during a deflation, i.e., it loses in purchasing power during the = inflation and gains in it during a deflation. T h e use of such terms might help to fill newspaper articles and muddle the = issues rather than help to clear them up. Under competitive, = market-rated and optional currencies they might no longer be as = frequently used. They are rather among the symptoms of th e exclusive and forced\- currencies of governments, while rightful and = sound alternative currencies by private or cooperative issuers are = outlawed. -\- J. Z., 4.9.89, 29.4.97, 9.9.02. \par ECONOMIC INTERVENTIONISM, REGULATIONS, DIRIGISM, CONTROLS,\- = CENTRAL BANKING: You can't try to control one side of an \-economic = system without screwing up some other segment of the \-economy. This is = because all economic phenomena are at some level\- interconnected. - Jim Downard, TC131p40. - Centralised and = \-monopolised banking screws up almost everything. - J. Z., 6.10.89. \par EMPLOYER UNDER MONETARY FREEDOM : The concept of the employer is = \-likely to change in the future, under monetary freedom. He will \-then = not only be considered as a provider of working capital,\- land, = buildings, machinery, raw material and organiser and \- manager and supervisor of productive efforts, as a\- publicist, sales = person and advertiser as well, but, also as one who\- either issues = sound means of exchange himself, to pay his suppliers and\- labourers and staff and his own profit with or who associates\- with = others, especially shopping centres, for the provision of \-sound = exchange media, as many as needed. Then he will also choose \- one or the other sound value standard for his exchange media and\- agree = with others that it is used in pricing goods, services and labour. = Today, under monetary despotism, employers have failed to\- be employers = for al l the unemployed and under-employed. His job \-as a distributor for = products and services will be very much\- facilitated. Issuing money = tokens based upon them, is easier than\- offering goods and services for = sale only against a monopolised \- and forced exchange medium. He will then appear, to that extent of his = currency issues, as a cash\--paying buyer in the market, instead of a = seller, trying to get enough monopoly money. All his\- issued notes will automatically and rather soon tend to stream\- back = to him, in payment for his goods and services (directly, or = \-indirectly, via his wholesaler and the retailers of this = \-wholesaler), for they have no other value. His notes will be\- recognised as distribution, transport and sales tickets for his = \-products and services. - J. Z.,\- 20.2.93, 23.4.97. \par EMPLOYERS UNDER MONETARY DESPOTISM: They can "provide" jobs only = \-to the extent that the central banking system permits them and\- their = customers to do so. When the central bank fails in this task then the = \-employers and traders have to dismiss a percentage of their \-employees, since they do no longer earn enough = through sales, to \-pay the wages of workers whose work they do no = longer need under \-these conditions of reduced production and reduced = sales. Presently, \- self-help steps, to overcome their sales difficulties, through = \-monetary freedom, are outlawed and usually not even \-known to and = appreciated by them. Like the workers themselves, \- they have become victims of monetary despotism - and usually even grant = it the sanction of the victims. - J. Z., 28.4.97. \par EMPLOYERS UNDER MONETARY FREEDOM: Only under monetary freedom\- are = employers free to completely fill their niche as employers, i.e. to be\- = or become or remain employers for all those able and willing to work = productively, even for the fra ctionally disabled, who, within their\- limitations, could still be = fully employed at whatever rates \-their work efforts would still be = worth. Already a single \-permanently unemployed in an economy, who is = able and willing to \- work, shows up a condition of monetary despotism that reduces all\- = employers at least fractionally to non-employers and employed to = \-unemployed - or people who have to fear unemployment and thus put \- up with jobs, conditions and wages that otherwise they would not\- = choose for themselves and would not have to. - J. Z., 28.4.97. \par EMPLOYMENT, STRIKES: Jobs need not be and cannot be rightfully = \-conquered, occupied and forcefully defended against competitors, no = matter\- how hard and violently one tries. Lastly the remaining free = consumer choices \- will defeat all such efforts. All one can achieve by coercive = \-intervention is not job creation but job transfers, from \-unfavoured = to favoured groups, e.g. from non-unionists to \-unionists, from private = employment into government employment. \- Nor are jobs inherently scarce and limited so that one has to \-fight = for them, although the conditions under monetary despotism\- do often = give people that impression and the notion of a "fair" \- distribution of the limited number of available jobs and various \-forms = of "job sharing" do remain popular. But jobs, under freedom, = especially\- monetary and financial freedom, can be rightfully = "created", or rather\- financed, as far as wage and salary payments are concerned, by\- = assuring the sale of their products and services. The products\- and = services themselves can then be monetised and exert a demand \-for or = purchasing pow er for labour. When there is no legal or \-miseducational (prejudicial, = ignorant) obstruction against \-free forms of payment for productive = jobs, via competing currencies and\- clearing options, all usable to purchase daily wanted goods, services = and labour with, then there will always be more jobs waiting than can be = filled by \- the available workforce. (Adding up all the goods and services that they = would want to purchase, if they had the money for them, come to much = more than they can earn in a day, a week=20 or a months or even a year. And, since all these goods and services = require labour for their availability, the need for labor is always = greater than the quantity of labor that can be offered in a day, even if = three 8 hour shifts as worked, or even in a we ek or a months. - J.Z., 8.9.02.) The desire for consumer goods and\- = services (including labour) is not limited and need no artificial = stimulation, e.g., \-by advertisements and miseducation. As free = producers and \- consumers all people can do their things for each other, under \-free = enterprise (including coops), division of labour (as\- extensive as they = want it to be and find profitable and enjoyable\- ) and freedom of exchange (including all monetary and financial \-rights = and liberties). Even much overtime 3x 8-hour shifts a day (to fully use = the machine and building capital available) \-by many to most employees, = cannot produce at any time as much as \-most people want to consume of the luxuries of life that can now \-be = produced and gradually acquired out of the p roceeds of one's daily labours. The good living and the wealth that can = be accumulated by productively working for 40 years constitutes, in = essence 40 years of demand for one's labour. The day's labour can = supply only a fraction of one's own wants or of=20 t hose of anyone else. Shortage of labor or the fullest possible = employment is the natural condition of a free market - for people not = prepared to beg, eat garbage, merely gather natural food - that can be = very laborious, too or steal or rob from other peop le. There is only a limit to the quantity\- of e.g. basic consumption, = of e.g. food stuffs and clothing that one an consume, without doing harm = to oneself. However, when the basics are secured by them, most people = then do not want to sit \- back and enjoy only these, and more leisure, but are prepared to\- work = more for increased qualities, advancing e.g., from a VW to a Mercedes,\- = from a track suit to a tailored suit, from a shack to a mansion. There = is no shortage of\- jobs but an artificial and legally upheld shortage of exchange \-media = and sound value standards to pay for them. That can be \-abolished by a = stroke of a pen or by the acts of a monetary \- revolution. Moreover, from the saved-up surpluses of greatly increased = current production over current consump tion, an unlimited amount of productive capital can be saved and soundly = invested, as long as there are still any unsatisfied wants or needs that = people are willing to work and pay for. - J. Z., 6.11.91, 26.4.97, = 8.9.02. \par ENERGY UTILITIES AS ISSUERS: How much better off would the \-plants = and distributors be (and the general economy as well) if\- they gained = the freedom to issue and accept their own oil-, \-petrol-, coal-, gas- = and electricity token monies? Why should\- they, too, have to depend the either inflated, deflated or\- stagflated = and always somewhat mismanaged note issues of central \-banks, when = their own service supply capacities could render them monetarily largely = independent from currencies supplied by=20 \-others? - They, too, are considered to be powerful lobby groups.\- = Alas, they did not, so far, to my knowledge, lobby for monetary\- = freedom for themselves and others. - To that extent they, too, have = granted \- the sanction of the victims. - J. Z. 16.5.94, 22.4.97. \par EXCLUSIVE CURRENCY, MONETARY DESPOTISM LEGAL TENDER & THE\- LEGAL & = JURIDICAL AUTHORITY FOR CREDITORS TO DEMAND "THE COIN OF\- THE REALM" OR = LEGAL TENDER, & IN CASE OF NON-PAYMENT, TO DRIVE A\- DEBTOR INTO BANKRUPTCY, RATHER THAN PERMITTING HIM TO SETTLE HIS \-DEBT = THROUGH A CLEARING EFFORT: The legal authority of a\- creditor to demand = a particular exclusive means of payment from a\- debtor is as pernicious as the authority for a debtor to pay in a = particular coercive exchange medium. - J. Z., 30.8.74. - The right\- to = demand legal tender paper money or gold or silver, unless this\- has been contractually agreed upon, should be replaced by the \-right = of creditors to demand only settlement via clearing, to the \-full = stated value of a debt, accepting in payment of that debt\- any mean s of payment, including IOUs of the debtor, but only at their free = market rating. In case of disagreements, that market rating\- might have = to be settled by arbitration. - This does, naturally, \- presume that the debtor is still an able and willing producer or\- = trader, prepared to recognize and to work and pay off his debts with his = goods, services or labor. \-Otherwise, the faster he is driven out of = business, the better. \- All his assets should be claimable by his creditors and he should\- = never get out of his debts by his bankruptcy declaration. All his = \-future earnings should still be subject to the claims of his \- former creditors. They might just leave him enough to go on\- producing. = - I do hold that the present bankruptcy laws do much\- wrong - to both = sides. - J. Z., 18.4.97. \par EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO FREE BANKING & MONETARY FREEDOM, = \-MISTAKES, GRADUALLISM, DEVELOPMENT, LEARNING CURVE, EXPERIENCE, = \-ENLIGHTENMENT: We must not, of course, assume that people will \-at = once act rationally in a new situation. But, if not by\- insight, they would soon learn by experience and imitation of the = \-most successful what conduct best serves their interests. - \-Hayek, = Denationalisation of Money, 55. \par FAST & EASY & SOFT MONEY: While governments, through their central = bank and its printing=20 presses, , can get their kind of "money" fast and easily and it becomes = soon a "soft" money, of diminishing value (due to its legal tender = monopoly status, which make over-issues possible and easy, it remains = often hard to obtain for all who are not in wo r king in the "public disservices" or are other moochers and parasites or = bought or subsidised groups of voters. Those who are not part of the = government's budget expenditures might not get any of the government's = money fast and easily, not only in credit a p plications but also when they struggle for it, with their goods, labor = and services, in what remains of the free market under monetary = despotism. "Hard money" may originally have been a careless use of words = for metallic currency, ignoring the fact that f o r a long time governments had reduced the gold and silver contents of = their coins as well, thus turning them into "soft" and "easy" money. = Moreover, it ignored that gold is one of the softest metals. As soft = money was considered, probably, without suffici e nt discrimination, all paper money, not only legal tender paper money = but also all paper money not redeemable in metal, regardless of whether = it was otherwise sufficiently secured and stabilised in its value. - = While government is easy to obtain for gover n ments and easy to spend for them, it is not so easy to obtain for = members of the "private sector". And when private people invest it in = loans they might get it back only nominally, in inflated form, which = makes it rather hard on the creditors and only som ewhat easier, not very often, to debtors. (Soon they will find such = loans harder to get.) \par FEDERAL FUNDS: A typical statist and political misnomer for \-funds = robbed from individuals and their voluntary associations and then = wastefully \-and dishonestly spread among the vast number of favourite = federal \- programs and their favourites, as determined by the election interests = of the politicians spending the proceeds of these robberies, of what is left of them after they had first looked = out, directly, after themselves. Federal or State "funds" are the = accumulated "funds" or treasures of professional robbers. - J. Z., = 4.7.93, 24.4.97, 8.9.02. - See : SPENDING, GOVERNMEN T \-SPENDING, VOLUNTARY TAXATION, TAXATION. \par FINANCIAL FREEDOM: Freedom of issue, free market rating, free = \-transferability, freedom to refuse to buy certain "investments" \-at = all, e.g., government "insecurities, and completely free and "\- well publicised trade in the financial sphere, would be the\- equivalent = to monetary freedom in the monetary sphere (exchange \-media or = currencies). It would permit the free accumulation, \- utilisation, transfer and combination or separation of productive = \-capital in every economic sphere as voluntary owners, traders,\- = investors and produ cers would require. - J. Z., 25.4.97. - Both, monetary freedom and = financial freedom require not any imposed value standard, not even if = this is the best one ever found or proposed, but, rather, freedom of = choice for individuals among all the value standa rds, for all their contracts. Not even an ideal value standard should be = forced upon anyone, far less upon the whole world or all people. - J.Z., = 8.9.02. \par FOUNDATION OR CAPITAL REQUIRMENTS FOR BANKS OF ISSUE TO\- = FACILITATE THE TURNOVER OF DAILY REQUIRED CONSUMER GOODS, SERVICES\- & = LABOUR, AS OPPOSED TO THE FOUNDATION & RUNNING CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS \- FOR SAVINGS & LOAN BANKS THAT DO GATHER & LEND PRODUCTIVE\- CAPITAL, = USING VARIOUS CURRENCIES & CAPITAL SECURITIES IN THE PROCESS: \-Most of = the errors in this sphere came in with the notion of\- banknotes as mere gold deposit certificates. Then, obviously,\- only = those with a sufficient gold stock, their own, or that\- deposited with = them by others, i.e., possessing real capital or its gold medal = equivalent, cou ld issue banknotes. These notes, being instantly redeemable in gold = coins, were wrongly considered\- as having no other foundation to = achieve their acceptance as exchange media in the their circulation = sphere, regardless of\- what short-term and self-liquidating real securities the bank had = \-demanded for the loans granted in its notes. The accumulated\- gold = stock was also considered as the ultimate reserve of the\- bank. If it had a 100% cover for the gold certificate banknotes\- then = bankruptcy as a result of failure to redeem its notes in gold, could = never occur. The introduction of fractional reserve currencies then \- led to the introduction of other securities as an ultimate \-backing, in = case a bank of issue would go bankrupt. These assets were either to be = used to purchase enough gold in the open \-market, to redeem all notes = in gold or, in case of bankruptcy, to\- satisfy the creditors at least with capital assets. Based upon \-this = model, legislators, public opinion and supposed experts \-insisted that = for each bank of issue the founders must have\- either a sufficiently = capital of their own or must be able to\- raise a sufficiently large capital through subscription by\- = shareholders in the bank. Other options for securing the par-\-value of = banknotes issued were not considered in this model. Such\- gold = certificates were considered merely as convenient\- substitutes for payments in gold coins and bullion. No further = \-thought on the subject seemed required and no further thought is\- = still invested in it by the adher ents to this systems. They are all too ready to condemn all other = currency issues as fraudulent\- or coercive issues of paper money, = whether done by businessmen or \-governments or the governments' central = banks. - However, even \- gold coins and 100% covered gold certificates, would have little \-value = to most holders, most of the time and in most situations,\- if they were = not also redeemable into daily wanted consumer \- goods, services and labours by those who provide these. This \-latter = real redemption fund or demand for notes, by all those who\- depend = upon monetary exchanges, due to the division of labour, is \- usually ignored by the metallists. They wrongly assumed that \-these = providers always want to be paid in gold coins or gold\- certificates = only and that they could not monetise their \-readiness to sell their = assets into monies of their own and that \- they could not keep any of their goods-, service- and \-labour-vouchers = at par with their nominal gold weight value, even when they would not = possess a single gold coin between them. - \-Here the true banking = principle as opposed to the currency \- principle is involved, or the "real bills doctrine": the\- discounting = of sound commercial bills that represent goods\- already produced and = sold and on their road to the retailers. In \-the issues these bills are = then merely discounted (for the time \- difference, insurance, cost and service involved) or, rather, \-"cut = up", temporarily or replaced by smaller, standardised bills,\- in money = denominations, with which ultimately the original large and uneven bill = \- is paid or cleared: The manufacturer receives a short-term IOU from the = wholesaler or draws a commercial bill upon him. Then the \-manufacturer = gets this IOU, or real bill, discounted by the bank.\- The bank keeps = it, the m anufacturer gets banknotes. Then the\- manufacturer pays his labourers = and suppliers with the banknotes. \-They carry them into the shops of = the retailers, getting goods \-for them. The retailers use them, in cash = payments or via\- deposits at the bank, to pay their debts to the wholesaler and he = \-pays his debt to the manufacturer or the bank. (The bank might\- = merely have taken the real bill as security or may have purchased \- it.) This kind of turn-over clearing and payment scheme is\- = self-liquidating and does not need any gold stock or other\- capital = securities behind it to make it possible. It merely \-requires some = office facilities, some staff and the ability to \- pay the printer immediately or soon. The ready for sale goods, = \-services and labour provide a very large redemption fund for \-these = goods, the only redemption fund required and establish a \- strong demand for such notes, which assures their reflux to the = \-issuer, whereby the notes disappear from the circulation, as well\- as = all the debts involved and the goods, services and labour \-efforts that = were used up in the process. Although the \- participants may consider gold weight pricing of their goods,\- services = and labour as convenient and would have to be ready to \-accept such = notes at par with their nominal gold weight values, \- none of them would have to possess a single gold coin or bullion \-bar = and none of them would have to be traded between them, far \-less would = there have to be a gold hoard, in the vaults of the \-issuer, = corresponding to their total e xchanges. How unnecessary \-such a gold hoard is can also be seen if one = envisions all these \-transactions having taken place only via much more = obvious clearing, in account \-books or electronically, without any = money tokens (or gold coins or\- bullion), being owned, produced or moved from one to the other. As = \-long as this current or reflux or demand or debt foundation for a\- = currency is sound, i.e., remains equivalent to the notes issued, no = other ultimate redemption fund or security is \- required - apart fr om the standard shop foundation among the members of the bank of issue, = which might be a shop association. When sufficient immediate or near = future reflux is missing then only a capital security or insurance fund = or claim upon it is all that the note hold ers can ultimately claim - if such funds, guaranties or insurance is = provided. But for the note-issue and acceptance business itself it is = not required. If notes are only issued upon capital assets then no one = is obliged to honour these notes with them\- any or sufficient immediately available consumer goods, services or labour. = An "asset currency" has no such assets. Its security is only realisable = upon the liquidation of the business - or to the extent that any cash = can be raised by the sale of such assets on the open market. Unless, of course, people are acting under = delusions,\- once again, and, although they are the real providers of = the real \-redemption fund, they oblige themselves to accept notes = issued\- upon mere capital securities, because they think that the existence = of\- these securities would make the currency safe or give it a sound\- = and sufficient current value. But even then it is their own readiness to = accept\- which would give that currency a real, full and immediate value, not = the ultimate \-redemption, security or reserve fund which they and they = issuers \-imagine to be necessary. People who issued ticket or token = monies\- were often clearer about the foundation of their kinds of private = \-money. Alas, often they, too, were mixed up and promised \-redemption = in "real" money, although their own money was more \- real than the money they considered to be the only "real" money.\- Alas, = even those who were aware of the mere clearing involved in\- the pure = "banking principle" and of its self-limiting and\- self -liquidating nature, as well as its inherent safety features, assuring = sufficient "reflux" or clearing, were all too often children of their = \-time and thus still subscribed to gold convertibility notions so that = \- they not only demanded real bills as security but also gold = \-convertibility, although objectively it was unnecessary and the = \-gold-par-value of the notes and gold pricing could have been = \-continued merely by using gold weight units as a reckoning or \- value standard unit, NOT AT ALL as a means of exchange unit - or\- only = rarely, when holders of such rare metal coins wanted to pay \-with them = and their creditors were willing to accept them. - What \- any currency really needs is a CURRENT DEMAND for it by the \-providers = of daily wanted consumer goods, services and labour. Currency holders = usually \-want to buy and use goods, services and labour, not purchase\- capital securities, at least not with most of their regular \-earnings = or all of their savings. (The cases where their earnings are so high = that they\- could immediately or soon consume only a small fraction of them and = have to invest most of the rest, are still rather rare.) - \-Currencies = should not be issued upon capital that is only required in case of the = ultimate failure of a currency issue. \- Instead, currency should be issued upon whatever gives it an \-immediate = value in the hands of note holders for the things they\- do want most of = all and most regularly, daily or weekly, in their \- normal shopping and spending, without which they could not\- survive in = an exchange economy for many days. - The issue \-principle for capital = assets involves capital securities, not\- currencies. Capital is made = easier transferable by capital\- securities. Consumer goods and services and labour are easier\- = exchanged by currencies. Capital asset securities are useless \-without = real capital assets or capital expectations (returns of\- capital with profit) behind them. Currencies are useless without\- = currently wanted goods and services behind them. The two should\- never = be mixed up. Currency should never be ISSUED to finance \- capital requirements. It should only be USED by those who can\- spare = some of their income or earnings for investment purposes, \-to SUBSCRIBE = to capital securities. And capital securities should\- not be used=20 and need not be used to ISSUE currencies but can at most provide a = guaranty fund in case sound issue principles\- and practices for = currency issues have not been followed and that\- is exactly the case = when currencies have been issued merely upon "\- securities". What good is a banknote claim to some bricks in a \-house, = some railway sleeper or part of a bulldozer, or to some\- capital = securities, due in a few years, to the consumer who holds \- the currency note? No matter how often and how strongly such a bank note = issuer assures him that all his capitals is secured by\- capital assets, = to the full amount of the note issue, what can \- the note issuer then buy with the notes - unless he finds some\- deluded = acceptors who are ready to deliver for such asset\- currency the kinds = of goods, services and labour which the note\--holder really wants? But = then others provide the real cover for=20 \-these notes, not those who issued the assets upon which such note\- = issues were supposedly based. - At most the bank issuing "asset = \-currency" could supply a redemption demand for some of its notes\- with a corresponding quantity of the securities it holds. Then\- the = securities so received in redemption by the former note\- holder, would = have to be sold by him on the capital market, to \-get the currency he = wants. That market may be in decline just \- then or even in a desperate situation. - Indeed, capital\- securities = may be really secure and profitable - in the long run, in the average, = and when insured \-- but that means merely that they are good capital = securities in \- the long run and not that they do have any other value presently \-than = their market-rated sales value - if and when they can be\- sold. Some = might even have an almost instant cash value on the \-capital market. = But, obviously, they=20 do not have it in the local shopping centre. \-Consequently, potential = acceptors avoid them, even if they come \-in denominations that are like = those of money denominations, even\- if they stand at par with their = money denominations. Try to do\- your shopping with shares or bonds nominally and in the market = \-presently worth $ 1. Will you find many acceptors who do accept \-them = like ready cash? Why should they, if they do not want to \- invest or speculate in the capital market, or not in these of its = assets? Can you blame them if \-they reject your share or bond issue = offer and rather insist on \-being paid in their own notes or in the = currency notes of others \- which they do know and have reasons to trust? - In this sphere \-people = are too ready to accept the mere glowing promises of the politicians of = business instead of insisting upon realized \-promises only, goods and = services and wanted reforms supplied. \- Many businesses fail. Business promises or promising businesses\- are = not always kept or successful. They are not ready cash - of a\- public = or private kind - which represents already produced goods,\- services and labour ready for sale for this cash. - Would you\- accept = the promises of a politician of a large wealth, that he \-supposedly = could provide, in form of cash notes issued by him?\- Would any of your suppliers accept such notes? Then why accept \-notes = that are merely based upon promises or speculations of\- businessmen, = financiers, managers and organizers, who have no \-immediate cover or = redemption fund to offer in the form of the \- goods, services and labour that you want or need? When one gets = \-one's asset currency notes redeemed in a capital asset, one is \-then = confronted always with the problem or task to convert that \-capital = asset into cash or a clearing dis count by conversion at a stock exchange via a broker. Time and costs are = involved. The transaction costs may be large. The delays involved = considerable. One \-might have to collect the security and present it to = a broker,\- who may live a 100 km from where one lives and whose office hours\- one = cannot keep for a while because one has to keep one's own\- office = hours. Nowadays there are also permits and taxes involved\- upon the transfer of capital securities and special record\-keeping. = Even the best capital securities are as good as cash \-only among = certain people and in limited situations. They do not \-encounter an = almost universal local acceptance wherever one \- happens to live and work. - Those who insisted upon a capital\- guaranty = fund even for mere turnover promoting banknotes, acted \-under one or = the other of many delusions, e.g. the one that the \- issue of banknotes would enable a banker to take up a loan from \-the = public. Then they wanted to balance that loan by securities \-to be = provided by the banker. They did not see the note-issuing banker as merely providing a clearing = house service with his\- notes, i.e., helping his customers to exchange = their goods,\- services and labour for those of other customers, paying = the \- banker a fee for this important service. Neither the banker nor \-his = customers need any capital for this purpose. (Apart from the costs of = note-printing and offices and their furniture.) - Alas, the very \- wording of the traditional commercial bills kept up the illusion\- of a = metal payment being ultimately required, although most\- bills, in = practice, were settled by clearing or payment in banknotes. That = "payment in gold" was a fixed idea or spook in\- the heads and still does much damage now, in form of the \-authority of = creditors to suddenly demand cash in form of legal \-tender currency = instead of merely non-cash payment or clearing.\- Even most banknotes, = in their texts, persisted to uphold the \- illusion of gold payment - when this was long legally abolished\- and = one legal tender paper note was merely exchanged upon demand\- for = another legal tender paper note. - People are not mastering \- the words but are largely mastered in their thinking and actions - by = the words and ideas in their heads, no matter how false and misleading = \-these words and ideas are. Indeed, cash and securities are both = "valuables" \- but that does not give them an equal and ready cash value towards\- all = people in all localities and situations. Both are also all \-too often = merely called money. But that does not make them the \-same a nd easily interchangeable everywhere by everyone and\- equally = acceptable to all people at their face value or at their\- market value. = Indeed, capital securities are sold and bought for\- cash but the very = fact that they are bought and sold for cash\- does already indicate that they are not identical to cash. Cash \-has = to be kept at par with its nominal value, or close to it and \-must be = acceptable widely, at least locally. Nor is interest paid\- to cash holders or is any capital appreciation to be expected\- from = holding it (except in times of deflation). - Indeed, \-there exists even = a special "scrip" or currency which facilitates \- the transfer of capital securities and dividend stamps attached\- to = securities have sometimes been used as cash, in some circles,\- shortly = before they were due. But that still does not make the\- securities identical or sufficiently interchangeable with cash to\- = allow them to serve as a foundation. Securities bridge time and promise = - not always deliver - a greater value in the future.\- Currencies offer = instant or near future satisfaction \- opportunities and without them they become mere capital securities of = which most people want, if any then only a limited \-number. Moreover, = capital securities rarely stay in their market \-rating near their = nominal or issue values but fluctuate greatly\- above or below these. That makes them still useful in the capital = market but not in the currency market, expect for limited and\- wanted = conversions there. - J. Z., 23.4.97. - Since there exists so much co nfusion on this subject I did not mind repeating myself on thus subject = but I do invite shorter and more effective refutations of this ancient = error. \par FREE BANKING VS. MONETARY DESPOTISM, MONETARY TOLERANCE VS. = \-MONETARY INTOLERANCE: If you let your money become monopolised\- and = coercive (centrally issued, planned, directed and \-mismanaged, often to = the benefit of the issuer only), then the \- results are even worse than letting your religion become \-monopolistic = and compulsory. - J. Z., 26.7.91. - Indeed, in the\- exchange media = sphere and that of value standards, we are likewise\- confronted by = dominant faiths as well as minority groups of non-conformists, non-believers, = dissident and\- Protestant groups and sects, all of them representing, = usually, only small \-fractions of truths and moral values among their = dogmas, if any. The atheists, \- rationalists, humanists or agnostics in this sphere are still\- only a = very tiny and uninfluential minority and that one, too, is\- split into = numerous factions or sects engaged in a verbal civil war or\- verbal intolerance. Some have already made attempts to define the = \-basic principles of monetary tolerance but so far few have\- = subscribed to them. See especially the writings and drafts of \-Ulrich = von Beckerath. - J. Z., 26.7.91, 28.4.97. \par FREE BANKING, DEFINITION: Consumer sovereignty, free enterprise = \-competition, freedom of contract, free pricing, free trade, \-property = rights, self-responsibility, in the most important\- sphere of money, = currency, clearing, credit and value standards.=20 \-- J. Z., 24.4.97. \par FREE BANKING, THE GREATEST GOLD RUSH OF THEM ALL, WHILE AVOIDING\- = GOLD AS AN EXCLUSIVE & FORCED MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE & AS AN EXCLUSIVE & = FORCE VALUE\- STANDARD: The greatest new "gold rush" and most permanent = boom \- will occur when the owners of wanted goods and services realize, = \-finally, that they can directly "coin" or "monetise" or \-"liquidify" = them into their own kinds of competing currencies, buy\- with them the goods and services they want, grant short-term productive = loans with them, especially for wage payments, and assure, through\- = such spending, corresponding sales of their goods, services and\- labours. In this way all producers and traders could "open their \-own = and successful gold mine". - J. Z., 4.7.93, 24.4.97. - Via the gold = clearing or gold for account standard they=20 would open up the treasure chest of all the gold accumulated in the = world, for thousands of years, for the purpose of gold-weight reckoning, = as well as exchanging clearing certificates and notes that have been = kept at par with their nominal gold weight va lue, into part of this combined gold treasure, if they want to and to = the extent that they want to. To that extent gold-redemptionism would be = very much extended, but it would no longer by compulsory for the = issuers. - J. Z., 8.9.02. \par FREE BANKING: "Blessed will be the day when it will no longer = \-from the benevolence of the government that we expect good money \-but = from the regards of the banks for their own interest. It is\- in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater \-part = of those good offices we stand in need of." - Hayek,\- Denationalisation = of Money, 100. - What benevolence of\- governments, since they are = always benevolent only with other \- people's money? - Not just the banks would enjoy monetary\- freedom. The = right to issue, to clear, to discount, to refuse\- competitive currency = issues and value standards, will belong to\- everyone. Many other = businesses with many payments to make and \- many payments to receive will also be suitable issuers, at least for\- = some forms of local currency. Without legal tender and a monopoly \-for = bad money, good money would drive it out. - J. Z., 7.4.94,\- 24.4.97. \par FREE BANKING: Free clearing and free note issue can bring about = \-the exchange of all labour, services and goods that their owners \-or = providers are otherwise free to exchange at free market\- prices. - J. Z., 23.7.93. - That option is as important to our = \-survival and prosperity as are e.g. freedom of expression and\- = information, freedom of conscience and freedom to measure and calculate. = And yet, this freedom is severely suppressed by the \- laws of monetary despotism and neglected by public opinion more = \-than most other liberties are. I still wonder why, after pondering = this question since 1952. - J. Z., 26.4.97. \par FREE BANKING: I should be able to OFFER you MY money, issued by\- = myself (or with my associates) but I should not be able to\- FORCE it = upon you at par or at any discount, unless you agreed, \- beforehand, to accept it on terms that are agreeable to both of \-us. = There are some exceptions to this: In case my money has \-become a local = currency, locally accepted at par, and you have \- not insisted on another payment in our contract, then you should have to = accept this local currency - as tacitly agreed upon. - \-Moreover, = rather than driving me into bankruptcy, by demanding\- from me payment = in any exclusive currency, which I have not \- contracted to supply you with, you should only have the right to\- = demand clearing from me, possibly settled by the offer of my own\- means = of exchange, even if only at a discount, but up to the full\- amount = that I owe you, determined in some=20 sound value standard.\- If we cannot agree on the size of the discount = then we should\- come to agree on an arbitrator who would settle this = rate for us.\- Only if I were also unwilling or unable to thus satisfy = you thus, by \- clearing, should you be able to drive me into bankruptcy. - J. Z., = \-2.2.90, 22.4.97. \par FREE BANKING: The term is applicable to all monetary freedom\- = options, not only to the issues and acceptances and clearings of\- = formal banks. Primitive money issue and acceptance is also a \-banking = and clearing function, although a pri mitive one. Monetary \-development towards to advanced banknotes, = commercial bills, bill\-discounting, clearing facilities, money exchange = services, etc., falls \-also under banking, even while formal banks are = not established.\- The name indicates, probably, the origin. It refers to the bench or = table of\- a money exchanger. He needed no other capital than it, small = amounts in different currencies and his\- exchange rate knowledge and = reckoning skill, to let him profitably\- deal with the various currencies and currency substitutes offered\- to = him and wanted from him by his customers. A modern bank of\- issue does = also not need a capital of its own, just an office and \-a printing = facility or a printer's credit. How far the \- circulation area of any advanced private currency will expand,\- = beyond a local payment community, over a state, a federation, a = \-continent or the world, would have to be left to the market and\- its free participants, acceptors and refusers. Computers will = \-facilitate checking up on the validity and value and genuineness\- of = private competing exchange media, as they can, upon various\- credit cards. Automatic forgery detection machines do already\- exist. = But I for one am less worried about international acceptance for any = private currency than I am interested in seeing locally provided as much = local currency as is required for \- local service, goods and labour providers. In areas that have \-much = international tourist influx there are already many \-competing exchange = offices, in addition to such services being \-provided by local = commercial banks. Even if no world-wide or\- continent-wide competing currencies should develop and be \-maintained, = under full monetary freedom - apart from the\- circulation of some = privately minted gold and silver coins, most likely in\- standardised weight units - and credit cards - these exchange = \-facilities would suffice to enable tourists to pay their way\- = everywhere and to see to it that local exchange media are \-returned to = their issuers. Whatever is convenient and profitable \- in this sphere - will be provided under monetary freedom. Whatever\- is = too inconvenient and too unprofitable will not be - and that\- is as it = should be. We should not sacrifice our economic options, prosperity and = our liberties to the uniformity spleen. \- Informally, and without having legal tender in other countries,\- and = often under-ground, some currencies, like the U.S. dollar,\- have already turned into world currencies. DM were, likewise, widely = accepted in other European countries, at least on the \-black market, = when the own national currencies were more wildly\- inflated than the DM was. Let people do their own things for and\- to = themselves, in this sphere, too. Only coercion, theft, forgery\- and = fraud need to be suppressed and that can be done more \-e ffectively by private or cooperative and competing agencies,\- too than = by territorial State governments. - J. Z., 7.12.92. \par FREE BANKING: To force all people in a country to be paid only\- = with one exclusive and forced currency is as wrong and\- uneconomical as = forcing all of them to be employed only by the\- State or by a single = private but monopolistic corporation. Free\- choice for the issue & acceptance of all kinds of wage payment \-means = and for all kinds of value standards for them. - J. Z.,\- 29.12.92, = 29.4.97. - What is unlawful here should be legalised \- and what is legalised here should be outlawed. - "Embrace what\- you = have burned and burn what you have embraced" - A remark\- supposedly = uttered by a priest upon the conversion of the first\- French king to = Christianity.=20 \par FREE EXCHANGE & MONETARY FREEDOM & TAXES: Only an unlicensed\- = unregulated, untaxed exchange on a truly free market, that is\- also = monetarily and financially free, is a FREE EXCHANGE. - J. Z.,\- 21.10.89. - It requires absence of all wage- and price-, = interest\--rate- and rent-controls, quotas, subsidies, compulsory = licensing, reserve requirements, imposed rare metal convertibility and a = \-free transp ort system, too. - The Soviets are not longer ruling\- in the Soviet = empire but all too many of the Soviet's \-interventionist economic = measures persist there - and in the\- supposedly free Western countries, = without being recognised and\- fought as such. - J. Z., 29.4.97. \par FREE MARKET & MONETARY FREEDOM & MONETARY DESPOTISM: The free = market cannot sufficiently liberate, e.g. supply full employment \- (for = all able and willing to work) and easy sales (for all\- offering consumer satisfactions at market prices) if it is not a = \-fully freed market, i.e., one that would especially include\- monetary = and financial freedom, too. - It is hard to understand\- how such an = important liberty could have been=20 overlooked or distrusted or slandered for so long and by so many, even = when \-freedom of expression and information existed. The extensive = existing freedom of expression and information and powerful and very = affordable alternative media should be bully \- utilised, in their strength, against monetary despotism, a.s.a.p. - J. = Z., 29.12.92, 29.4.97. \par FREE TRADE & MONETARY & CLEARING FREEDOM: The stocks of goods \-and = the number of services and labour hours that could be made \-accessible = on the international market are immense. They could be\- mobilised, = world-wide, via a) gold weight value accounting (or \-their freely agreed upon equivalents), used in\- free = international clearing transactions that never promise \-payment in gold = weight units but acceptance of these clearing\- media as if they were their equivalents in metallic gold. b) By the = free\- circulation of clearing certificates of this kind, world-wide, = \-and their use to pay all imports and exports with them, if that\- is agreeable to the traders involved. c) By the free transfer of = \-non-cash accounts, whether these are kept on paper records or are = \-merely electronically recorded and whether they use for their \- clearing purposes a gold weight unit or whatever other value standard = unit the \-trading partners find mutually acceptable. d) By the use of = sound \-commercial bills of exchange (real bills) or their equivalents, = \- in international trading, as has been the tradition for hundreds\- of = years, when not interfered with. But these should be bills\- "for = clearing only", unless something to the contrary has been\- = contractually agreed upon. They should not longer be legally and\- juridically treated as promises to = deliver rare metal quantities or legal\- tender paper money. For that is = a kind of speculative dealings in futures in which \- fulfilment of the contract is not always possible, unless hedging \-has = been undertaken or withdrawal premiums have been agreed upon.\- If the Special Drawing Rights or SDRs, granted by the IMF, were of that = nature and if the IMF were not a monopolist for such issues and if they = were not usually granted to more or less\- bankrupt and mismanaged = governments, then they would be O.K.,\- too. But it seems advisable to replace them by private issues and\- = accounting and value reckoning, without any exclusive and forced\- = values and between traders rather than between governments -\- which should have nothing whatsoever to do with international \-trade = and finance. - J. Z., n.d., 29.4.97. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE, = INTERNATIONAL CLEARING.=20 \par FREEDOM OF NOTE ISSUE, FREE BANKING: "They may even find out that = \-freedom of note issue is the simple key to the abolition of bank = \-monopoly." - HENRY MEULEN, THE INDIVIDUALIST, 6/78 p 27. \par FULL EMPLOYMENT & MUCH EASIER SALE FOR ALL GOODS & SERVICES: = \-Goods, services and labour could almost sell themselves if they = \-could be freely offered in form of money tokens. Moreover, the \-o wners of goods, providers of services and labourers offering \-their = labour services, could then even anticipate their sales by using their = money tokens first, buying with them - as far as they \-could - their = requirements and then later accepting them \- in payment, i.e., redeeming them with their goods, services and\- = labour. Only monetary despotism could have left such a free,\- easy, = natural and self-liquidating issue and reflux option for \- sound exchange media - largely unused over the centuries and still\- = overwhelmingly repressed today. The tradition of this repression \-is so = strong and widespread that it is largely accepted as widely \- as death and taxes are. But this evil is much easier to avoid and defeat = permanently. As many goods, services and labour hours\- could thus be = monetarised as people want and are willing to give \- their goods, services and labours in return. Any shortage of\- exchange = media between them could then be rapidly supplied. Moreover, under = voluntary acceptance and free competition and sound value\- standard reckoning, no one could, even if he wanted to, force so \-many = of his tokens into circulation that they would become vastly\- = depreciated or that they could affect any prices marked out in\- sound = exchange value standards. - Yet, this natu ral and problem solving monetary \-liberty is everywhere legally = suppressed and largely unknown and \-studied only in some more or less = obscure writings, that few\- scholars are fully aware of. Probably no = one knows all of them as \- yet - for no full bibliography of such writings has been published and = only few of them are in print at any time or accessible in\- public = libraries. Almost all people talk or write about money -\- but usually only about the money of monetary despotism, not the\- money = of their monetary emancipation. As a result they are all\- unjustly and = unnecessarily impoverished, driven into\- dictatorships, civil wars and = wars against their will, dedicate\- their lives to class-, race-, national-, religious- and\- ideological = hatreds - instead of being fully employed and freely \-exchanging with = whoever they like on earth. It is a tragi-comedy.\- According to one recent report, it may be exaggerated, if one can\- = really exaggerate the wrongs and evil of artificially brought\- about = unemployment, there are ca. 1 billion unemployed and \- underemployed now. Add to them their dependants! And, apparently, \-no = leader or parliamentarian or bureaucrat or government expert \-or = central banker knows the cure or admits to it. Neither do\- their = victims. Nor do they show a ny significant interest in it. - \-It is almost as it was before the = Reformation in Europe with \-regard to religious freedom. - J. Z., = 18.9.91, 28.4.97. \par FULL EMPLOYMENT: Full employment expresses the freedom to = \-exchange, to mutual satisfaction, whatever one has to offer in = \-labour services and skills (via some currency, employer, retailer, = banking or clearing services) for whatever goods, services \- and labours one wants. To be fully free and effective in \-promoting = full employment for all involved in free exchanges, all factors = involved, \-the exchange media, value standards, clearing and banking \- services, prices, wages, employers, bankers, wholesalers, \-retailers, = etc., must be quite free to do their things in this process, \-quite = unlimited in their productive and exchange contracts and in \- their terms and conditions. Especially they must know,\- appreciate and = apply full monetary, clearing and financial\- freedom. No law or = regulation or board, authority, judge, inspector, controller, \- policeman - or central bank must be given any powers to prevent,\- = reduce, regulate or postpone or tax their exchanges. Only then\- will = the market be free and can all the debts and credits become freely = exchanged for each othe r and thus settled. Not only some \-forms of money must be permitted, = namely the money of monetary despotism: an exclusive and forced or legal = tender currency, but all kinds\- of money that free people are able and = willing to issue and able \- and willing to accept, to their own advantage and to that of their = trading partners and that of the whole economy. With regard \-to full = employment that requires e.g. the repeal of all\- anti-truck = legislation, so that alternative exchange media for\- wage payments can be freely offered and freely accepted,\- discounted = or refused, particularly in times when a central bank\- severely = over-issues its paper money or has severely deflated it. \-In other = words, full employment requires free and voluntary \- conditions, in which good monies are free to drive out bad monies\-, = that is: in which bad monies are not legally given despotic powers to\- = drive out good monies - which leads to stop-and-go policies, \- alternating booms and busts, and almost all the time introduces \-at = least degrees of inflations AND deflations AND stagflations,\- which = would not occur under monetary freedom. No truths may be \- better established in fact and in theories in economics and \-public = policies and legislative efforts and yet, this insight is \-still one of = the rarest and least popular, most ignored or most\- argued against. - = J. Z., n.d. & 29.4.97. \par FULL EMPLOYMENT: Full employment requires, first of all, full\- = monetary freedom. - J. Z., 6.11.91. - Alas, so far not one in a\- = million unemployed and perhaps only one in ten-thousand economists \- has recognised this truth or, in other words, the connection \-between = legal tender monopoly money and inflation, deflation and\- stagflation. = - Once this truth is recognised, involuntary mass \- unemployment could, in most cases, be abolished within a day. But \-the = mentality of unemployed induces them rather to seek further \-government = meddling, or to appeal to charity or to gamble, prospect for \- gold, diamonds etc., retreat to a potato and carrot patch and\- blame, = "capitalism", "financiers", "the market", "conspirators", = \-"competition", "immigrants", "profiteering", "greed", "speculation" = etc. - Even these \-i magined causes have not yet been fully registered and refuted\- yet. - = Their floods swamp or push out of consciousness the few real solutions = that have been \-proposed. GIGO. - J. Z., 26.4.97. \par GIFT VOUCHERS, ON THE ROAD TO MONETARY FREEDOM? Only yesterday, = \-in Franklins supermarket store in Bowral, I saw a sign that\- = indicated that Franklins issues gift vouchers in $ 10, 25 & 50 \- denominations, which are usable in all of 240 Franklins stores in = \-Victoria, NSW & Queensland. These, too, could suddenly be transformed = into loans for wage payments to employers. It might\- be worth a try for = them. One of the other shop association or\- chain store ought to take the lead in this. - Gift vouchers,\- properly = issued, as loans, for wage payments, could become a very \-important = gift to a whole depressed economy, with close to 1 \- million unemployed in Australia alone. - Do look this gift-horse \-into = the mouth. Do check out its teeth. You will find them to be sound. These = gift vouchers, in the hands of consumers, have their \-full monetary = value, even when=20 they were not first paid for with \-the government's forced monopoly = currency. - It is also obvious\- that no store could or would over-issue = gift vouchers or could\- afford not to accept them like ready cash. - = And from one day to\- another the local stores could declare that they would mutually\- = accept their gift vouchers. Within a few days they might agree\- upon = issuing a local shop currency which all of them would \-accept, and = issue it largely in loans for wage and salary \- payments, i.e., for goods already produced and sold at least to \-the = wholesalers, in most cases. - The shopping centres could become the = centres for new banks of issue. That would lead to a \-boom economy = comparable to the limited booms for computer-, \- video- and mobile phone shops. - Allow good monies to supplement\- and = finally drive out the government money - and with it all\- imposed = taxes, too. - J. Z., 25.4.97. \par GOLD BONDHOLDERS PROTECTIVE COUNCIL, P.O. Box 2283, Seattle, = \-Washington 98 111, Tel. (206) 622 4960. - I found this address in 1990 = and have not contacted them as yet. - As long as governments \- are authorised to wipe out any monetary and financial rights \-merely by = an act of legislation, no mere council can offer much protection. = Monetary and financial rights as well as particular\- other economic = rights have first to be compiled, then fully\- discussed, then become widely enough recognised to become part of\- = effective and protective constitutions. Ultimately, they would\- not = only have to be upheld by courts, which are independent of politicians = \- and their ambitions, frauds and false pretences but also by \-volunteer = militias, well trained, armed and organized to uphold\- all individual = rights. - We are still very far from such an \-awareness. Just another = lobby gro up for gold clauses is definitely not enough, although it might do some = good by\- educational efforts and lobby pressures. - J. Z., 26.4.97. \par GOLD COINS AS TICKET MONEY: Counters representing commodities\- and = services. - Charles Moran, Money, 21. - This they would have \-in common = with length, weight & volume measures. Neither an\- over-supply n or an under-supply of these measures should be feared \-when they can be = freely produced - and rejected. But, obviously, \-these measures need = not be made out of gold. Nor need purchasing\- claims for commodities = and services be made out of gold, if only \- they can be issued and maintained at par with their nominal\- gold = weight value, i.e., for their purposes, made as good as gold. - J. Z., = \-22.4.97. \par GOLD MARKET, FREE, RARE METAL MARKETS TO BE UNRESTRAINED: Rare = \-metal markets should be completely freed from all government\- = restraints, subsidies, prohibitions, taxes, confiscations, = \-jurisdictions, regulations and controls. They all interfere with\- the free choice of value standards, which is an important part of = monetary freedom and of the right to issue money tokens, to make = \-contracts, to take steps to employ oneself or provide oneself\- with sales of one's goods and services. After thousands of years\- of = governmental abuses no kind of monetary and value standard\- despotism = and monopolism must be permitted any longer. The price \-to be paid for = it, in mass unemployment, bankruptcies,\- impoverishment, in inflations, deflations, stagflations and in\- = political despotism, wars, civil wars, revolutions and terrorism, \-in = suicides and sickness and despair - is just to high for the single = benefit of having a "uniform" curre ncy, "guarded" and\- guarantied" by one's government. We have put up = with lies and\- ignorance and powerlessness to undertake self-help = actions this\- sphere - for all too long in. At last we must become = monetarily emancipated, too. Our\- very survival may be at stake. For our misrulers are now \-armed with = mass murder devices or anti-people and anti-city, even\- anti-country = "weapons". - J. Z., n.d., 29.4.97. \par GOLD PRICE, DISTINCTION BETWEEN PURCHASE AND SALES PRICES OF A\- = CENTRAL BANK: Ulrich von Beckerath frequently pointed out that\- one = ought to distinguish, in the managed "gold standard" between \- the central bank's purchase price and its sales price for gold. For many = years there was no sales price for gold at central\- banks, because they = did not sell any. All they did was PURCHASE\- gold at a price, expressed = in national le gal tender, that tended to be considerably below its market\- price, at = least that on the black market. They pretended that their\- PURCHASE price established a par value for their paper money. But that = par value can only be achieved when there is not only a \-purchase price = but also a sales price for gold and this not only \- at the central bank but on a free gold market, that is world\--wide. - = Likewise, for some years there was a sales price for\- gold from the = central banks - but it applied only to other \-foreign banks and thus = was not a proper sales price, either, \- because all others were excluded as bidders. - When any paper \-money, = one that is not legal tender and is an optional or competing\- currency, = stands at par, in a free money and gold market, then \-t his means that its price consists of a free purchase and a free\- sales = price - different only by the "gold points". This profit\- margin for = gold traders is rather small but has to cover \-transport costs and = risks. Sales and purchase prices for other\- commodities vary, usually, much more. - J. Z., 22.4.97. \par GOLD STANDARD, THE: Most of the advocates of "the" gold standard = \-do not sufficiently distinguish between gold a) as an EXCLUSIVE &\- = FORCED value standard AND as an EXCLUSIVE & FORCED exchange \-medium and = b) Gold as=20 either an EXCLUSIVE & FORCED value standard \-or merely as an OPTIONAL, = COMPETING & MARKET RATED value\- standard, in combination with gold as = an OPTIONAL, COMPETITIVE & \-MARKET RATED means of exchange, one that = is supplemented by numerous\- other optional means of exchange and value standards, that are\- all = competitive and market rated e.g., against gold weight units, but \-not = covered by or redeemable into them and c) gold as a means of\- exchange that a debtor may pay, when he is well enough supplied with = it, from gold as a means of exchange that a creditor may\- demand from a = debtor, although the debtor is not well enough\- supplied with it. When gold metal payment is optional for a debtor then = no difficulties arise, as a \-rule (apart from the transaction costs for = large rare metal \- payments) for debtor and creditor. When it is compulsory, upon demand by = the creditor, for a debtor, then the\- difficulties that arise from this = for both, debtor and creditor,\- are large. - Moreover, advocates of = "the" gold standard do \- usually assume that the market for goods and services of all kinds can = and will rapidly and fully enough adapt to ANY and\- RAPID changes in = the quantities of rare metals that are readily \-available as exclusive = exchange media and value standards in a ny \-developed economy, so that the quantity available would not = \-matter at all. That expectation or prediction or "rule" is not\- = sufficiently born out by the facts. Rare metals have been used as\- exchange media and value standards for thousands of years but\- still = have never managed to make all desired monetary exchanges \-possible. = Barter exchanges and currency famines persisted to some\- degree, even in boom times and spread widely during crises. And\- this = in spite of the fact that numerous clearing exchanges did\- supplement = those exchanges which were made possible by the \-available quantities = of rare metals, used for exchanges. As a \- result of the prices of goods, labour and services not\- immediately = falling far enough to restore the equilibrium between\- the suddenly = reduced (in circulation) exclusive rare metal\- exchange media on the one side and of the goods, services and labour on = the other side, even primitive emergency monies gained currency for = a\-while, at least locally and dozens of millions of involuntarily \- unemployed found it impossible to exchange their labour even at\- = emergency sales prices for labour. - In this connection it is\- often = overlooked that falling prices deter from buying and\- encourage more = hoarding, while fallen prices encourage buye rs and \-reduce cash hoardings. Deflations tend to induce falling = prices. Technical improvements and better harvests tend to bring about = \-individually fallen prices. - Generally speaking, monopolies are \- never very good at fast adapting to any changes. But gold bugs\- assumed = that their favourite monopoly could and would. - J. Z.,\- 16.4.97 & = 22.4.97. \par GOVERNMENT MONEY: Government money has now no redeemable feature = \-except that you can pay with it the government's tribute\- extractions = and the charges for its monopolised and usually over-priced public = services or \- disservices and that you can buy investments in tax slaves with \-it, in = form of government insecurities. Formerly, its\- convertibility in rare = metals and the absence of legal tender for\- it were its only redeemable = features. - Its uniformity counts as=20 \-nothing when compared with the deflationary, inflationary and\- = stagflationary wrongs it commits and damages it does to people's = \-lives, earnings, properties and liberties. - J. Z., 6.7.91,\- 28.4.97. \par GOVERNMENT PROMISES, GOVERNMENT PAPER MONEY, REFUSALS & = DISCOUNTS\-: All government promises ought to be either outright refused = or \-greatly discounted, if experience is to be any guide. - J.Z., \- 6.7.91, 26.4.97. - See: TAX STRIKES, PAPER MONEY, LEGAL TENDER,\- = REFUSALS TO ACCEPT GOVERNMENT PAPER MONEY, DISCOUNTING. \par GOVERNMENTS & TOKEN MONEY: Governments can't even provide a\- = decent token money, in the best possible forms, shapes, sizes and = \-quantities. - J. Z., 6.7.91, 28.4.97. \par GOVERNMENTS AS MANAGERS AND REGULATORS OF MONEY, CURRENCY &\- = CREDIT: Having been mostly and for most periods wrong to \-dishonest in = the administration of exclusive and forced\- currencies and wrong and = mistaken, mostly, in their monetary\- despotism now, all governments should be deprived of any powers, = \-monopolies and privileges in this sphere. Without a coercive = \-government backing even the worst privately or cooperatively \-issued = currency could not do as much wrong and damage in any=20 \-country as even the best government-managed currencies have \-usually = done so far and are likely to do in the future. The worst \-mercenaries = do not do as much wrong and damage as the \-government's conscript = armies do. All the private criminals do \- not rob citizens as much as the government does. No one can cause\- as = much mass unemployment or inflation or as severe crises as\- governments = have often been culpable of. - Decentralise,\- minimise and voluntarise = damaging systems - and let the good\- systems drive out the bad ones - not only by collectivist and \-very = restricted political voting rights but by granting full\- consumer = sovereignty and free enterprise to individual citizens \-and = exterritorial autonomy to their media, standards, c learing \-processes & credit arrangements, in their voluntary payment = and \-political communities. - J. Z., 10.7.91, 22.4.97. \par GRESHAM'S LAW: According to the gold bugs, banknotes without\- gold = cover are a bad kind of money and banknotes 100% gold\- covered and = convertible are the only good money in paper form.\- They have not = considered that without possessing legal tender \- the other kind of the supposedly bad money would tend to drive out their = \-only supposedly good paper certificates, much against their = expectations \- and predictions, simply because e.g., gold certificates for only = clearing gold weight values could be provided much cheaply. Only if = their kind of favoured money would be given \-legal tender status and = the privilege of an exclusive currency, one \- that a creditor could at any time demand, could it drive out the\- = cheaper alternative currencies and clearing options. Cheap and \-sound = money issues would find it easy and cheap enough (compared\- with the costs of a gold stock and convertibility into it for its\- = notes), to keep its notes at par with their nominal gold weight\- value = standard units. Why should people prefer only gold-\- certificates, 100 % covered in gold, when competing issuers can, much = \-more cheaply, supply turnover credits in paper notes, freely\- issued, = freely accepted or refused or discountable, that stand, \- nevertheless, stand at par, i.e. are for practical purposes not\- only = as good as gold but even better, because more convenient.\- Should the = holders desired gold convertibility - then the whole gold market \- would be at their disposal, through free purchases, not only the gold = treasures of the \-issuer of gold certificates. But nobody would be = obliged to supply them with gold at par for exchange media that had been = depreciated and stand be low the par value with their gold weight accounting or clearing unit. - = J. Z., 8.12.92, 29.4.97, 9.9.02. \par GRESHAM'S LAW: Gresham's Law applies only to legal tender = \-currencies or any accounts based on forced and exclusive \-currencies = or to the customary acceptance of a free market \-currency whenever = competition and market rating for it is \- insufficient, i. e., when a situation exists that is comparable \-to the = situation of a legalized forced and exclusive currency.\- Sometimes = customs and habits are stronger than laws. But that\- does not mean that = legal tender and money monopoly laws are=20 \-harmless and ineffective - but merely that they do not have\- absolute = power, either. - J. Z., 21.7.89, 29.4.97. \par HARD & SOFT CURRENCIES: This is a case of false and misleading = \-alternatives. Hard and soft currencies are not necessarily and in\- = all respects opposites and between them they do not cover all = \-possibilitie s except merely verbally and conceptually. More \-significant are = distinctions between honest and dishonest, sound\- and unsound, = monopolistic and competitive, forced and optional,\- stable enough and all too unstable currencies, whether any of them are = "hard" or "soft" by any definition. And what does hard \-or soft mean = with regard to any of thousands of different ways to\- determine or to try to preserve the purchasing power of an index\- = currency? Physically one of the hardest currencies would be one \-of = diamonds. But they are not malleable enough to be coined. (In \- future, when artificial diamond production becomes quite cheap, \-at = least for diamond coatings, we might come to diamond-coat pure\- gold = coins to prevent them from wearing down too fast. In the \-me antime, to the extent that we would still bother to use them, \-we might = mostly keep each of them in a cheap small plastic and \-transparent = pocket or pouch. A gold currency is usually \-considered a "hard" = currency and yet it is made out of one of the\- softest metals and also of a metal that has been more than any \-other = subjected to legal interventionism. Coins made out of\- harder and cheaper metals, copper or iron, were often not kept hard, = judged by their par value with better standards, but depreciated against = them. And soft materials, like wood, bamboo,\- paper and plastic, have often been used in quite sound private money = \-tokens. The distinction merely between hard money and soft money \-is = as insufficient as that merely between rare metal exchange \-medi a and paper means of exchange, with the misunderstanding that \-the = latter would always have to be fiat money or legal tender \-money and = depreciating, unless 100% covered by gold coins in the\- possession of the issuer. - J. Z., 26.4.97. - Here, too, our lan guage, our terms, definitions and notions, our choice of words, more or = less careless and injudicious, leads to and maintains most of our = remaining problems. How many innocents will die because the war against = terrorism and against Saddam Hussein, with hi s aspiration to acquire and use a stock of ABC mass murder devices (or = anti-people "weapons", all to be used under the "principle" of = "collective responsibility", has suddenly, via thoughtless journalists = and politicians, become a planned war against "Ira q ", "Bagdad" and the people of Iraq, requiring massive military forces = and sacrifices, possibly leading to WW III. While people are organized, = think and act only in territorialist terms, rather than in terms of = individual sovereignty, individual secessioni s m and exterritorial autonomy for volunteer communities, such = misjudgements and mistakes are almost inevitable, on both sides, among = men on the street as well as among the monopolistic and centralistic top = decision-makers. Obviously, the terrorists, to who s e mass murder this and the previous war were supposed to be rightful and = rational responses, also acted upon the "principle" of collective = responsibility and under territorialist assumptions - and with these = wrongful dogmas and institutions the slaughter=20 goes on, almost everywhere, at least on a small scale, e.g., via racism = or the war against the rich. - J. Z., 8.9.02. \par HOARDING OF MONEY AS A LOAN: Hoarding of money tokens for goods\- = or services that are ready for sale does also provide a corresponding = but rather generalised loan to the local economy (the local issuers) = since \- these tokens are not being redeemed during their hoarding\- period. They = issuers received some values for them but had not\- yet to give their = counter values in exchange. All they had to\- offer so far are=20 paper tokens. As owners of perishable goods or as people hoping for a = more regular turnover they might,\- naturally, not be too happy about = this kind of anonymously \-granted loan by a multitude of their note = holders and hoarders.\- To ensure a more regular turnover, a clause in such private\- exchange = media could give them a limited period of validity only,\- to speed up = their reflux and prevent their excess hoarding for\- long periods. Cheques are likewise, at least in some countries, already = under a time limit for their presentation. But with them \-it is not = expressed on the cheque forms. Tickets have often only\- a daily value - unless they are weekly, monthly or yearly = \-subscription tickets. People are already accustomed to "use \-by...." = inscriptions on many of their consumer goods. - It would \-not be a tax = or stamp imposed like on Silvio Gesell's money \- alternative. Whenever notes are permanently hoarded, e.g. by coin\- and = note collectors, the issuers could simply issue\- correspondingly more = of them. Trade would not depend on these \-notes. The distinction = between turnover exchange media and value-\- preserving and interest-bearing capital securities would thereby \-be = made clearer than it is at present. Gold and silver coins did \-not help = to make this distinction, nor did legal tender that\- lasted for years = or decades. - This time limitation was\- recommended by Prof. E. Milhaud and Ulrich von Beckerath made it\- part = and parcel of his very detailed monetary freedom system. - J. Z., = 17.9.91,\-28.4.97. \par HONEST MONEY BY PRIVATE & COMPETING ISSUERS VS. DISHONEST MONEY\- = BY GOVERNMENTS: There ought to be full freedom to provide honest\- = money, i.e. money that is soundly covered by wanted goods and\- serv ices, in daily demand, soundly valued by a freely chosen \-value = standard, optional, that is without monopoly or exclusive\- currency = status, without legal tender, that may be freely\- refused or market = rated or accepted at par and which only the\- issuers themselves - and by contract their debtors - would have \-to = accept at any time from anyone at par in all payments due to \-them. = Publicity, note exchanges, clearing, local \- circulation areas, limited time periods for their validity, voluntary = acceptance, the possibility of a discount and a \-sound distrust towards = all suspicious and unknown and not easily\- evaluated or certified means of exchange and value standards, would = contribute to keep these issues limited and uninflated. At\- the same = time, freedom of issue and clearing would keep exchange \- media well enough supplied to serve to bring about all desired\- and = possible exchanges of goods, services and labour. - The\- dishonest, = monopolised, paper money of the government, with a \-mere paper value = "standard" and nevertheless the power of \- compulsory acceptance and compulsory value for every\- creditor, ought = to be done completely away with, for all\- remaining territorial States. = Likewise the legal or juridical "right" of creditors to demand e.g. gold = coins or lega l tender in the settlement of debts, rather than any honest and full = settlement by acceptable forms of clearing. Only within the panarchistic = or\- merely exterritorially autonomous communities of volunteers, when\- they are true believers in monetary, financial and other\- despotism, = should such abuses be allowed to be continued, at the \-risk and expense = of their adherents only. They still have to learn their lessons from = these despotic and dishonest practices. \- - J. Z., 3.7.93, 25.4.97.=20 \par INDEX CURRENCIES, INDEX STANDARDS & MONETARY FREEDOM: Free \-market = rating of currencies and free choice among competing value \-standards, = are also a form of indexing - but of a \-non-monopolistic kind and one = in which the money monopoly and the \- exclusive and forced value standard or legal tender privilege of\- the = government currency is eliminated. Then, and as a rule, via\- consumer = and entrepreneurial sovereignty, ensuring free\- competition and fully = free choice, only those currencies could\- survive, in the long run, which remain largely and mostly at par\- with = their value standards. In other words, under monetary\- freedom any = additional and frequent indexing of prices, wages &\- contracts would no = longer be required. Price and wage levels \- would then be as stable as they could be, and should be, from the\- = monetary side, because they would be safe from coercive monetary = interventions and policies and measures, safe from any \- government, as safe as measures of length, weight and volume. -\- J. Z., = 18.10.89, 29.4.97. \par INFLATION & DEFLATION, ARE THEY ALWAYS OPPOSITES & OCCUR ONLY ONE = AFTER THE OTHER OR CAN THEY OCCUR AT THE SAME TIME IN THE SAME COUNTRY? = Under monetary despotism they can occur at the same time and in the same = country, for the n different segments of the economy are differently supplied with = exchange media from one monopoly centre only. There are different = circulation spheres and channels as well as greater or smaller time = delays. For instance, governments may insist on rapid t a x payments but are not so rapid when it comes to paying the bills that = taxpayers send them for supplies to the government. One area or segment = of all business may be flooded with currency (e.g. arms industries = during a war) while others are starved for ca s h (like e.g., clothing or toy producers or builders during war time.) = From one issuing centre a whole country can no more be evenly supplied = with locally required currencies than water could be supplied to it from = a single spring or lake or via the weath er. - Moreover, during rapid inflations prices can race ahead of the = printing presses and thus cause shortages in the depreciated notes, to = pay all these rapidly increasing prices with them. - J.Z., 9.9.02. \par INFLATION TARGET: Inflation, with 1.3%, is at the lower end of\- = the Reserve Bank's target of 2-3%. - Radio news 24.4.97. - And\- who = says Keynesianism is dead after it has been repeatedly and\- thoroughly = refuted? Here it even=20 frankly admits that it aims not \-at currency stability but at inflation = or currency depreciation,\- instead and pretends that it has reasons to = be proud of having\- achieved a lower inflation rate, rather than stopping inflation = altogether, something that it could do immediately, merely by\- ending = its monopoly and legal tender powers, letting its paper \- money find its true market value and leaving all prices and wages\- to = be marked out in sound alternative value standards, unchanged \-by its = shenanigans. The law usually ascribes the role as a\- defender of the currency to the central bank. In reality, it\- becomes = its depreciator in the vain pursuit of full employment\- through a = gradual and managed inflation of the monopolised and\- forced currency. = The figures gi ven are, naturally for government institutions, not the truly = representative ones for the facts but\- politically influenced ones. = See: CPI or Consumer Price Index.\- This is also a monopolistically = determined figure that leans away\- from the fact to please the politicians. Controlled prices are = \-included to measure inflation and no economists protests, at \-least = not in public. - J. Z., 24.4.97. \par INFLATION, GERMAN INFLATION OF 1914-23: By November 1923 notes = denominated 100 Billion Reichsmarks, was, apparently, the biggest = denomination note issued,\- according to the guides for collectors that = I have seen. One\- mentioned that this note was then worth about 7 UK pounds.\- - = "Workers were paid twice daily & given time to go shopping before \-the = value was eroded by inflation." Not only the Reichsbank \-issued large = denominations. The money shortage, in relation=20 \-to the inflated prices, which were expressed in the inflated \-money, = anticipating further inflation, was so large that numerous\- others = issued emergency currencies, also, mostly in Reichsmark \-denominations, = thus participating in the inflation of the \- Reichsmark while trying to reduce its deflationary effects. But = \-some, like the Reichsbahn & Farbwerke Hoechst, did later issue = emergency monies on a stable value basis. This and secessionist\- aspirations were two of the factors that finally forced the = \-Reichsbank to discontinue its paper money inflation. - J. Z.,\- = 25.4.97. - Initially many of the emergency money issues were only for = small change, tha t was in short supply by the Reichsbank. But soon these issues followed = the depreciation of the paper Reichsmark and thus they were also issued = in large denominations, although, probably, not in as large ones as = those which the Reichsbank got printed for=20 itself and forced upon the public. - J. Z., 8.9.02. \par INFLATION: "Monetary prudence in nipping inflation in the bud."\- - = I found that remark somewhere, I did not note down where. Nor \-did the = remark detail what monetary prudence would really\- require. I hold, e.g.: competitive issue, market rating against a = \-sound value standard, full publicity for all issues, absence of = \-legal tender and the issue monopoly, freedom to refuse or\- discount = the exchange media and value standards of others. - \- J. Z., 22.12.94, 17.4.97. \par INFLATION: There can be no large-scale inflation of any currency = \-or any inflation of the general price level in all currencies, \-from = the monetary side, without legal tender and the money issue \- monopoly. No inflation is possible under freedom for note issues\- and = free choice of value standards and free clearing, using sound\- = alternative value standards, and freedom to price one's goods,\- services, labour and contracts in sound value standards. - J. Z., = 20.11.91, 26.4.97. - Merely by observing how cheaply people with foreig n and relatively stable currencies can buy goods, labor and services in = countries with a galloping inflation, economists should have rapidly = come to the conclusion that the essential difference between the foreign = currencies with high purchasing power and =20 the low purchasing power of the own currency national was due to the = fact that the own currency was pushed into circulation by the issue = monopoly and legal tender, while the foreign currency, in the inflating = country, had no monopoly position and no legal =20 tender and thus did not participate in the inflation and could not make = it worse. On the contrary, it made at least some sound exchanges still = possible. It had preserved its own value standard and it was voluntarily = accepted at its purchasing power. - J.=20 Z., 8.9.02.=20 \par INFLATIONARY DEPRESSIONS OR STAGFLATIONS: When a forced and\- = exclusive currency depreciates considerably, during a galloping = \-inflation, from day to day, week to week, etc., and as an \-investor = the creditor could only be certain that, if at all, then\- he would only be repaid in depreciated money, then he would be a\- fool = if he continued saving and investing. To that extent all\- production = that depends upon further investments comes to a stop,\- causing a corresponding depression and unemployment, not a boom\- = economy and full employment. Furthermore, once prices race ahead\- of = the note printing presses, inflations will at the same time \- become deflations or stagflations. Within a system of monetary\- = despotism there are only hard and costly options of ending an = \-inflation. The moderate steps merely prolong the stagflation. The \- soft options of free markets in this sphere, offered by monetary = \-freedom, are not possible under monetary despotism. Thus \-inflations = are often continued, although not desired, out of fear\- of sharply = increased mass unemployment, which would be \- politically even less acceptable. If the victimisers of this\- system = are not prepared to give up their wrongful powers, then the \-victims of = it should at least consider no longer granting them \-these powers. - J. = Z., 28.4.97. \par INFLATIONS & GOVERNMENTS: Governments force you into = \-participating in the depreciation of their paper currencies by a)\- = legal tender, b) their money issue monopoly, c) their outlawry of\- = value preserving clauses in contracts, d) by misdirecting\- savings, pension- and insurance funds into government \-"insecurities". = - J. Z., 10.7.91.=20 \par INFORMATION BASED ECONOMY? As we move from an economy based on = \-money and ownership to one based on information, the way we interpret = information becomes a key issue. - Jeremy Horey, THE\- AUSTRALIAN. (Some text was lost here.) - We can't survive merely by = lecturing each other and supplying each other with literature. Try to = eat the screened or printed out words from your computer - or use them = as a sh elter again rain, wind and snow. Is an economy based on "money" or upon = production, in division of labour, tools, machines (capital) and on free = exchange of products and services, in whatever form that is done, with = or without money tokens? While knowledg e , skills and ideas, tools and machines, as well as better = communications, can increase production and facilitate exchange, we = cannot live on them directly. An economy needs information, e.g. that of = the free pricing system, but we cannot live by reading c l assified advertisements or the share prices published by the stock = exchange. And how long could we survive without private property and = self-ownership? How many Internet users managed so far to make their = living from it? And even then they can ultimately=20 d o so only via distributing goods or services through it. (Those = committing fraud through it still live at the expense of the production = of goods by others.) Some intellectuals fancy that they provide the only = really required services. At least these would =20 be over-paid, I believe, even if they received only a minimum wage. Let = them live from and within their intellectual structures, with no one = forced to listen to them or to read them. Their economic knowledge and = interest is all to often negative and then=20 they make such absurd statements. - The assertion \-that we live in an = information age and that our whole economy is \-based upon it, is very = popular. But you cannot eat information or readily exchange it for = edibles in the local supermarket. Just \- try to do so. If you are a sufficiently skilled or strong bio-robot they = \-might use you as a packer or stacker. If you are better educated\- you = might be employed as a cashier or even as a supervisor. But, \- try to sell other information there! Or anywhere! An Ideas\- Archive and = Talent Centre or Genius Employment Agency does not\- yet exist. The = wisest men do not rule and are not used as\- advisors of those that do. = Information to prevent war, poverty, \- unemployment, inflation, deflation, stagflation, despotism, or to\- end = them, does exist - but just try to publicise it or sell it to\- someone. = I offer lots of freedom, peace and justice information\- on over 1400 microfiche - but there is hardly any demand for it. \-- = Naturally, one has to distinguish between information that is \-popular = or fashionable or amusing or part of a game or bet, and\- misinformation that amounts to prejudices, errors, false dogmas \-etc., = but that may still be very popular. So far, the new\- Information = sources have not promoted all the old and new truths \- sufficiently nor refuted all the old and new errors sufficiently.\- = Instead, they have added more errors and prejudices and left them = \-unquestioned, too and even very popular or predominant, like this\- = one, regardless of its truthfulness, merit or lack of it. - See: SYMBOLIC \-MONEY, ELECTRONIC MONEY. - What is transferred = with these is not \-just information but the information that consists = in claims or \-rights to ownership. And these claims are a form of = money. -\- J. Z., 29.4.97. \par INTEREST RATE POLICY AGAINST INFLATION? - Could any other policy = \-be more absurd in situations wherever and when the government's \-note = printing presses continue to churn out legal tender paper \- money? An artificially increased interest rate would then merely \-mean = that all economic activities not favoured and subsidised by \-a = government are restrained through lack of affordable credit,\- while the = bureaucratically misma naged public sector, e.g. the \-public works, national defence and = welfare sectors continue to be \-expanded via the note printing presses. = I remember periods as a\- public servant when I was still paid in cash = and the notes I \- received were fresh from the printing presses and still in\- consecutive = numbers. Such attempts to restrain inflation through \-irrelevant = "measures" or to "balance" coercive over-supplies in\- one sphere through coercive under-supplies in other spheres, remind me = of the hypothetical case of a Mafia gang pretending to fight \-crime. It = certainly fights crimes committed by its competitors. \- And it does seem to fight crime when it, unofficially, favours\- even = more severer "wars against drugs", which may harm the small\- producers = and distributors but boost the profits of the large\- drug entrepreneurs. The government "measures" against inflation \-leave = its own criminal inflationary steps its taxation and\- redistribution = policies untouched but do intervene with free \-production and free = exchanges, instead, via credit, price- and\- wage controls etc. - Inflation presumes an exclusive and forced\- value = standard, one that is elastic and can be manipulated like a rubber = \-band. One that is not even properly defined but is just given an = \-abstract name. On ly when this "standard" is imposed upon a whole \-country can the = exchange medium using it, the government's monopolistic paper money and = currency, be imposed upon all \-transactions, i.e., can it inflate or = deflate all transactions. \- Giving them a monopoly status means that they cannot be refused \-by = anyone depending upon monetary exchanges. Giving them legal \-tender = status means that their compulsory acceptance at a \-compulsory value, = at par with their paper standard, even though=20 \-this standard is continuously manipulated and, usually inflated. = \-Such a forced currency can be forced into the market beyond its\- = requirements. It can force up all prices, wages & fees etc.,\- which have to be marked out in it. This is the only avoidance \-option = left to those to be paid immediately or very soon. Those under medium and long-term = contracts, when they were not foresighted enough or allowed to include = value-preserving clauses, have no such escape option. They can be "paid = off" ultimately in scrap paper. Even share pric es and their dividend and\- interest rates are not upwardly mobile = enough to make up for the \-all the degrees of inflation that can occur = during a rapid \-inflation, as was experienced e.g. in the last stages = of the \- Great Inflation in Germany, which ended in 1923. - Without legal = \-tender and the issue monopoly, competing exchange media would be = \-issued, in accordance with the requirements of the market. These could = \- not be over-issued as a whole and drive up all prices expressed\- in = sound and competing and freely chosen value standards. Thus not too many = exchange media could come to chase too few goods. On the other hand, any = \- under-supply of exchange media could be countered by new and sound = issues, fully\- covered by the goods, services, debts and labour with = which their \- issuers would cover and redeem them at any. Only such currencies can = remain stable enough to promote free exchanges under permanent \-boom = conditions. Without them the law of supply and demand is not\- = completely realized but monetarily distort ed. Sound alternative \-exchange media and value standards are not = impossible but just \-outlawed. We have so far put up with this, mostly = even\- without protesting. I have never seen e.g. a demonstration against = legal tender and the issue monopoly. Against their\- consequences, = unrealised as such, there were and are demonstrations aplenty. - J. Z., = 19.12.89, 29.4.97. \par INTEREST, ENEMIES OF: Enemies of charging interest should secede\-- = and do their own things among themselves and to themselves - like \-any = other sectarians and true believers. - J. Z., n.d. & 29.4.97. \par INTEREST, FIXED INTEREST RATES: It is wrong to imposed centrally\- = fixed interest rates under changing and different business\- conditions = upon a whole community. They should be adapted and\- haggled out between = free debtors and free creditors in every\- case, in accordance with the business risks and expectations and\- only = guided by average interest rates of the general free market\- but allowing every required deviation from them. It is wrong and = misguided to impose interest rates as a means to counteract some\- of = the results of monetary despotism, like inflation, deflation \-and = stagflation. It is w rong to artificially raise or lower interest rates, e.g., through = inflation or through deflation. Interest\- rates should be freely = determined on a quite free market, not\- through the various despotic = policies of monetary despotism or their effects. \- Inded, inflation can raise interest rates somewhat and can also = \-somewhat lower them, in certain situations or as a result of\- certain policies. (At a 3% inflation rate an interest rate of 6% = becomes effectively an interest rate of 3% only.) The same applies to = deflation. A rational and \-just allocation of scarce resources and = reward to those who\- supply them and use them, thus becomes close to impossible in all\- too = many cases. It is even more wrong and absurd to impose }{\b\f0\fs24 = fixed}{\f0\fs24 \-interest rates upon farmers and graziers than upon = industrial\- debtors, since the agricultural returns, much more so than \-industrial = returns from production, are variable with the weather.\- Instead, here = and in most other cases, interest should become - a\- freely agreed upon = - percentage share in the additional \- productivity achieved through an investment, with capital perhaps = being considered as pre-done labour, that is also entitled to its\- just = rewards for the values it added, once it is properly \-employed. Thus = interest returns should b e high when profits are \-high and low when profits are low and nil when = there were zero\- profits. (To the extent that this can be practised without penalising = efficient debtors while letting off inefficient ones. - J.Z., 8.9.02.) = The best way to achieve this would be via shares, bonds \- or partnerships, with fluctuating devidends, dependent upon\- = productivity - provided they are run really democratically, in\- the = interests of the shareholders, not of the managing directors,\- whose = authoritarian position now=20 allows them all kinds of perks\- and the abuse of their position, to = reinvest too much of annual company \-earnings in their own kind of = empire building, profitable mainly \-to themselves, rather than to their = shareholders, now often\- almost as helpless as the political voter is towards his\- "representatives". - J. Z., 2.12.94, 25.4.97. - Thus not only = wide-spread shareholding should be considered and extensive shareholding = by employees in their own companies but all kinds of other = self-management organization al forms, e.g. partnerships and cooperatives, as well as autonomous work = groups. - J.Z., 8.9.02. \par INTEREST: Even under degrees of monopolism and regulations for = \-productive capital and their capital issues, interest\- arrangements = for them do rather help than hinder making more\- capital available for = production. Not only the capitalists profit\- but all their employees and all consumers. But the system would\- work = with much less friction and often much cheaper without any\- legal = monopolies and regulatory interventions and "safeguards", \- "guaranties", subsidies, prohibitions, compulsory licensing,\- = officially imposed controls and supervisions, and interest-rate = regulations, at its optimal capacity when fully free pricing and free = contracts are int roduced in this sphere as well. That would also require the abolition of = all compulsory taxes, which simply confiscate capital from their = victims. Moreover, capital securities or, rather, seeing the inflation = risk, capital insecurities of governments shou ld also be done away with, because they are part of the compulsory = tribute system and amount merely to investments in tax slaves. - See: = CAPITAL\- MARKET, SECURITIES MARKET, FINANCIAL FREEDOM, ISSUE OF\- SECURITIES, OWNERSHIP OF CAPITAL SECURITIES, TRANSFERABILITY,\- RIGHT = TO ISSUE SECURITIES. - J. Z., 1.2.90, 29.4.97, 9.9.02. \par INTEREST: Even with regard to interest rates "the trees can't\- = grow far into the sky". - J. Z., 24.9.89. - Enemies of interest\- have = often calculated how much a cent, invested for 2,000 years,\- would have = grown as money capital th rough an interest of, e.g.\- 5%. But does it correspond to human = experience that heirs will\- forever leave their heritage untouched or = that governments and\- private criminals will? Almost all investments = have time limits \- and investors sooner or later want to enjoy somewhat the benefits\- from = their investments, even if only by establishing a new \-benevolent = foundation. - J. Z., 26.4.97. \par INTEREST: Interest under the money monopoly should be = \-distinguished from interest under full monetary and financial = \-freedom. Only once money supply monopolists can no longer extort\- = monopoly interest rates for their exclusive and forced currencies -=20 \-can real market interest rates freely develop and fulfil their\- = pricing functions, just like any other freely haggled-out prices.\- - J. = Z., 30.3.95. \par ISSUE PRINCIPLE: Allow the producers and owners of goods and the\- = providers of services to also produce and offer vouchers,\- warrants, = purchasing and clearing certificates (in convenient \-money = denominations but distinct from other monies) - BASED UPON \- THEIR READINESS FOR SALE OFFERS. Such notes would only oblige THEM to = accept them at any time from anyone at par with their \-nominal value, = in payments. A huge daily demand or reflux for \-such notes can thus be = achieved, quite freely and honestly, \- naturally and beneficially, for the issuers and acceptors. The \-balance = between all the goods and services offered for sale and\- the purchasing = power to sell=20 and buy them, could thus be achieved quite easily, almost as part of the = process of production and as a \-result of the readiness to sell. By = rights no one but the \-producers and owners of goods and providers of = services (\- including labour) have the RIGHT to issue money tokens to \-purchase = them with. - J. Z., 20.9.91. \par ISSUE PRINCIPLE: Only readiness to sell and willingness to buy = \-can form the basis for a corresponding quantity of alternative = \-private or cooperative exchange media and this only for as long \- and to the extent that these conditions persist. But the offered\- and = wanted goods must be exclusively or predominantly daily\- wanted = consumer goods and services. Only these can act as the \- ultimate and most important and immediate redemption and convertibility = fund. Beyond this no other is required to maintain \-the value of an = alternative currency at par, at least locally, \-around the centre of = issue. All such assets not only could but\- should be monetised, not by a central bank, which has no right to\- = them, but, instead, by their owners, but only up to the limits set by=20 the par acceptance of such currency. The actual backing by consumer = goods and services is likely to be much higher than the amount of "shop = currency" that can be issued at any time at par. Stores stock goods not = only for immediate sales but also for the s a les in the near future. On the other hand, the fact that most of their = goods and services offered can be rapidly replenished, would open at = least the theoretical possibility of keeping at par a larger volume of = shore currency than could at once be covered =20 by all the ready for sale goods and services, if all consumers were to = spend all their shop currency immediately. So, where is the limit for = such issues? The free market rating for these media will determine it, = not a central bank. And that is determined=20 by the self-interest of the issuers as well as by that of the acceptors = and buyers. - Failure to monetise such \-assets up to the limits of = one's supply ability for goods and \- services in any short term period, and up to the limits set by the free = market rating - acceptances and refusals of such alternative currencies, = does in effect deprive other\- exchange spheres of some of their = exchange media, which they have \- issued for themselves, for their turn-overs. Here, too, each\- should = clothe himself with his own clothing rather than robbing \-the clothing = of others. Each should feed himself rather than \-steal or beg his food. = Each should become, as far as humanly \- possible and convenient, become self-reliant in this sphere, too.\- = There is no rightful and sound substitute for self-responsibility \-in = this sphere, either. The State is the worst possible \-substitute for = the assumption or rather usurpation of a \- responsibility for all traders and producers and consumers in this = sphere. - J. Z., 23.9.93, 24.4.97, 8.9.02. \par ISSUING CENTRES FOR COMPETITIVE & OPTIONAL CURRENCIES: Any = \-payment centre, where regularly many payments are made and\- received, = is, potentially, also an issuing centre for its own \-notes or clearing = certificates, in convenient money \- denominations, that are subject to voluntary acceptance or\- rejection = and free market rating and also valued by an optional\- value standard. = Whatever IOUs it would issue, would tend to \-quickly stream back to = it. Its notes would have no other value.=20 \-Its debtors would express a demand for these notes in the local\- = market, by offering their goods, services or labour for them. -\- J. Z., = 28.5.94. - See: PAYMENT COMMUNITIES.=20 \par LABOUR MARKET, UNEMPLOYMENT, MONETARY FREEDOM, MONETARY DESPOTISM = \-AND THE DEMAND FOR LABOUR: It is wrong to speak of a free labour = \-market when only the offer of labour is free on the market, not \- the demand for it. The demand for labour is the other side of the coin = of a \-free labour market. So far we were not free to turn up that = side\- of the coin - or to produce the kind of coins or notes that = would\- constitute a free, sound, reliable and=20 competitive monetary\- demand. Instead, we have left the demand for = labour to be\- supplied by a monopolist who, in the absence of = sufficient free market indicators\- for his forced and exclusive = currency, has either\- over-supplied or under-supplied the national economy with his monopoly = product and sometimes has done both, at the same time, in different = spheres and channels and managed even to\- depreciate the forced and = exclusive currency so fast that this \- seemingly extra demand for labour did, in reality, cause involuntary = mass\--unemployment. Nobody wants to invest any more when he can be = \-legally and juridically repaid in "worthless" scrap. So \- production and monetary exchanges come almost to a stop or are\- greatly = reduced. Then the ignorant, prejudiced and helpless politicians try to = stop inflation by artificially creating\- unemployment through credit restrictions and deflations, price or = interest rate controls. When \-they have thus and otherwise established = and maintained mass unemployment by their \-"measures", then they can = think of nothing better than heavily \- taxing the few still employed and in business, in order to\- subsidise = make-work schemes and unprofitable enterprises. Within\- the framework = of monetary despotism no real solution is possible. \-It is a bottleneck for the monetary demand for labour or prevents much = possible and desirable demand for labour from arising at\- all, because = the means for it are outlawed by it. To free the\- labour market the = market must be freed with regard to the supply=20 \-of sound and honest exchange media and value standards. Nothing \-less = will suffice to overcome all involuntary mass unemployment (\-apart from = e.g., natural catastrophes) when the obvious steps are \- taken, like free pricing, free enterprise, free trade, free wage = determination, freed interest rates, free entry into all jobs, no\- = closed union shops, no punitive and transfer taxes - or, best of all, no = taxes\- at all. Monetary freedom is the most neglected factor of\- all. Even = after Hayek has pointed it out in The Denationalisation of \-Money, in = 1976, many still overlook that factor and can only \-imagine an = exclusive and forced gold standard currency as the \- only sound demand for labour. They can not imagine the\- deflationary = conditions such a "reform" could cause. Nor can they \-imagine that free = clearing does not require gold coins as an exclusive exchange medium or = any kind of gold cover or reserve \- but, if gold weight units are wanted as value standards, merely\- their = adoption for all clearing and accounting purposes, without \-the = participants having to possess and trade even a single gold\- coin. But a collective blindness and deafness seems to persist = \-towards such a solution. - Free coinage, free note issue, free\- = choice of value standards, free clearing - for all demand for \- labour, goods and services. Without it you will all too often get 20 or = even 200 job\- applicants for a single open job, payable in monopoly = money. - No extra capital is required,\- just short term turn-over = credits with means of exchange suitable \- for wage and salary payments and with sound goods and service\- = foundation. Allow all the potential issuers to supply this \-monetary = demand - in their own interest, that of the unemployed,\- = under-employed, their families - and of everybody else. For\-=20 prolonged mass unemployment not only impoverishes a whole country but it = has extreme political, revolutionary and military\- consequences. So = have the inflations of monetary despotism.\- Remember, Hitler made his = first putsch in 1923, during the \- galloping German Inflation and his second one, ten years later,\- during = one of the worst deflations. Monetary despotism could not \-prevent = either crisis and its consequences. On the contrary, it\- caused both of them. This alone should have sufficed to call it \-into = question, examine it thoroughly and to abolish it. While the\- Nazis = prosecuted dissenters and Jews and others, which they had selected as\- scapegoats, gypsies, half-breeds etc., other countries closed \-their = borders against refugees, because they feared their\- competition on the = labour market. We are almost at the same \-situation now. Those who have = managed to escape despotic or\- totalitarian regimes, often risking their lives in the process,\- are = hunted by police and military forces, using high tech, then \-imprisoned = and, often to mostly, deported back into the merciless hands of\- their victimizers and exploiters. The supposedly free countries \-do no = longer welcome refugees with open arms - because they have \-failed to = liberate the monetary demand for labour. If they had, \- they would even organise the smuggling in of more refugees (via official = people smugglers, official on our side) - and\- could help to organise = the financing of liberating military \-insurrections and revolutions = against the remaining despotic\- regimes. - Since international clashes with despotic regimes can\- now = lead to holocausts, carried out with small and cheap but high \-tech = mass extermination packages, carried around the world on\- IBM's, automatically, in minutes and accurately targeted against\- = centers of population as if these were enemies, our very survival \-is = involved. If a billion unemployed and underemployed are not\- enough to get us to rethink and reform our institutions and actions in = this\- respect, then our survival instincts should. Alas, it takes = \-understanding and vision to see this threat. And that is \- missing here as in all too many other spheres -. See my "An ABC\- = Against Nuclear War", in PP 16-17 (now available by e-mail, J.Z., = 8.9.02.) and my series On Panarchy. - J. Z., 25.4.97. \par LABOUR MOVEMENT: Few members of the labour-, left-, communist-,\- = socialist, and modern liberal movement have pondered the \-consequences = for labour and the economy in general of letting the \-supply of the = cash demand for labour become monopolised by a=20 \-central bank. - If the monetary despotism had, instead, insisted = \-that only a church hierarchy would be authorised to issue money \- tokens and decide upon a standard of value for all contracts, then they = would, probably, have rebelled by now. But their statism and \-continued = and misplaced confidence in politicians and bureaucrats,\- their parties and reform movements, their central planning and legally, = administratively and juridically imposed measures, in short, their = statist religion, has\- prevented them from rebelling against monetary = despotism, no\- matter how much, how many of them and for how long they suffered \-and = suffer under it. - About one billion unemployed and\- under-employed = exist now in the world. - And some still believe \-that private = charities and en forced transfers of earnings and property can help \-these victims and = their dependants sufficiently. - J. Z., 26.4.97. \par LAWFUL MONEY: Dr. E. C. Simmons discussed "lawful money" in the = \-JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1938, pp. 108-18. - I have not yet\- got = a copy of this article but merely a follow-up by IRA B.\- CROSS. - The = term "lawful money" as a substitute for "legal \- tender" money is even more misleading. Cheques, for instance, are = \-not lawless money and there exists even an all too extensive\- = interventionist legislation about them, which prevents e.g.\- , cheques-for-clearing-only to be issued and freely accepted, issued in = \-money denominations, upon a value standard that issuers and\- = acceptors find quite acceptable for their transactions. The money\- of = monetary despotism is so full of misconcei ved laws that it\- contributed to the rise of quite lawless or = totalitarian regimes. The lawful money of governments caused and = causes\- inflation, deflation and stagflation, with their humanly worst = \- aspects of mass unemployment and wide-spread poverty. - It is\- almost = criminal to cover up or try to defend such an evil with\- the term = "lawful money". - J. Z., 26.4.97. - See: LEGAL TENDER. \par LEGAL TENDER & GOVERNMENT PROMISES: Government promises are like\- = its legal tender: All promise & no fulfilment or \-under-fulfilment. - = J. Z., 6.7.91. \par LEGAL TENDER : Legal tender laws form a strong case against = \-monetary authorities, parliaments, supreme courts and the \-political = voting, representation and miseducation system.\- Parliaments were originally intended to prevent, not to legalise = financial and \-monetary despotism and other forms of despotism. At = least they \-were expected to thoroughly discuss it and its alternatives = and \- to throw out any despotic measure, once it had done\- its job, namely = immense wrong and harm to millions of people. But, instead, they\- = consider such evils as self-evidently necessary and justified and \-do = not question them at all. If, on the other hand, they knew the consequences of\- = their despotic acts, then they would have to classed among the = \-greatest criminals of all. - J. Z., 5.9.92, 24.4.97. \par LEGAL TENDER: Legal tender allows bad money to drive good money\- = out of circulation. Without it the creditors are free to refuse \-or = discount bad money. As a consequence, the bad money is driven \- out of circulation by the good money. - J. Z., 10.11.92. - This = \-observation, known for centuries, should on its own have been\- = sufficient to throw out legal tender legislation everywhere. \- Nevertheless, few are aware of its existence and consequences, even = among the professional economists. One can browse through\- hundreds, = even thousands of economic textbooks before one comes \-across a single = one with some awareness of the close re lationship \-between legal tender and inflation and of the exclusive = currency\- aspect of legal tender and deflation. - Monographs on legal = \-tender are also rather rare still, although it has done and still\- does immense wrongs and damages. It is almost as if medical\- experts = were not bothering to study an almost universal disease\-, like cancer = or tuberculosis, in attempts to find cures for sicknesses. - J. Z., = \-26.4.97. \par LEGAL TENDER: Legal tender is not constitutional, lawful, = \-juridical, moral or fair but outright despotic and criminal. -\- J. = Z., 6.7.91. \par LEGAL TENDER: The legal tender acts are wrong and harsh, not\- = "tender" at all towards all creditors. Through them the law does no = \-longer even try to protect but, rather, to expropriate property \- at the rate at which a legal tender currency is inflated. It\- says, in = effect, to all debtors, including all employers, who owe \-wages to = their employees: We not only permit you but order you \- to loot your creditors, to the same extent as we have inflated \-the = exclusive and forced currency. - In spite of this, most legal\- and = economic commentators treat legal tender only as if it were a\- = necessary convenience=20 for debtors, or a guaranty for creditors, so that they could be certain = \-that they could pay their debts or be paid with the legal tender = medium, supposing it to be a stable and honestly administered currency = and value standard. -\- As if creditors would refuse good or the best means of exchange \-if = they had not legal tender! - Moreover, most of the "expert" \-writers do = not see or do not state the connection between legal \- tender and inflation: Without legal tender no inflation! Legal \-tender = makes inflation possible! - Check 100 or even 1000 textbooks - and you = will be lucky to find one among them that\- would point out this = connection quite clearly. Most are\- writers and thinkers on the subject are conditioned to think only in = terms of an exclusive and forced \-currency - and thus become unable to = judge it and to see sound\- alternatives to it and the monetary natural = laws that would apply \- to these alternatives - The opposite to legal tender is free \-market = rating against value standards that are subject to free \-choice of = value standards and optional and competing exchange \- media, i.e. media that can be discounted or altogether and refused and = that are also competitively or cooperatively produced and offered. = \-Only, by natural rights and the nature of promises, an issuer \- himself cannot refuse to accept or discount his own exchange \-media = when he accepts them in payment. Towards him they do have a\- = }{\b\f0\fs24 natural}{\f0\fs24 & just legal tender, one that does not = have to be legislatively imposed. - \- J. Z., 2.10.91, 27.4.97, 8.9.02.=20 \par LEGAL TENDER: The U.S. Constitution stated: No STATE may make = \-anything but gold or silver coins legal tender. - This leads,\- = inevitably, to the question : Is or is the U.S.A federation a State? - = When \-the constitutio n was written is was, probably, not considered as \-a State by itself = but merely as a federation of sovereign States\- and only the States it = federated were considered as States. - \- However, it might be worthwhile to start a test case before the Supreme = Court on this - but without great hopes that this Court\- will be just = in its decision. It has not been, very often, in its \- history, particularly in monetary matters and it has not paid\- much = attention to the literal interpretation of the words of the\- = constitution but, rather, imposed its own meanings and\- interpretations - to such an extent that even the clear wordings of = \-the bill of rights have been negated by it. Nevertheless, those\- who = have the time, energy and funds, might attempt this approach\- there.=20 As an individual rights declaration the statement should \-be different, = too: No one and no organization has the right to\- declare ANYTHING to = be legal tender - except towards itself and towards all its voluntary = followers, while they have not yet\- seceded from it. - J. Z., 16.8.94, 17.4.97. \par LEGAL TENDER: The very nature of legal tender turns an exchange = \-medium that is given legal tender power from an EXCHANGE medium\- into = a REQUISITIONING certificate. A free and just EXCHANGE can \- no longer be mediated by it. For in a free and just exchange no\- side = has an unjust advantage via a monopoly and coercion. \-Moreover, a money = with legal tender power and a nominal value\- standard, does no longer = have a VALUE STANDARD that deserves the=20 \-name value standard. Its value does then become non-standardised,\- = fluctuating, manipulated by stop-and- go policies. Would we call \-the = kg a weight standard when by legal intervention today=20 it might be only 500 grams tomorrow and next month 2 kg? Would a meter = be \-a length measure when, by legal coercion, today it might be = declared to be only \-50 cm long and in a month 2 meters long? - It is = hard to\- understand how millions of people could allow their governments\- to = thus abolish, fool around or manipulate a value standard that\- all = people in a country are made to depend upon. - J. Z., 27.4.97. \par LEGAL TENDER: Through legal tender and motivated by its = ever-\-increasing spending habits and inclinations, governments can = \-force much more of their forced and exclusive paper currencies\- into = circulation than is warranted even by the largest tax\- -foundations for them. The resistance against taxing the whole\- economy = through inflation is also minimal, much less than against other direct = or indirect taxes. Moreover, so far they were always able \- to wrongfully blame others for the results of their inflations, under = the pretence that they are not the culprits themselves. Compulsory\- = State education or State controlled education, did not enlighten\- its victims in this respect, either. It teaches nothing about\- = monetary freedom but distributes instead publicity releases fo\-r the = central bank, full of its usual self-serving propaganda. Thus \- they tend to resort to the inflation tax, even more destructive \-than = other taxation would have been and, so far, got away with \-it. None of = the culprits was so far imprisoned or hanged for his\- part in inflating = - or deflating or stagflating - the national \-monopolised currency. Citizens are not = given class action rights \-in this situation, either, before government = courts and would \-have little chance before a supreme court whose = judges are former \- government men and are government appointees and share the usual = \-statist prejudices or readiness to cover up crimes by government\- = officials, under the pretence that this would be "in the public \- interest" and that they had been committed quite legally. In the U.S., = one of the worst inflation taxes was \-imposed by the "continentals" = currency, given legal tender power \-and issued to "finance" the War of = Independence, while the states\- and their confederation were unwilling or unable to levy any \-taxes to = give this paper money some tax foundation. As a result \-this war of = independence was unnecessarily prolonged and bloody. \- Thousands of books have been written on it but I know of not\- even one = which considered all the monetary freedom options that\- could and = should have been applied in this as in all other\- revolutionary or civil war attempts that at least aim at liberation, = even when\- not always practising liberation in every respect. Ulrich = von \-Beckerath produced a manuscript on the proper financing of = \-rightful revolutions. An air r aid on Berlin, in 1943, destroyed \-it, with most of his library. But = some of the ideas of this\- manuscript were preserved in the book by his = friend, Gustav \-Holzhauer, missing in action in Stalingrad, called: = "Barzahlung \- in besetzten Gebieten." (Cash Payments in Occupied Territories). See = PEACE PLANS 532.) Others can be concluded from Beckerath's\- other = writings. Revolutions, too, become unnecessarily prolonged, \- bitter and bloody when not properly financed and without full\- monetary = and financial freedom this cannot be done. A central \-banking system = would not always be suitable or willing to finance \- a revolution against a despotic government. But it is often able\- and = willing to finance and indirectly can even cause the \-establishment of = a still more despotic or totalitarian government\- by a revolution or = putsch or temporarily somewhat popular \- take-over bid against a less despotic or somewhat democratic\- = government. Compare e.g. the rise of Lenin and of Hitler. - Sound\- tax = foundation for tax foundation (although on the immoral and\- unsound foundation of compulsory taxes), would limit the issue \-and = circulation of State paper money, reckoning in a sound value standard = (not subject to legal tender \-in general circulation but only towards = the tax offices), to the\- amounts required to facilitate the payment of all taxes. It would\- = distinguish the means of payment from a sound value standard and \-allow = the means of payment to get a discount against its value \-standard - = everywhere except at the tax offices. I t would also \-require that the rate of taxes is expressed in sound = value \-standard units, so that the tax payers, not the government, = would benefit by the government issuing notes below par and having to\- accept them, the next moment, from any tax payer at par. - The\- money = issue monopoly constitutes its own kind of legal tender\- power. People = depending upon monetary exchanges do have to accept\- the monopoly money even when it is depreciated, for want of\- anything = better being available to them. Thus, under these\- conditions and due = to this fact, governments can issue their \-legal tender forced and = monopolised currency beyond the amounts \- required for tax payments. - Once the issue monopoly and the\- legal = tender power are either officially and legally or \-juridically = abolished - or ignored in a monetary revolution, the\- government's = paper money will be correspondingly depreciated. The\- government will be less able to unable to collect any more taxes, = \-payable in it and will be unable or less able to force it as the = \-only monetary exchange option upon the general economy. More and\- more people will become involved in a tax strike against a government = and refusals to accept any government paper money at \-all, preferring, = instead, whatever sound alternative currencies\- the market would provided for their desired exchanges. Naturally,\- the = government will then blame the sound new issues for the \-depreciation = of its own paper money. But it had already achieved \-the depreciation = of its paper money by over-issues beyo nd its\- sound tax foundation before. Now that over-issue would simply\- = become }{\b\f0\fs24 revealed}{\f0\fs24 , because the whole economy would = no longer be forced to accept it at all and at par and would be = liberated to \- substitute for it the own sound exchange media and value \-standards. = Like other criminals, and their apologists, the \-government experts, = the culprits, here, too, would like to blame\- "society", i.e., the = victims of their crimes, for the crimes\- committed by the criminals with victims. Here they say that the \-money = (exchange media) of monetary freedom and its sound and\- freely chosen = value standards, would destroy the government's currency and thus free = notes issues and free choice of value\- standards ought to be suppressed. But what really happens is the = \-removal of a cover-up, of coercion, of a monopoly and of a fiat or = forced value. The prior inflation crime and inflationary \- tribute extraction would become revealed as such. The emperor is then = seen \-naked, without his forced currency clothing or cover. This fraud = and\- deception is ended. The good money is then free to drive out the = bad. \- Bad luck, but deserved bad luck, for the bad money, without a = \-sufficient sound foundation for it. The sooner all monopoly and\- = legal tender monies are rendered worthless, the better. - \-However, as = exterritorially autonomous panarchists, in their own \- volunteer communities, the true believers should remain at\- liberty = to choose all the wrongs and mistakes of monetary \-despotism for = themselves, at their own expense and risk - until \-they finally wise up = sufficiently, individually, and opt out of=20 \-these messes, too. - J. Z., 4.3.95, 25.4.97. - Deterrent examples can = also be helpful and there are enough utopists and true believers among = us so that, among themselves, they will tend t o repeat them, at least now and then - for the enlightenment or = amusement of other people and, perhaps for their own enlightenment, = soon, as well. - J. Z., 8.9.02. \par LENDING & BORROWING, CREDITORS & DEBTORS, CREDIT & DEBT, FRIENDS\- = & ENEMIES: All becomes different when we change from the money of = monetary despotism to the monies of monetary freedom. "When I lend I am = a friend, when I ask I am a foe." - \- Proverb, 16th century. - Here, too, no distinction is made \-between the = money of monetary freedom and that of monetary\- despotism. - Even if = the one who lends you money, his own money \- issue, is your friend, you will, at least at first, consider this kind = of \-money loan offer with great suspicion. He will have to prove to\- = you that it is liquid enough by being fully usable against him \-and his = debtors for things you want. When it comes to\- repaying his loan, it will be much = easier to repay it to him in \-his own money than in legal tender money. = It would be still\- easier for you if you could repay it in your own = IOUs or clearing\- certificates, to mutual satisfaction. - J. Z., 18.4.97. \par LIQUIDITY PROBLEMS: Most liquidity problems, business losses and\- = bankruptcies are caused by governments, by their laws on\- taxation, = exchange media, value standards, legal tender, credit,\- capital = securities, prices, wages, rents, interest rates, foreign\- exchange and international trading. - Free clearing or full = \-monetary freedom could avoid most liquidity problems, leaving \-only = those caused by ignorance, miscalculations, frauds and \-catastrophes. - = J. Z., 7.6.91, 26.4.97. =20 \par LOVE OF MONEY: A good deal of misunderstandings arises from the\- = persistent misreading of the proverb which speaks of the "love of = \-money", for it is, of course, the love and not the money which is = \-the root of all evil. - E. Benn, Happier Days,=20 97. - I would \-rather say that it is the love of the money of monetary = despotism\- that causes major evils, not the love of the money of = monetary \- freedom. If people loved the latter then they would have, long ago, = provided themselves with just enough of it for their \-purposes. - If we = really came to understand the money of monetary\- despotism, then we = would no longer love it but despise it and \- reject it at every opportunity and insist upon providing\- ourselves = with something just, harmless and immensely beneficial \-to ourselves: = the monies of monetary freedom. Then and therefore, being no\- longer dependent upon a monopoly money and short supplied with\- it, we = would no longer be greedy for it, either, in the same way \-as we are = not greedy, as a rule, for tickets. Nor would we have \- to work so hard or long and with so many uncertainties and so\- heavily = taxed and exploited by xyz monopolies, for the money of \-monetary = freedom. Through it the rest of the economy could be \-liberated fast. - = J. Z., 25.4.97. \par MARKETING OR DISTRIBUTION: An easier marketing or sale of goods\- = and services, including labour services, is achievable via the\- issue = of purchasing and clearing vouchers based upon these goods\- and services, provided this issue is undertaken by the owners of = \-these goods and services themselves or by the associations they = \-establish and use for this purpose. They should use for this\- convenient money denominations and sound value standards and full = publicity for their issues, whose acceptance should be optional \-in = general circulation and whose ratings should also be left to \-the free = market, especially the local one. To be able to issue\- them, again and again, and get them accepted by = many of their \-potential customers, the issuers would have to keep them = at par\- with their nominal values or close enough to the par value = most\- of the time. Then, to the extent that they could issue these \-notes = and seeing that their potential customers would have no \-other use for = these notes, they would have assured themselves\- with corresponding sales. In essence, the notes would circulate \-only = as long as needed to get into the hands of a consumer who\- wants to pay = with them for his daily consumption requirements.\- That kind of demand for means of payment is vast and can probably = \-keep a circulation at par that corresponds not only to the daily = \-consumption but to the consumption of the next month to 3 months,\- if the experience with real bills and with tax foundation money is any = guide. The daily rating\- of private exchange media against their value = standards would be \-a better indicator. They can be readily issued as = long as they \-a re accepted at par. Then, in the own interest, the issuers will\- stop = further issues until the par is restored. They do not want \-to suffer a = loss and do want to stay in the note issuing \- business. Moreover, they want to be able to settle their balances\- with = other note issuers. On the other side, acceptance of notes will become = \- greatly reduced when notes fall below par. (Among all who do not have to = pay due debts to the issuer or who want to immediately buy goods or = services from him.) When they want to \-receive a CURRENCY then people = are not satisfied with receiving\- something that is NOT current at par in general circulation but = \-merely acceptable at par by the issuer, whose goods and services = \-they might not want or need at present. Only some debtors of the = issuer \- would then still be prepared to accept or obliged to accept the\- notes = at par. No issuer would have to assure convertibility of \-his notes = into rare metals, unless he had obliged himself to make this additional = effort. His competitors would no t have this \-additional capital costs and could thus undercut his = prices. -\- Such alternative means of exchange and value standards to = keep \-the economy, businesses and jobs going and integrate millions of = \- unemployed into the economy, could be rightfully and efficiently = supplied very\- fast, especially when and while governments are quite = obviously \-unable to supply enough or sound enough exchange media and = value \- standards - a situation which has often catastrophic consequences. - = There is no moral\- obligation to respect the forced currency and the = monopoly of the\- central bank. And under certain conditions they will not or cannot be = enforced. These situations should be utilised and one \-should = sufficiently prepare oneself for them. - J. Z., 20.9.91,\- 27.4.97. \par MEULEN, HENRY, ON MONETARY DESPOTISM & CREDIT RESTRICTIONS: "What = \-I do know with certainty is the amazing contradiction of a world\- = that most certainly desires increased production, and is yet \-busily = engaged everywhere in stripping down production by \- squeezing credit. This contradiction springs solely from the fact\- = that governments have everywhere prohibited industry from\- furnishing = its own means of exchange. The two instruments of this \- prohibition are (1) insistence on maintaining gold as a fixed \-price; = (2) prohibition of commercial bank note issues." - THE \-INDIVIDUALIST, = 1/76. - Not only industry but commerce,\- agriculture and transport = companies are under credit\- restrictions. Legal or insistence upon ANY value standard does = \-restrict credit, as opposed to free choice of value standards,\- which = Meulen to my knowledge never advocated. Nor should commercial banks be = the only permitted issuers of banknotes, \- clearing certificates and other means of exchange, like, e.g., railway = \-monies and sound private coinage. Like almost all money \-reformers, = this free banking advocate had his own favourite\- system which blinded him to all other monetary freedom options.\- This = remained true even after many years, if not decades, of correspondence = \-with Ulrich von Beckerath, of which, alas, all too little is still \- in existence. Fixed ideas still predominate in this sphere, too,\- even = among individualists, even among readers and advocates of Max Stirner. = -\- J. Z., 29.4.97. \par MISTAKES: The right to make mistakes - at the own expense and\- = risk and that of only voluntary followers or partners - is as = \-important in the sphere of exchange media and value standards as\- it is in others. - But under full freedom in this sphere mistakes\- = will soon become rarer and rarer and harmfully affect smaller and = \-smaller groups of the remaining true believers in them. - J. Z., = 24.4.97. \par MODERATING THE ECONOMY: Successfully moderate the economy. - I\- = believe that was also one of the "pearls of wisdom" by our former = \-"great leader", PM Keating, possibly also uttered on 14.12.94. -\- Other such expressions are "cooling the economy down" and\- "demand = manipulation", or "shaving the top off demand". - All your income, paid = only in the money they have excessively issued,\- is considered to be=20 "excess demand" that "overheats" the economy.\- Their spending and = waste, often even on luxuries for their own\- enjoyment, at least whilst = they remain in power, is not to be \-subject to any restrictions, least = of all restrictions that voters are \- to be free to vote upon and decide. - They are not ready to\- moderate = their monetary and financial and general economic \-despotism. On the = contrary, they are always ready to increase it\- at your expense and = then to call it "moderating the economy". I\- know of no moderate terms for this kind of policy, nor even of a term = \-which would be severe enough in condemning these frauds, robbers and = despots or political con-men. At \-present the socialists and the = liberals compete with each other \- in selling off public assets, with the proceeds always ending up \-in = their own pockets or budgets for further wasteful and misdirected\- = spending, to let them appear as benefactors to the public, rather \- than embezzlers. But, formerly nationalised or municipalised\- = enterprises belong to the taxpayers as involuntary shareholders\- or = citizen owners of all public assets in Australia. Thus the\- shareholders or citizens should, upon each privatisation, have \-got = their personal shares in these assets. But, once again, they are\- = robbed, instead, by their "representatives" and "leaders" and foolish = enough to\- put up with this. Only in some cases, in the formerly sovietised\- = countries, have vouchers been distributed to the citizens, with\- which = they could buy an interest in formerly nationalised \-e nterprises. - For a comprehensive and rightful denationalisation\- plan, = that could also finance a liberation effort by a\- libertarian party, = see my PEACE PLANS 19 c: Let Freedom Pay Its Way. Its 3}{\f0\fs24\super = rd}{\f0\fs24=20 . edition is now also digitized and available as an e-mail, until it = becomes available on a website and on CD-ROM. \par MONETARY DESPOTISM & OUR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL: Years\- = ago, on a trip with my 3 boys, when they were young, and not far \-from = here, on a fence post along the Old Hume Highway (I think\- it was near = Bargo), I saw a p ityful sight: An eagle chained to \-that fence post. To do that to an = eagle seems to me to be even \-worse than to do it to one of the less = soaring birds. To some\- extent this chained eagle can supply an analogy = to monetary\- despotism and our more or less miserable situation in it. In this\- = case the chain is the forced and exclusive paper currency of the\- = government's central bank and the post itself to which it is\- anchored, is the central bank. Under monetary freedom, like an \-eagle = unchained, we would soon be able to soar - to the limits of \-our = physical and mental capacities and willingness to use them \- productively to satisfy other producers and traders, at market\- prices, = and thereby get our consumer satisfactions in exchange. -\- I do know, = like all others, this analogy limps, too. Eagles are\- not exchangers but, rather, like governments, beasts of prey.\- They = are not sound potential issuers. They are not productive but = \-parasitic. (Apart from their developmental role of improving other = species, which the y hunt.) Typically, many governments have chosen them for their = \-symbols. At the same time, their high and wide-ranging and \-seemingly = effortless flights, have also turned them into symbols\- of freedom. = Eagles and free currencies have some other \- characteristics in common, though. They do not multiply endlessly\- = until we suffocate in eagle feathers. There is a natural limit to = \-their reproduction. And if there is no coercive intervention by \- hunters, there is no deflation of eagles, either. They just fill\- their = natural niche. In Australia, they probably helped, together with foxes, = to reduce the rabbit plague. Rabbits really\- "inflated" themselves. But even with them multiplication had its = \-limits. During drought times, when food for them was sparse,\- = pregnant rabbits were able to assimilate their embryos again, as \- food for themselves. And the flood of their numbers, at least \-from the = point of view of graziers and gardeners, was not \-restrained by the = right of graziers to refuse to accept them on \-their properties. They = did try, not very successfully, via rabbit \- proof fences. But then so much of Australia is still unfenced or = \-fenced-in only to keep cattle and sheep in. Rabbits multiplied\- not = because of legal tender but as a natural force, turning into \-a natural catastrophe, in a country where they did not have \-sufficient = natural enemies, only e.g. eagles, and dingo (dogs), \-not wolves. Foxes = were introduced and helped to reduce their\- numbers and later = rabbit-specific virus infections. Weasel-like=20 \-animals, which in India reduced the snake plague were introduced\- = here on a trial basis, but went for rabbits, instead. I do not \-know = why they were not retained for rabbits. Probably the lobby \- of chicken farmers objected. The second rabbit plague - the calci\-virus = - after the first, myxomatosis, did no longer work well\- enough, was = accidentally released (biologists did not anticipate \- birds or insects could bridge an ocean gap of only 4 km easily, so = \-something was wrong with their biological education) and then = \-systematically spread, has now reduced rabbits so much that \- rabbit hunters can no longer make a living from them and felt-\-hat = producers are looking around for farm bred rabbits instead. (By now this = situation has changed again and rabbits have become plentiful again, at = least where I live. - J. Z., 7.9.02.) \- I think that under free migration rabbit hunting could have\- reduced = them sufficiently. I remember a park near my home in Berlin, which\- = was, just before the war, crowded by rabbits. It took only a few \- weeks of war and its meat rations to reduce that rabbit\- population to = zero. Under certain conditions certain animal \-populations can become = inflated. Such an inflation for humans has\- not yet happened and is = unlikely to occur. We have inbuilt and \- artificial preventative restraints. Even the "primitive" \-Aboriginals = knew, according to Dr. H.G. Pearce, ca. 70 different \-prophylactics. = They did not have to resort to cannibalism \-although, at one stage, = they were probably cannibals, too, like \- all other ethnic groups were, at some stage during their \-development. = Seeing the harm done by deflations and inflations, \-one should imagine = that the search for their natural\- preventatives would have been much = more intense and long ago \- successful. Alas, most people are not rational, selfish and moral\- = enough to so act in their own interest and that of justice,\- security, = prosperity, peace and harmony. - J. Z., 23.4.97. \par MONETARY DESPOTISM & SLAVE MENTALITY: Most people seem to hate\- = the market and its phenomena, as producers, labourers, tradesmen \-and = professionals. It is almost as if they were still standing \- for sale, as slaves on a slave auction block in a slave market,\- like = many or most of their ancestors were. Maybe a racial memory\- is = involved here and that particular gene might soon be discovered.\- In a way they still are slaves but with the slave masters of old\- = replaced by those who managed to get hold of enough of the forced \-and = exclusive currency of monetary despotism, to be able to bid\- for them. = They themselv es are not allowed to issue their own\- money tokens, redeemable in = their goods, services and labours,\- nor are their buyers. They are not = free to issue IOUs in free and effective clearing, based upon what they = have to offer to the \- market, and clear them against the IOUs of others, or, monetarily\- or = via clearing, to exchange their goods, services and labour for\- those = of others. All are kept within the tight network of \- monetary despotism and thus restricted in their exchange actions.\- All = are thus usually forced to offer their goods, services and \-labour not = at free prices but only at prices that are more or \-less emergency = sales prices, because they may legally be\- expressed only in a forced and exclusive currency that is\- monopolised = by a central bank. Due to their remaining slave \-mentality, they tend = to put up with this condition rather than\- effectively rebelling = against it and abolishing it, starting with\- doubts, discussions and theoretical explorations of this freedom = option. They are not in the market with the money of monetary = \-despotism for the literature expounding the options of monetary\- freedom, even though such literature is not outlawed or censored. = \-They have put this major freedom option out of their mind or \-beyond = their horizon or ridicule and slander it when they come\- across it! - "For every tyrant a thousand ready slaves!" - Here: For = every monetary tyrant there are millions of ready slaves and\- numerous = apologists for his monetary despotism. - J. Z., 17.9.91,\- 28.4,97. \par MONETARY DESPOTISM: Just and full payments cannot always be\- = obtained, if at all, for some people, via an exclusive and\- government = managed and mismanaged forced currency. Such a \-currency will always = leave some segments of the economy\- over-supplied with means of exchange (e.g. the public sector)\- and = others under-supplied (e.g. the private sector, especially the rural = one). It may \-over-supply cities and under- supply the countryside. It = may\- over-supply big business and under-supply small businesses. In the = \-absence of sound market rating, free enterprise, competition and = consumer \-sovereignty in this sphere, it will mostly lead to = inflations,\- deflations and stagflations, each with their forms of involuntary = mass-\-unemployment and business, investment and payment injustices and = \-difficulties. - J. Z., 5.10.91, 26.4.97. \par MONETARY DESPOTISM: The government's monetary policies are even = \-more mismanaged and crooked than all its other affairs. - J. Z., = \-6.7.91. \par MONETARY FREEDOM & FREE BANKING: Freedom to coin one's labour\- and = services and goods supply capacity and willingness into one's\- own = ready cash notes and clearing certificates - at least between\- some of one's own local direct or indirect suppliers of goods and\- = services. - The issuers of sound token money do not need a gold\- stock = or government supervision and control for their issues. \- They are self-managed and controlled by sovereign consumers. -\- J. Z., = 22.9.93, 24.4.97. \par MONETARY FREEDOM & RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: To each his own monetary = \-religion, church, dogma, ritual and priesthood, at his own expense and = risk. Tolerance\- towards all tolerant experiments of this kind among their believers. = Sooner or later the successful experiments would win \-more and more = converts at the expense of the unsuccessful ones.\- This is as it should = be. The good monies would drive the bad,\- even among those without knowledge of the theories, techniques \-and = practices involved in producing good money and maintaining \-its = quality. - J. Z., 12.8.91, 26.4.97, 8.9.02. \par MONETARY FREEDOM & THE CRIME RATE: When any productive capacity = \-and readiness can be much easier turned into ready cash, by\- oneself = or for a local and competitively supplied private \-currency, then there = will be many less desperate characters\- committing crimes as a means to support themselves. When, in\- = consequence, the Welfare State "rights" are more and more\- diminished, = too, or delegated to voluntary associations and\- communities and when = monetary rights and other economic rights\- are more and more recognised and utilised, then and with them the = general\- individual rights of others will also become more and more = \-recognised and respected and people will thus more and more \- abstain from criminally infringing them. Today property, personal\- and = trading rights are largely restricted by an avalanche of laws \-and by = public opinion, based largely upon "free" public \- miseducation that creates sympathy for criminal actions of all \-kinds = of "underdogs" and that classes achievers, producers and traders as = criminals, to be penalised at least with high taxes. ("Tax the rich!") = We would come to see\- a shrinkage of that anti-capitalist mentality and with it of\- crime. = People act upon their ideas, no matter how wrong they are. \-With right = ideas more right actions will follow. Even presently \- many to most of the convicted prisoners have also their kinds of\- = standards, i.e., there are criminal actions which most of them\- would = not commit even if they were highly profitable for them.\- That kind of = self-control i s likely to be greatly increased once \-monetary and financial freedom = have been realized for a while. - Frustrations in jobs would become much = more rare. People would\- more often end up and remain in jobs that they = really like and\- are good in. Nor would economic dependency and housing shortage force = people to remain together longer than they would like \-otherwise. = Productive work, savings and investments, inventiveness, creativeness, = innovation, would be seen much more\- as an attractive and safe road to personal riches, rather than = gambling, \-betting, lotteries, theft, embezzlement or robberies and = murder.\- I would even assume that drug consumption and alcoholism would = be greatly \- reduced. Adventurous spirits could try themselves in\- hundred-thousands = of new productive jobs, with more of these appearing\- almost every day. = Moreover, they would be much more able to pay for any \- adventures and experiences that can be purchased. The world would\- = become their oyster. Immigration and business entry barriers\- would = fall. Finally, even the universe would be opened up for \- them. And if they persisted with crimes, then they would have to deal\- = with more armed self-defence, competitive protection and police\- = services, competitive jurisdiction channels, competitive penal \- services and competitive indemnification extraction companies. \-Crime = would be much less likely to pay. Among more enlightened \-people even = the number of crimes of passion would be reduced,\- which are all too often based on the primitive and insufficiently = \-refuted notion of "ownership" of other people. Nor would power be = \-glorified in a free society. It would become rather despised. For \- these and other reasons I would expect much less crime in a \-society = largely liberated via monetary and financial freedom. -\- Compare also = peace plan No. 241 in PEACE PLANS 15, PP 12-20:\- Some Thoughts on how a = libertarian society would tend to reduce \- crime, by J. Z., Dec. 1971. \par MONETARY FREEDOM & THE RISK OF ROBBERIES, THEFT, EMBEZZLEMENT AND = \-FORGERY: Private issues would, as a rule, have a smaller \-circulation = area, a small circle of acceptors and also a shorter circulation or = oscillation period than legal tender and mo nopoly\- currencies that are forced upon a whole country. = Consequently,\- the dishonest acquisition of a certain quantity of them = and their\- reappearance would be much more, easier and faster = noticeable \- than for legal tender. The same applies to forgeries. They are \-not as = easily marketable, either. Especially when issues are in\- series, and = numbered, valid only for short periods, 3 to 12 \- months at most and upon return to the issuing centre cancelled \-and = replaced by other numbered series. When all series and\- numbers are = recorded upon issue and reflux, then the criminal\- disappearance and = reappearance of many of such notes would tend=20 \-to be fast detected. And so would double numbering in case of = \-forgeries. Years ago I enquired into the Australian shop currency\- = system, used in consumer credits. At least by then forgeries had\- never occurred. That may have been a special case, though, for \-the = consumer, receiving these private cash notes in a consumer\- credit, = usable only in the store granting the consumer credit or \- in its associated branches, would mostly spend them themselves\- and = immediately for whatever goods and services they wanted,\- leaving no = opportunity for forgers. Moreover, there exist now\- very small machines = that can very rapidly check a stack o f notes for \-forgeries, even before a cashier accepts them in payment. = Private notes, \-freshly printed and only circulating very shortly, = would pass \-much easier and faster through these electronic forgery = checking\- machines than much used legal tender paper money. \par MONETARY FREEDOM : To each his own monetary theory and practice. = \-- J. Z. 11.7.91. - The monetary theories and practices preferred \-by = some should never be forced upon others. - J. Z., 22.4.97. -\- See TOLERANCE, EXPERIMENTAL FREEDOM, CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY, FREE\- = CHOICE OF EXCHANGE MEDIA & VALUE STANDARDS, FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, \-FREE = ENTERPRISE, FREE TRADE, FREE EXCHANGE, etc.=20 \par MONETARY FREEDOM, ENLIGHTENMENT & REVOLUTION: From a\- moderate = interest in or more or less tacit approval of monetary \-freedom, in all = too general terms, to a well prepared\- and organised readiness to realize it, whenever there is a suitable = opportunity for\- this, many educational and self-educational steps are = required and explorations of the\- best techniques for monetary = experiments and monetary revolutions\- as well as of the best financing methods for already existing and\- = somewhat liberating revolutions, which would have a better chance\- to = succeed via monetary freedom. Under monetary freedom there would be less = bloodshed, less destruction and less like lihood for \-the establishment of another despotism. The gap is as large = as \-that between quiet disapproval or dissent and a full scale \- revolution, including and armed and organised uprising. - J. Z., 5.9.86, = 29. 4. 97. - However, under democratic governme nts a monetary revolution can be quite peaceful, quite non-violent. Only = some laws would have to be broken when the time is optimal for this, in = self-help efforts to end deflations or inflations. There are times and = conditions when governments would not d are to enforce the laws of monetary despotism. These ought to be fully = utilised to abolish it. - J. Z., 9.9.02. \par MONETARY FREEDOM, EXPERTS, SELF-HELP, MONEY QUACKS & TOLERANCE: = \-Let each choose or be his own monetary quack or crank or expert -\- but only at his own expense and risk - and that of his voluntary = followers. So far we were the victims of coercive money cranks of\- the = government, who forced their central bank monopoly and powers\- and their forced and exclusive legal tender paper money upon us and who = manipulated it not\- only into inflations but deflations and = stagflations, without \-allowing us to opt out from under them and to = become monetarily\- emancipated. This is one of the many important votes that they \-have = deprived us of in their republics or democracies, supposedly \-based = upon THE right to vote. - J. Z., 2.2.90, 29.4.97. \par MONETARY FREEDOM, PRIMITIVE MONEY, ADVANCED MONEY SYSTEMS &\- = MONETARY DESPOTISM: Primitive money that one can provide for\- oneself = is, in some important ways, better than the "advanced" \-monies for = whose supply one depends on privilege institutions. - \- J. Z., 10.7.91. See: ABILITY TO PAY. \par MONETARY FREEDOM: Freedom to express all our contracts in other\- = and better value standards and exchange media than those which\- are now = provided by our own governments or by foreign governments\- or by their privileged central banks. - J. Z., 19.11.93, 24.4.97. \par MONETARY FREEDOM: Producers and traders could by rights and in = \-practice issue notes as local currency, alone or in association, = \-only upon the goods and services which they have to offer ready\- for = sale at market prices. All their issues would be\- self-limiting and self-liquidating, balancing the goods offer\- with = the money demand. - No third party is morally authorised or\- can sufficiently and elastically supply them with exchange media that = are exclusive currency and have a forced value. All attempts \-to do so = end in catastrophic economic crises. - The supply of\- sound exchange = media and=20 of sound value standards should, in the\- interests of everyone, be as = free and competitive as that of\- tooth brushes, bicycles and socks. = Then neither an over-supply \-nor an under-supply will occur and anyone = can acquire or produce \- just as many of them as he needs for his purposes and at the\- qualities = that he prefers. - J. Z., 17.11.93, 24.4.97. \par MONETARY FREEDOM: There are relatively many advocates of\- concrete = or commodity value standards, combined with concrete or \-commodity = means of payment, that are also proposed as exclusive\- ones, and, likewise, advocates of abstract value standards and of\- = various more or less despotic reform attempts of money and\- currency = (exchange media and value standards). All would be\- rightful only if freely chosen by volunteers for their own payment = communities. All could, with some good will, be \-exchanged for each = other in a free market, at market rates. Alas, \- tolerance is missing in this sphere as well. The established system is = \-intolerantly, nay even despotically, upheld and the vast majority\- of = dissenters merely aim at another form of monetary despotism -\- to be = forced upon the adherents of the old form of monetary\- despotism and of all other = monetary reformers. Advocates of\- full monetary freedom, who pay more = than lip service to it, by\- subscribing to a general principle of it, = are still extremely \- rare. Presently, I know of no one else in Australia but myself. = \-Thousands my exist - but they are more or less hidden, not = \-organized, not pulled together by a periodical, newsletter \-meetings = or correspondence. - At the same time, there are \- ten-thousands who participate in very limited monetary freedom and = \-free clearing experiments like the LETS. But even they show no = \-interest in their full monetary freedom options. They are more\- like religious sectarians than advocates of religious liberty.\- = Moreover, like most sectarians, they are usually not much better in = their ideas, dogmas and cures than the old churches were, which\- they attempt to replace. - The problem is : How can one give\- value, = in they eyes of the market, to the ideas and literature of \-monetary = freedom. How can one give an exchange value to full monetary freedom\- views and literature? How can the good and truthful money and currency, = exchange media and value standard, clearing and credit ideas, drive out = the \-bad and false theories and practices, which by ignorance, law, \- habits, custom or prejudice have been given almost legal tender \-power = in all opinion exchanges on such subjects. How can one \-freely trade = and spread monetary freedom views under present conditions? - To me some = of the obvious steps are to provide more \- and more such literature upon demand, cheaply, at least in an\- = alternative medium like microfiche (or floppy disks, or text\--only = CD-ROMs), etc.. Likewise, a full bibliography, library and \-information = service, abstract and review compilation and=20 an \-on-going and well recorded published and retrievable discussion = \-on microfiche etc. and online. Also an up to date association = \-directory is required and an address list, listing their special \- preferences and interests. Furthermore, ideas archives and charted = surveys and comparable studies ought to be offered of the\- different = means of payment and value standard and clearing \-systems advocated, = with their good sides and flaws. All the \- options to start new monetary experiments with a chance for \-success, = ought to be fully discussed and listed. Historical \-records of all = monetary freedom experiments ought to be compiled.\- Collectors of notes and coins ought to be contacted and be made = familiar with correct\- monetary theories. Useful plans for a monetary = revolution ought\- to be prepared and contacts made with all other = revolutionaries, all those among them who are \- already fighting somewhere for significant liberties, showing them how = monetary freedom could facilitate their struggles.\- Somehow or the = other the millions of unemployed should be \-interested in cause and = cure for unemployment, even if, for this \- purpose, one would have to draft a million leaflets before one \-would = design one that would be a hit with them. - I still hold\- that the most = advanced advocate and pioneer of full monetary \- freedom was ULRICH VON BECKERATH, 1882 - 1969, whose works I have = \-reproduced in several languages and of whose correspondence I \-have = also reproduced much already, with more to follow. - J.Z.,\- 28.4.97. \par MONETARY FREEDOM:\tab Cash makes no enemies. - Quote in film = series, \-No. 1: The Barbary Coast, 10.6.76, on channel 10. \par MONEY AS A SYMBOL: Money is a symbol for everything. - Napoleon = \-I. - Love, friendship, faith, honesty, intelligence, creativity? - = J.Z., 7.9.02. \par MONEY MONOPOLY: The money monopoly acts like a restrictive = \-licence for jobs and sales (purchases), as well as credits and debt = repayments, directly or indirectly. \-(Indirectly when monopoly money is = used as a compulsory "cover"\- for credits or when it can be legally or juridically demanded at = any\-time, in repayments from a debtor, instead of merely a non-cash = payment or clearing settlement.)\- - Unemployment and other sales = difficulties do inevitably follow \- from it and become extreme during the crises termed deflations,\- = inflations and stagflations, depressions, recessions or\- = credit-restrictions and credit expansions. - All these phenomena,\- not being property defined and then traced back to their causes,\- are = usually merely accepted as if their were natural\- catastrophes, rather = than consequences of monetary despotism. But they are merely \-various = symptoms of monetary despotism. - J. Z., 2.10.89. 29.4.97. \par MONEY REFORMERS: Most do wrongly assume that they already know\- = all there is to know about money and are thus disinterested in or \-even = intolerant of other monetary reformers and, most of all,\- ignorant of or suspicious towards the full monetary freedom\- = potential. - Thus and at least sometimes they are the least \-promising = potential candidates for educational efforts on monetary \- freedom or for experiments with monetary freedom. Most do prefer their = own favourite kind of monetary despotism. - J. Z., 12.3.93,\-24.4.97. \par MONEY SUPPLY, FREE COMPETITION, FREE ENTERPRISE AND FREE TRADE IN = \-THE PROVISION OF EXCHANGE MEDIA, CLEARING FACILITIES AND VALUE\- = STANDARDS: AS far as possible - as far as individuals and\- voluntary associations are willing to try to issue and others are = \-willing to accept, let each be his own money supplier. And let \-each = be judge and jury towards the money issued & offered to him \- by someone else, unless he has contractually obliged himself to\- accept = it. Everyone is morally only obliged to accept his own \-money or = clearing certificate from anyone at any time and at its\- nominal value (at par), in all payments due to him. - J. Z., 27.9.91,\- = 27.4.97. \par MONEY, DEFINITION ATTEMPTS: It represents goods and services and\- = its function is to facilitate the interchange of goods and\- services = between individuals and peoples. - Ernest Benn, Honest \-Doubt, 32/33. - = That would be true of the monies of monetary=20 \-freedom. Alas, it is not true of the monies of monetary\- despotism. - = J. Z., 25.4.97. \par MONEY, DEFINITION: I must deny the statement that "money is an = \-information system we use to deploy human effort" (Michael \-Linton, = LETS). - We use money to CONVEY OWNERSHIP & owners deploy human effort. = The statement that textbook definitions tell what \- money DOES, not what it IS, while Michael's tells what it IS, is = \-not clear. A shovel IS a digging instrument because it is used to\- = dig with. The IS category depends on the doing. The same with \- money. - But what information does money convey? Some say the\- = essential feature of money is that it is a generalised credit\- = instrument. In that case the information is a claim of ownership.\- But of what & how much? - Don Werkheiser to Tom Greco, Aug. 6, \-1986, = p. 2. - I find that general "definition" as useless as another all too = general one: "Money is property". - Property owners, from shop owners=20 to land owners or car owners, would strongly disagree, while they vainly = try to sell their properties for money. And so would unemployed, who = rightfully own their labour power, skills and willingness to work. - J. = Z., 8.9.02. \par MONEY, ITS IMPORTANCE & HAPPINESS, ABILITY TO PAY VS. INABILITY TO = PAY: Money alone does not make one happy - one has \-to have it, too. - = Peter Gorf, Der Gruene Dik tator, 119. It will almost always be easier to acquire money issued by = oneself, alone or in association with others, than to gain monopoly = money by struggling, together with many other victims of monetary = despotism, for its possession. - J.Z., 7.9.02. - S ee: \-ABILITY TO PAY. \par MONEY: Money serves to ease the pain. - Quoted from film: The = \-Love Bug. - The indiscriminate defence as well as indiscri minate attacks on all kinds of money are ill conceived and misdirected, = or at most half-truths, because they defend or attack a generalisation, = namely "money", that does not distinguish between despotic and free = money, bad and good money, optional and ref u sable money, exclusive and competitive money, the money of monetary = despotism and the money of monetary freedom. This is like praising or = condemning "man" without distinguishing between criminals and innocents, = robbers and producers, destroyers and creato rs, murderers and victims. - Nevertheless, all such opinions should be = collected for whatever values they can offer us, even if they might only = stimulate us to ponder efficient refutations of them. - J. Z., 8.9.02. \par MORE MONEY IS NOT NECESSARILY INFLATIONARY: Do not allow any\- = central bank to print even more of its forced and exclusive (\-legal = tender currency) and do repeal all its legal privileges, \-to stop its = inflation. On the other hand, allow people to spend \- more money, money they coined or issued themselves, based upon\- = their own goods, services and labour, to the extent that they do \- find willing acceptors for these alternative and competitive currencies, = and any economy will tend to become a permanent boom\- economy - unless = other despotic economic interventions are \-continued. Monetary demand = will then grow only with the growth\- of goods, services and labour offered for sale. The change-over \-from = monetary despotism to monetary freedom is the most\- significant = change-over from totalitarian, dirigistic or\- centrally planned = economies, with all the problems they create \- for themselves and their victims, to the problem-solving free \-market = economics. - J. Z., 24.9.93, 24.4.97. - See: ELASTICITY, DEMAND, = QUANTITY THEORY, INFLATION, ABILITY TO PAY, ADAPTABILITY. \par NEUTRAL MONEY: Something that is as essential to the existence = \-and functioning of a really free market as the exchange media and\- = value standards of monetary freedom cannot be considered as \- neutral. They would be extremely effective & beneficial, in the \-same = way was free contracts and free prices and free trade are, \-in a free = market. They are a moral and necessary part of freedom \-of contracts, = free pricing and fr ee trade. Free money is no more\- neutral than freedom of expression and = freedom of information \-are, free enterprise, free competition, free = cooperation, and freedom for all transport enterprises. But the monies = and value\- standards of monetary freedom would be insofar neutral as it \-would = not DISTURB free market transactions. It would neither\- cause = inflations, deflations, stagflations, credit restrictions\- or credit = expansions (beyond those the trade requires),\- depressions nor mass unemployment. It would be extremely elastic\- to = adapt fast to all changes in the supply of goods and services. \par OBJECTIONS: FEAR OF IMAGINED INFLATIONARY OR DEFLATIONARY = \-CONSEQUENCES, FEAR OF FRAUD & FORGERY, PRIVATE POWER & MONOPOLY, = \-FEAR OF THE UNKNOWN, FEAR OF NEW EXPERIMENTS: There is\- especially = the fear that too much or too little currency would \- then be issued, assuming that acceptors could not refuse or\- discount = it, while persisting in using sound value standards in \-their = contracts, wage agreements and goods and service pricing.\- Consumer sovereignty has never been considered seriously by the \-man = in the street, who otherwise might be able and willing to \-haggle with = the best of them for each of his major purchases. The \- real causes of inflation and deflation are so little known even \-after = to so many experiences with them that inflation and\- deflation proof = currencies are simply not comprehended as being possible\- or people simply delegate all their monetary responsibilities to\- the = government - although few of them could point out a\- single politician, = bureaucrat, policeman or judge whose views on money \-would make much sense and whose views, if realized, would fully \-and soon solve = monetary problems, in their opinion. When they\- think of issuers then = they have only the model of monopolistic and legal tender\- paper money issues in mind. If everyone could issue legal tender then, = \-indeed, everyone could inflate. It is hard for most to keep more = \-than one thought or condition in mind at the same time. Sweeping\- generalisations are so much easier to state and to believe in.\- But = when e.g. optional acceptance, optional value standards, free\- market rating and freedom to refuse acceptance are taken into = consideration, together with note exchanges and balances from\- clearing = and full publicity for the market rating of exchange \-media and value = standards, as well as the ease with which the soundness\- of suspected local currencies can be checked = - in the nearest\- store, then fear of inflation will tend to evaporate. = Likewise,\- with awareness of the number of potential issuers in the = future \- and their great variety in past monetary freedom experiments, the \-fear = of deflations will become reduced. That will be helped along\- by a = proper understanding of Gresham's Law: In the absence of \- legal tender the good money will drive out the bad. Further, by\- the = understanding that all the principles of free market pricing \-and = exchanges do apply to the commodity "money" and the service \-of banking = as well. - The most evil or misguided issuer=20 \-might attempt an inflationary issue. But he cannot undertake it = \-one-sidedly. He has to find acceptors, who do accept his notes at\- = par. He needs their collaboration and he has no powers to make \- them accept his depreciated and depreciating notes (not \-sufficiently = covered by his credits, goods, services and labour) at par. \-It takes = two to dance tango. Sovereign consumers would decide for \- themselves how much of any competing currency they would be \-willing to = accept at any particular time and under any particular\- circumstances. = It would be a mutual convenience relationship, not \-a single = convenience=20 one. - One has to be able to see beyond the \-forced and exclusive legal = paper money to competitive offers to consider the optional acceptances = by sovereign individual consumers (or users of competing currencies), = their ratings or refusals. -\- We haven't even fully realized as yet the self-management options in = the\- sphere of goods production and service supplies. Far less have = we\- so far seriously considered all the options for competitively and = \- cooperatively supplying (rating or refusing) alternative exchange media = and value \-standards and the free market, free contract, consumer = \-sovereignty limitations upon any issues. - Most people have not\- yet gained full confidence in competition, free markets, free = \-enterprise, free trade, private property, self-regulation etc. in\- = other spheres, so we should not expect knowledge and appreciation of = such relationships to dominate in the monetary \- sphere, either, especially seeing that this sphere, much more than = others ever were and for much longer, was ruled and\- r egulated by States. Not even the frequently repeated messes that = governments have made out of their "monetary authority" has been enough = to achieve a demand for relieving them of this responsibility, no more = so than the persistent wars has made their vict i ms ware that territorial States are not able and willing to achieve = peace but are warfare States, that they are the problem, not the = solution. Thus the monetary aspect of territorialism continues to be = accepted as well as its military aspect. All too many =20 of us have still the slave or serf mentality and let ourselves be = distracted by handouts and circus performances. How can one break out of = that mind-set oneself and induce others to do so? One of the first = requirements seems to be to assemble all relevant facts, ideas and opinions and make them permanently, easily and cheaply = accessible and then to demand experimental freedom for volunteers in = this sphere as well as in all other creative or tolerant spheres of = human activities. - J. Z., 4/97, 8.9.02. \par OBJECTIONS: People would no make use of monetary freedom. -\- = Indeed, most people would not, not at all or not soon or would not = immediately make use of \-all the options that monetary freedom offers. = That would also be\- one of the safeguards against initial mistakes in monetary freedom = experiments, that would be harmful \-to their practitioners and the = acceptors of their notes. Then the flawed schemes could at most only = harm the small groups\- of their true believers. Many of these experiments would fail but a few would\- succeed and the = intelligence of most people is enough to permit \-them to imitate, if = they are unable or unwilling to initiate\- sound innovations. Consider = how rapidly e.g., ball point pens,\- digital watches and computers spread. For many centuries all of \-us = have been the victims of repressive monetary legislation and \- conditioned to accept its evils as unavoidable. Being neither the = decision-makers of monetary despotism, nor grasping its wrongs and evi ls, and their consequences, most people rather blamed other victims of = the system than the victimisers themselves, e.g. by blaming shop keepers = for price rises due to inflation. Such false positions are is supported = by\- governmental miseducation and propaganda and misleading\- terminology = and the monetary ignorance and prejudices of most \-academics, = journalists and writers on this subject, even of most economists and = bankers and financiers. Thus \- enlightenment is not easy to achieve or cannot be achieved very \-fast = in this sphere, at least not when we confine ourselves\- largely to = traditional, costly and insufficient communication\- channels. But there are now powerful and affordable alternative \-media = that can offer all the accumulated wisdom, facts and \-opinions in this = sphere, in combination and sufficiently ordered\- as well as cross-referenced. Moreover, autonomous monetary experiments = among\- volunteers and at their expense and costs only, would be = newsworthy \-and their successes - and failures - would spea k for themselves. They could, e.g., either be undertaken in countries = that are already up in arms against an oppressive governments, or, = properly timed for effectiveness, as civil disobedience actions in = democracies, during acute economic crises, which wo uld prevent the rulers from strictly applying the laws of monetary = despotism, since they do want to become re-elected. \-Thus it would not = need to take centuries, decades or even years\- to spread monetary = enlightenment sufficiently to permit almost \- everyone to enjoy the benefits of full monetary and financial \-freedom. = - Central banking, on the other hand, legally and\- juridically upheld = and not overthrown by a monetary revolution, one \- that really and lastingly emancipated us in this sphere, could\- come to = last centuries. The powers of evil, ignorance and\- prejudices are still = great and our territorial, coercive and\- monopolistic institutions have = institutionalised them and direct\- ed our discontent towards "bread and circuses". When despotic \-monetary = laws have long existed, then they become finally and very \-widely = perceived as inevitable, as laws of nature, and their \- natural consequences as natural catastrophes, not to be blamed\- upon = monetary despotism. - J. Z., 4.7.93, 24.4.97. \par OVER-ISSUES, FIAT MONEY, GOLD MONEY PRICE ADAPTATIONS TO THE = MONEY\- SUPPLY & AUSTRIAN ECONOMISTS: Some Austrian economists believe = \-in price adaptations and limitations for everything except for \- paper notes not covered fractionally or 100% by gold. Even in the \-face = of gold clearing certificates only reckoning in gold weight\- value or = of historical precedents for them, they would still be\- all too ready = to condemn them as mere fiat=20 money, although such \-certificates would have a very much larger = redemption fund (in the world's gold-market), even\- though not at the issuer. (But the issuers would have their = self-interest and that of their potential acceptors to keep their issues = are par with their nominal gold weight value.) The Austrian School's = redemption funds\- would be required only for their own issues of gold certificates and = limit these issues to the quantities of metallic gold they will be able = to acquire for this purpose. (This fixed and high cost for their issues would make them rather = uncompetitive.) The gold clearing notes and\- certificates of monetary = freedom (which would not exclude or\- suppress other freely chosen value = standards ) would not offer \- merely the limited gold redemption funds of these "goldbug" issuers. = They would not offer such limited funds\- at all. Instead, the issuers = of gold-\-clearing notes or certificates, who would issue and keep them = at \- par with their nominal gold value, through sound reflux,\- security, = clearing or demand arrangements for them, would refer\- any of their = note holders, who wanted gold coins or bullion, to the huge \- world market for gold - and its local agents. That would make all\- the = gold in the world (that not used industrially, for art and jewellery,\- = or buried in hidden treasures or in graves (in dentures), \- accessible to all possessing exchange media with a par value to \-gold = or acceptable on the gold market at a discount. The very possibility = that they could suffer a discount there w ould tend to keep their issues limited enough and thus close or close = enough to par. - Gold bugs, who want to confine all our transactions = to\- gold payments or payments in gold certificates, do not envision\- any other inherent limitations of issues and acceptances, not \-even = for currencies that are competitively issued, optional and\- market = rated and may be freely refused and which are likely to be \- freely refused, if not well founded and administered and if they\- do = suffer a discount. - They are not fully aware that the \-reversal of = Gresham's Law (popular version) into the correct\- one: That good money = drives out bad money, when neither are\- legal tender, would also operate against their favourite \-currency, = which they expect to win this race. For people, who can\- manage to keep = their paper money at par with gold weight values \- will always have a competitive edge against the issuers of the more = expensive gold \-certificate (the 100% gold dollar) currency and also = against one that that will only have to be fractionally \- covered in gold. Gold redemptionism by the issuer is comparable \-to the = limited government notion, which attempts to substitute \-this form of = government for all kinds of other governments which\- statists want for = themselves and all kinds of free societies which non-governmentalists want for themselves. Monetary = freedom\- would, mean, instead: To each the each the exchange medium,\- = value standard, clearing system and short-term credit system of his or = her dreams. - No\- one can rightly demand any more freedom in this sphere, either. -\- J. = Z., 28.4.97. \par OVER-ISSUES: Under completely free clearing and publicity and\- = note exchanges every deception and over-issue would inevitably\- = discovered and mostly discovered very fast. - Solneman, Drei = \-Kernfragen zur Vermoegensverteilung, p. 20 & J. Z., 17.4.97. \par PAYMENTS & FORMS OF PAYMENTS OR CLEARING TO BE QUITE FREE: \-Wages = and salaries, pensions & superannuations, rents, dividends \- and interest rates, import & exports, all kinds of fees, subscriptions = and charges ( including taxes, while they can still be imposed and\- = extracted), are to become payable in any means of payment and using = \-any value standards whi ch the contractors can agree upon or which \-their chosen arbitrators = settle for them in case they do not\- agree. Each issuer must only = accept his own means of payment or \-IOU's or clearing certificates at = any time from anyone in any \- payment or settlement due to him, at par with their nominal value. No = means \-of payment to be legal tender or an exclusive means of payment = \-in general circulation any longer. But when a local currency,\- standing at par with its nominal value, has not been explicitly = \-excluded in a contract then, in case of disagreements regarding \-its = use, it may be juridically presumed as having been the\- intended means of settlement of a debt. These are the only cases that = \-I can presently think of where some form of moral or customary\- legal = tender would still continue, under any just and free system. But for = this no special legal\- tender legislation would be required. This form of acceptance\- = obligation or honest or moral settlement is inherent in the obligation = of contracts. - J. Z., n.d., 29.4.97. \par POLLUTION OF CURRENCIES BY GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION, MONETARY = DESPOTISM: The \-pollution of money by coercive and monopolistic = government \-intervention is probably the worst of all cases of = pollution. It affects \- all exchanges, all goods, all services, properties, jobs,\- investments, = all enterprises, all retired persons. - J. Z.,\- 22.4.97. \par PRICE LEVEL FOR STAPLE FOOD ITEMS, INDEX CURRENCY, CPI: Australia = has the lowest food \-prices in the developed world, according to a = study conducted by\- the US Dpt. of Agriculture, for 1987/88, as stated = in a leaflet \-by ARA, Australian Reta ilers' Association, 1/1, 1988. Alas, I can \-no longer find this = association in the 96/97 Sydney telephone \-books. Otherwise, I would = have asked them for their monthly \-turn-over figures, i.e., for their = potential shop-money \- foundation capacity. - Statistics like this might be correct or = incorrect. It depends upon whose prices and for which goods are = \-selected and combined in an index. There are hundreds to\- thousands = of different ways for doing it and the selection can be \- very selective and self-interested to push the case for one or \-the = other vested interest group. It depends also upon whether you\- catch the prices of a year of bad harvests or good ones, during a lull = before an inflation-caused spurt of prices or afterwards, during\- a = period of credit restriction or deflation and upon the\- correctness or incorrectness of still somewhat manipulated\- foreign = exchange rates. Thus all such comparisons should be taken \-with more = than a grain of salt. It is so easy to make mistakes\- with statistics = or to lie with them. I have come to greatly \- distrust e.g. any government determined CPI. - J. Z., 29.4.97. During = the great German inflation of 1914-1923, Heinrich Rittershausen once = checked back upon those who actually compiled the detailed price figures = for the ind ex statistics and found out that these compilations were already very = unreliable at that level, done usually by junior clerks who wanted to = get over such a chore with the least possible effort to themselves. GIGO = again. - For instance, potato prices, when =20 free, vary over a year from 1 to 20 points and dozens of varieties of = potatoes exist and the conditions of their harvesting, storage and sales = do also vary greatly. So, which price, for which kind of potatoes, etc., = will a junior clerk, in a hurry, and di s interested in the job, pick among all these options? - Look through any = kind of super market, e.g., among soaps, pens and tooth brushes. Their = types and prices vary greatly. So, which is the average price for each = of these "detailed" consumer goods? After that experience Rittershausen ceased to be an advocate of index = currencies. - J. Z., 9.9.02. \par PRIVATE COINAGE: The state's nationalisation of the minting = \-business injured the free market and the monetary system in many = \-ways. One neglected point is that government minting is subject \- to the same flaws, inefficiencies, and tyranny over the consumer \-as = every other government operation. Since coins are a convenient\- = monetary shape for daily transactions, the state's decree that\- only X, = Y, and Z denominations sh all be coined, imposes a loss of utility on consumers and substitutes = uniformity for the diversity \-of the market. It also begins the long = disastrous slide from an\- emphasis on weight to an emphasis on name or = tale. In short, under \- private coinage there would be a number of denominations, in\- strict = accordance with the variety of consumer wants. The private \-stamp would = probably guarantee fineness rather than weight, and\- the coins would circulate by weight..." - Rothbard, The 100% Gold\- = Dollar, 14. - The suppression of private coins with private\- acceptance = foundations and produced out of cheap metals or \- plastic, has had probably an even worse effect. With gold value = \-reckoning widely practised and gold coins only rarely used, in a \-few = transactions and cheap metal coins easily given a gold weight \- value by ready acceptance as local currency, there is no need to = \-resort to rare metals to provide change or small change. Private gold = coinage should not be outlawed but there is no reason to\- use it = widely. - J. Z., 17.4.97. \par PRIVATE MONEY ISSUES WOULD DEPRECIATE THE VALUE OF THE STATE'S\- = PAPER MONEY & MUST THEREFORE BE SUPPRESSED: View popular among men of = the street and many "expert" economists. - To use an\- analogy: When a = bachelor gets a choice between a beautiful\- blonde and an ugly duckling, who is he likely to choose. Or when \-a = girl has a choice between a guy coming close to her ideal and a\- mere = jerk, whom is she likely to choose? Now, should the\- exi stence of the better choice be blamed for having caused the\- rejection = of the lesser choice? Has the beauty or character\- involved CAUSED the = ugliness or inferiority of the rejected \- parties? Or has it merely REVEALED them by comparison? - When there is = no free choice and ugliness, if given a monopoly and \-legal tender = value, while beauty is outlawed, then ugliness is \-given an artificial = legal tender and monopoly value. That value=20 \-it would, indeed, lose under freedom. But that kind of loss \-should = be distinguished from a coercive depreciation of something \-that has = great value by itself in a free market. The money of \-monetary freedom = does not bring about such a coercive\- depreciation. It merely brings about competition and choice, free\- = enterprise and free exchange and free value reckoning in a very\- = important sphere, where it was so far suppressed. It would not \- prevent any state paper money from retaining whatever value it \-might = still be able to retain for its issues e.g., through its = tax\--foundation. (Not exactly a free market foundation for it, either, = \- but acceptable for this discussion.) When, under freedom, the \-good = money is free to drive out the bad, because all creditors\- will tend to = prefer it and reject the bad money, the situation is \-the same , as for the rejection of "wall flowers". The creditors\- do not cause = the badness of the bad money. They simply refuse to\- use it. Thus it = can continue to exist only upon its merits, among those still prepared = to accept it. The beautiful boys and girls=20 \-do not MAKE the others ugly. They do not deface them, even while = \-they might make impolite or satirical and inconsiderate remarks\- = regarding them, which might hurt their feelings. It might also happen\- that many beautiful partners are only comparable to fool's gold,\- with = beauty only skin deep, and many of the rejected ones might \-have been = or might become the real bargains in these exchanges. \- Let the buyers and sellers beware, in this market, too. They \-should = look for real values and not just appearances. - Anyhow,\- good money = should not be blamed for the flaws of bad money and\- the resultant fate of bad money. Consumer sovereignty should be\- = combined with free enterprise and free marketing in this sphere,\- too. = Free markets should not be blamed because people, when free \- to choose, individually, not merely collectively, tend to prefer them\- = and would prefer them in this sphere, too. - Let the producers\- and = exchangers decide, with THEIR dollars about the fate of the \-government = paper dollars. And let the vo luntary supporters of the \-government's paper dollars give them = whatever value they want to and are able to \-give them, with their own = goods, services and labours. They have\- no right to subjugate others to = their preferred monetary\- despotism - but only themselves. - When private monies can be \-freely = issued, then state paper money will only be accepted to the\- extent = that it has used tax foundation properly, i. e., is needed by subjected = \- taxpayers to rid themselves temporarily of the current tributes = \-imposed upon them, by paying off these extortionists with the\- = extortionists own coins. "Give to Caesar what is Caesar's!" But \- even then they should insist that the government paper money \-loose its = monopoly as the ONLY permitted means for tax payments\- and, also, its = legal tender character for general circulation.\- Only the legal tender = towards the taxation offices should \- remain. All taxes, while these tributes or robberies are still \-allowed = to be continued, should be determined in stable value standards \-and = the tax offices should always have to accept tax payments in\- State paper money at par, even when, on the free market, this \-paper = money would stand considerably below par. - Sooner or\- later, = hopefully, a complete and successful tax strike would also \-include a = refusal to accept any State paper money in any \- payments, thus rendering the State unable to pay and driving it \-into = liquidation. (Temporarily, its armed hordes, including\- custom = officers, might then have to be paid by the tax strikers themselves, = from levies they impose temporarily upon themselves \-), in order to reduce the risk of armed clashes. In the long run, the = free market would provide sufficient jobs for these \-unemployed, at = market rates and with purchasing power that would \-be attractive to = most of them, if they are prepared to work\- harder than they were before, in their State socialist\- bureaucracies. = - J. Z., 6.7.93, 22.4.97. \par PRODUCTION FOR USE: "Einstein... Using a popular socialist = \-slogan, he wrote that 'production for use' ought to replace the = \-'production for profit' of the capitalist order. (1956:129 ) .\-... = Einstein appears to have been unaware that only calculation=20 \-and distribution in terms of market prices make it possible to = \-utilise our discoverable resources intensively, to guide \-production = to serve ends lying beyond the range of the \-producer's perception, and = to enable the individual to\- participate usefully in productive exchange (first, by serving\- = people, mostly unknown to him, to the gratification of whose\- needs he = can nonetheless effectively contribute; and second, by\- himself bei ng supplied as well as he is only because people who \-know nothing = about HIS existence are induced, also by market\- signals, to provide = for his needs: see the previous chapter). In\- following such sentiments Einstein shows his lack of comprehension of, = or real interest in, the actual processes by \-which human efforts are = coordinated. - Hayek, The Fatal Conceit,\- 59. - An excellent refutation = of state socialistic notions. But I\- wish that Hayek had pointed out the monetary connection, too, as \-he = did, in his The Denationalisation of Money. When producers or owners = \-issue goods and services vouchers upon themselves, in money\- denominations, to pay for what they need, want and USE, which \-they = readily accept at par when someone buys something from them,\- and to = the extent that their notes, IOUs etc. are readily\- accepted by their suppliers, then, obviously, they produced for \-their = own use, not only goods and services that others want to \-use but also = the monetary means that permit them to sell these\- goods and=20 services and that enables others to buy these goods and \-services. And = both find the exchange not only useful but both do\- also profit from = these exchanges. Under consumer sovereignty, \-with monetary demand = freed, all production with be subjectively\- useful to sovereign consumers - not to their dissenting critics. \-But = why bother about these. Let THEM buy what THEY want. More \-they cannot = rightly ask for. Their preferences and priorities are \-different and = they are their own. - J. Z., 25.4.97. \par PROPERTY RIGHTS & OBLIGATIONS & MONETARY FREEDOM: Unless he has\- = so contractually obliged himself, no one is obliged to accept the = \-notes issued by someone else at all or to accept them at par.\- Only = the issuer himself has to accept=20 his own IOUs etc. at any\-time at par with their nominal value - unless = another repayment \-term or cut-off period (after which it would become = invalid), has\- been clearly stated and, by acceptance, agreed upon. = E.g., money \- considered as a ticket suggests that something as perishable as\- a = theatre or cinema seating option cannot be held open except for \-the = date or period stated on it. A season's ticket for railway\- transport applies only to that period. And the supplier of \-perishable = food has to see to it that his produce warrants return \-to him before = too much of his produce has perished. The right of\- others to refuse or discount his IOUs set limits to his issues,\- and = so does his capacity to supply goods and services which can be\- = purchased with his IOUs. Other, indirect limitations arise from \- the short term real bills or their equivalents, upon which issues, in = form of short term loans, e.g. for wage payments, \-would mostly take = place. They, do, would establish a short term demand for \-the notes = that is equivalent to their volume, for the repayment of these short term = loans. Clearing houses would also see to that notes are quickly returned = to their issuers. Other checks are extensive publicity for all details = of issues and their reflux and the availabil ity of other and competitive currency \-issues, but especially the free = rating every issues on the\- currency and rare metal markets, against = their own value standard \-and that of others. The issuer also wants to = preserve his good\- business name, especially his reputation as a sound issuer and does not = want \-to lose his business and all other assets in case he is = convicted\- of criminal negligence or fraud with his issues. The issuer = wants \- to facilitate his sales and those of his associates, by sound\- exchange media and value reckoning. He has no interest in spoiling his business = chances, risking bankruptcy and being taken to court. That his IOUs are = not redeemable upon demand either in rare metals or in legal tender or = in securities,\- or insured or guaranteed by any government authority, will \-also help = to restrain his issues and their acceptance and relate \-them quite = clearly to his own ability and readiness to supply\- goods and services in exchange for them, alone or in association\- with = others in the same community or shopping centre. Initially \-and in the = long run only those private and cooperatively issued \- notes and certificates will be accepted which are rated at par or = \-close enough to par with their nominal value not to matter to the = \-holder, as long as the issuer or the issuing centre, with all its\- members, accepts the notes at par. Any local currency as well as any = unknown competing currency\- can be checked by a \-local potential = acceptor very fast, simply by presenting a suspected note at the nearest = shop's cashier, asking him\- or her whether they would accept it at par. No monetary studies, = \-scholarship, statistics or authoritative special commission would\- be = required. - J. Z., 3.8.94, 17.4.97, 7.9.02. \par PROPERTY RIGHTS, EXCHANGE RIGHTS & THE MENTALITY OF DOGS & = \-HUMANS: Observers of dogs have noticed that they do have at \-least a = primitive concept of property rights and property borders\- and of = violations of persons and personal property. But their \- brains or ideas are not sufficiently developed to comprehend\- = exchanges, far less quite free exchanges and their monetary,\- credit = and clearing requirements. Are humans to some extent still only like = dogs, in their non-comprehension of free exchange and \- what it implies? "One can't teach on old dog new tricks!" - says \-a = proverb. Does that apply to human beings and monetary freedom,\- too? - = The repeated monetary freedom experiments, even in face of \-severe lega l restrictions, speak against this, at least for a\- small percentage of = the human race. Without legal backing\- monetary despotism would not = have been established or maintained\- for long. - But at least under the = present "educational" system and \- limited experiences, free exchange and, more so, free clearing and \-its = potential, are understood only by a few human brains. Some human brains = might have to be classed even below dog brains, \- because they do not even comprehend and value private property \-rights, = far less stand up for it when necessary. - J. Z., 22.9.87, 22.4.97. \par PROTECTIONISM: Protectionism seems to presume that international = \-trade must be carried out only through scarce and exclusive \-national = exchange media or even rare metals or rare metal\- certificates. When = spending these in other countries, in \- payment for imports, then there would be no certainty that these\- = exchange media would fully or soon enough return to the country\- that = had issued them, in payment for its exports, directly, or \- indirectly through other countries. Gold coins or bullion or\- foreign = exchange, that is somewhat less inflated that the own\- forced and = exclusive paper currency, instead of returning them, to\- pay for their own imports (the exports of the issuing country), they = \-might be hoarded, under present conditions, in the central bank\- of = the country that had exported to us. This central bank might \-utilise them as a supposedly required currency reserve for its \-own currency. = And this country might impose import restrictions \-upon our exports, = which would be a hindrance in the utilisation\- of our means of payment, thus hoarded by them. One effect of the = non-return of these \-payments for our imports would be a corresponding = deflation in our \- country that had imported but not correspondingly exported. (The normal = internal products plus the imports would then be confronted by a reduced = volume of the internal currency.) The own \-central bank might not be = able or willing to make up this money\- shortage. The \-foreign central bank might do this repeatedly, calling = it: accumulating foreign exchange reserves. The Japanese government, for = \-many years, has held on to many of the earnings from its exports, \- thus creating, under monetary despotism, difficulties for the = \-importing countries. If that process could go on indefinitely, \-then = the importing country might run out of exchange media altogether. It = would be reduced to barter, not only for its\- external trade but also for its internal trade, as long as monetary = freedom remained suppressed. Luckily, this threat is\- never fully but = only partly realized. But these part-deflations \-are already damaging, = sometimes out of pr oportion to the figures involved. (Deflations, under monetary despotism, = tend to increase automatically, due to the effect of FALLING prices, = which discourage buying.) - These and other\- difficulties of monetary = and financial despotism, combined with \- protectionism and foreign exchange controls and foreign exchange\- = accumulations as "covers" and "reserves", could be avoided by \-freedom = to issue and accept goods and service vouchers and\- clearing = certificates in money denominations, all of which have \- only a limited circulation period and are redeemable only in \-goods, = services and labour, and in the payment of other debts, even though they = might use e. g. a \-gold or silver weight unit as their value standard = for pricing, \- accounting, clearing and payment purposes, with actual payments \-done = only in these certificates, not in the metal of the value\-standard, = unless the debtors are able and willing to do so and\- the creditors prepared to accept such payments. The time limits \-on = such certificates or credit accounts for clearing purposes\- only, would = see to it that they are not hoarded to excess but are used, instead, = within the \- period of their validity, to pay for our exports. To the \-extent that = these payment avenues could and would be freely used,\- imports and = exports would thus be obviously balanced. No \-motivation would remain = to restrict them. (There might be still \- special lobby groups demanding particular favours, i.e. the\- exclusion = of foreign competition to what they have to offer for \-sale. A wise = government, banking and clearing system would see to \- it that such industries and businessmen are largely paid in the\- = foreign goods and clearing warrants, so that their self-interest\- would = finally tend to overcome their protectionist and \-monopolistic aspira tions. When they are paid largely in Australian\- clearing certificates, = then they would not want to have these depreciated by protectionist = measures against Australian exports.\- They would then have the proper = pocketbook appeal.) The sums\- spent in other countries, for our imports, paid for in clearing = certificates (redeemable only in Australian goods and services) would = then inevitably return to us soon, in\- payment for exports. The only = alternative would be that foreign\- exporters would not utilise these clearing certificates at all,\- = directly or indirectly, to import from Australia. Instead, they\- might = persuade their government to purchase them and keep them,\- until they become invalid, at the expense of their taxpayers. = \-Australia would then have imported valuables and given only\- scraps = of printed paper for it, that would become valueless to\- the holder = after a short period. To that extent Australia would \- have received a free gift of goods and services from a foreign\- = country. The foreign country would have exported to Australia \-and = would have got nothing in return. The protectionist would\- have reasons to complain. Australians would not have. Australians\- = could go on issuing their international clearing certificates,\- even = upon the same goods that were formerly offered for the now \- forfeited clearing or goods certificates used for the former \-imports. = In the extreme case, if the other countries were foolish\- enough to = continue this policy indefinitely, Australians could \-stop working = altogether - apart from printing their clearing\- certificates which the others would be = foolish never to return to \-them in payments - while Australians would = import all their goods \-and services. Alas, the foreign protectionists = will never be as \- foolish for very long. So that kind of holiday and effortless\- income = for Australians would sooner or later be ended. But the \-extreme and = merely thought-up example shows up the absurdity that \- is inherent in proctectionist policies, expecially the spleen of\- = "export at any price", even if the price obtained is zero and the\- own = taxpayers are forced to provide gifts, in form of unpaid for\- exports, to foreign countries (since the means of payment\- offered for = them are accepted but not used for imports by them). - If,\- instead, = not only bilaterally but multilaterally, clearing \- certificates would be used in all international trades, all redeemable = soon but redeemable only in the goods and services of \-the country (or = its traders) that issued them, then the\- balances of trade and payments = would not be disturbed at all by \- these transactions. On the contrary, these exchanges could then\- be = multiplied up to the limits of any country's ability to \-satisfy the = demand of foreign countries demand for its goods and \-services. Foreign = trade might increase tenfold or hundred- fold\- under these conditions, requiring the issue and reflux of\- = correspondingly more international clearing certificates (or \-accounts) = of this kind. But, at the same time, any sound value\- standard used, to = measure the value of these transactions, would\- not, thereby, be depreciated. Issue and = reflux of such clearing\- certificates would remain in balance. Their = issue and their\- nature would assure their return. They would not become "lost sheep" or = "lost sons", except in the rare instances when such\- certificates might = actually be lost or destroyed. To the extent \-that this could be proven = by their former holders, they could=20 \-then be replaced. - What applies to international trade could\- also = be applied to the issue and reflux of local currencies, down \-to that = of individual shop issuers and the issuers of the shops in a\- street (street money), or the money of a local shopping centre,\- that = has become a local currency. Their free issue and automatic\- and rapid = return could be similarly assured. There would not occur \- the kind of deflation that tends to hit e.g., rural centres, when many\- = of its inhabitants buy in the cities and less city people tend to\- = purchase in the rural centres or their purchases in rural centres \-do = not ma ke up for the purchases of country people in cities.\- That is one of = the many disadvantages of centralised note issue,\- which can only be = overcome by decentralized note issue. But those\- complaining about = rural crises do usually neither consider the \- alternative internal nor the alternative external payment and\- clearing = options but, rather, leave them to the ignorance, \-prejudice, vested = interest and incompetence of the advocates and practitioners of = central\- banking. Goods and service vouchers \- and clearing certificates with a short life span or circulation \-period = would not be hoarded but would stream back to the issuers \- in payments. They would serve obviously as means of exchange and promote = turnovers, especially local sales, to the extent that\- they are spent = in payments, anywhere. If they suffered a discount\- in the process, anywhere, in any sector of an economy, they would \-be = returned to the issuer, at par, all the sooner. No shortage of \-such = media could ever arise nor any general oversupply. The\-y would be price regulated according to supply and demand. They\- would = do justice to creditors and debtors alike - otherwise they \-would not = be voluntarily and readily accepted at all, no more so \- than e.g. monopoly game money would be. - When medium and long-\-term = loans are needed, then these shop currencies etc. could be saved and = utilised for \- the purchase of the corresponding securities or fixed deposits. Once = these become due, then they could be paid out in the then current = local\- goods warrants and clearing certificates. For internal and\- external trade all the ready for sale goods, services and labour\- = power could thus be fully monetised, independent of the theories\- and = practices all too common for despotic central banking systems. - \-J. = Z., 17.12.92, 29.4.97. \par PURCHASING POWER OF PRODUCERS & CONSUMERS, INCREASED TO THE = \-MAXIMUM, I.E., THEIR ABILITY & READINESS TO GIVE GOODS, \-SERVICES & = LABOUR IN EXCHANGE: How can the purchasing power of \-producers and = traders (including all wage and salary recipients\- ) be increased to its natural limits and how can it be prevented\- to go = beyond that? Allow all people to issue notes upon their \-products and = services, notes which are optional for other people\- and which only the issuers would have to accept at any time at par from = anyone. They could not issue such tokens for more than \-they have to = offer under this kind of free enterprise. Under \- consumer sovereignty and free pricing the issues would be limited to = those voluntarily accepted while they are at par or close to \-par. = Publicity, free market rating, clearing and note exchanges \- would rapidly reveal any temporary under-supply and over-supply\- and = freedom to issue and freedom to stop issues or to refuse to accept = issues, in the own \-interest, would rapidly end under-supplies and = over-supplies of \-exchange media, before they could do much or any harm at the\- expense of any involuntary = victims. To grant the provision of all\- purchasing power, in form of = cash notes, to any unproductive\- monopolist, like the central bank, and to limit all non-cash = transactions and clearing to the availability of such cash, is a\- basic = wrong that exposes all monetary exchange economies to the \- frequent crises of inflations, deflations and stagflations, with \-their = many bankruptcies, sales difficulties and mass unemployment\- and to all = their political consequences, sometimes ending only with a\- Mussolini, Stalin, Hitler or Mao and their regimes, after \-millions of = human sacrifices. - J. Z., 17.11.93, 24.4.97. \par PURCHASING POWER: Purchasing power should not be made dependent = \-upon a money monopoly: a forced and exclusive or legal tender = \-currency, especially when supplied by a monopolist that has a\- vested interest in abusing this power - and usually does abuse it. - J. = Z.,\- 61.11.91, 26.4.97. \par QUANTITY THEORY & VALUE STANDARD: Suppose one said that the more\- = yards put on the market, the shorter each yard would be. That\- would be = 'textile inflation'. Now really!!??? - Don Werkheiser to\- Tom Greco, = 9.3.84, p. 1. \par QUANTITY THEORY: The Quantity Theory does not apply to all kinds\- = of monies: 1.) It does not apply to prices expressed in stable\- value = units while some exclusive currency is over-issued and thus\- depreciated. 2.) It does apply to the depreciation of the \-over-issued = currency - until it is finally totally refused or \-recalled. 3.) It = does not apply to any freely competing and not \- over-issued currency that does use a sound value standard rather \-than = e.g. the paper standard of the depreciated government currency. 4.) It\- = never applies to clearing transactions that are using sound value\- standards. Clearing, by its very nature, does not have any = \-"quantity", anyhow, no matter what is the number, volume or the value = \-of transactions. They are all merely exchanges of goods, services and = labour facilitated=20 by clearing, using a sound value standard. When\- more is cleared then = the value of the clearing option or its value standard is not\- = depreciated thereby. A sound value standard adopted by for\- all clearing exchanges is not depreciated or appreciated by = \-increasing or reducing the number of transactions that use it. - \-J. = Z., 4.10.91. 274.97. \par QUANTITY THEORY: The Quantity Theory does sometimes apply and\- = sometimes not to free market rated money: 1.) It does not apply \-in = case of a temporary over-issue of an exchange medium, while\- prices remain expressed in stable value units. It would then \-merely = mean that this particular exchange medium would, temporarily, be\- = somewhat depreciated. Other exchange media would not\- be, thereby, nor = would the prices, expressed in sound value\- standards be changed, even though more would have to be paid for \-the = SAME prices in the depreciated exchange medium. The prices\- of this issuer and the general price level would not be inflated. That = exchange medium would be depreciated. - 2.) But the Quantity Theory = would apply to an over-issued\- exchange medium. It would be depreciated = and discounted until the \- issuer does no longer find it profitable to issue any more (\-since he = has to accept his own notes at any time and from anyone at par) or \-the = potential acceptors simply refuse to accept it any longer.\- Note, that = here the=20 Quantity Theory could operate only within \-narrow limits and that this = particular over-issue would not \-affect the issuer's or general price = level. 3.) The Quantity Theory does not \-apply at all to all competing, = optional and soundly issued \- private currencies, with a sound reflux or demand or debt\- foundation = arrangement for them (which assures their clearing \-nature). The more = of these media would be issued, used and\- returned to the issuer, the = more goods, services and labour hours\- would be productively used. The exchange media, clearing\- certificates = and their value standards would not be depreciated \-thereby. The = exchange media and exchanges might double but the \-prices would remain = the same - unless there would appear some\- change on the goods side or in the subjective appreciation of\- certain = goods, e.g. fashionable articles, design differences, innovations, new = production processes etc. But the tendency of\- all these would be rather to decrease than to increase the prices\- of = all standard goods - even while those for luxury goods and\- services = might go up. 4.) The Quantity Theory does not apply at\- all to clearing transactions that use a sound value standard. If\- = physically possible, and this were wanted by the participants, 10 times = or 1000 times as much could be\- turned over tomorrow, in goods, = services and labour, without the\- value standard being depreciated or the increase in the quantity\- of = clearing certificates used (in as enormously increased\- exchange = volumes) reducing the value of these clearing certificates at \-all. - = J. Z., 26.4.97. \par RAILWAY MONEY: After some competition was introduced in the use = \-of the Australian rail network - after an admitted and still = \-continuing corrupt and monopolistic regime of ca. 150 years, we\- were for a while bombarded by advertisements from one of the new\- = carrier organizations: Freight Rail. It was there and then \-described = as a "real people power" and as "delivering the goods".\-=20 But when, where and how would it deliver the goods? Safely, = fast\-enough, not pilfered? And confined to the rail network only?\- = Trucks have long supplied a better and door to door services,\- when = permitted to do so, and not regulated or taxed out of\- existence, much faster, too and not tied to railway time tables\- and = unionist obstructions. To the extent that railways can still \-supply a = considerable and real service at competitive market \- prices, they should be freed to issue their own railway money.\- When = allowed to do so and to the extent that they can, they would\- no longer need to advertise. Their railway money would do this service = for them, free of charge and would, inevitably, stream\- back to the = railway in payment of freight charges and fees for \-person transport = services. Leaving the railway network and\- stations still in government hands, contracting out only some \-aspects = of railways, was not enough, no more so than leaving \-leaving Telstra = in charge of the telephone network, able to\- charge monopo ly fees for the use of its lines and switchboards, extorting\- annually = a huge monopoly profit thereby, as a tax on freedom of\- expression and = information when telephone lines are used. - J. Z.,\- 25.4.97. \par REDEMPTIONISM, CONVERTIBILITY, GOLD STOCK, DRAIN OF GOLD &\- = BULLION: "... suffered a serious drain of bullion". - A loaded\- remark. = With knowledge of how to issue gold clearing certificates, \-the = dependence upon an unproductive gold bullion reserve, in the \-hands of issuers, would disappear and the rapid dissolution = of\- all these gold stocks would even be welcomed. - Turnover or\- = clearing means of exchange do not have to be covered 100% or even \- fractionally by gold but 100% and more by ready for sale goods and\- = services of the issuers and their debtors. That can and will keep = \-them, mostly, at par with their nominal gold value. - J. Z., = \-19.8.92, 22.4.97. \par REDEMPTIONISM, METALLIC CONVERTIBILITY FOR BANKNOTES BY THE = \-ISSUER, GOLD STANDARD, SILVER STANDARD: Metallic redemptionism\- = disturbs free circulation and exchange precisely when exchange \-media = are needed most. A sound metallic value standard can be\- preserved without it and the security desirable upon ultimate = \-liquidation of a bank could and should be provided otherwise.\- = Without this customary or imposed redemption obligation for the \- issuer, most "bank failures" would not occur in the first place. The = same applies to notes that are to be "covered" by or\- "redeemable" in = legal tender notes. As long as the stocks of the\- whole world market are available for gold and silver certificates that = are \-standing at par with their mere accounting unit of a gold or = \-silver weight, what right has the holder of such notes or\- clearing certificates to complain? He can use it at its face \-value = towards the issuer and his debtors, in cash payments and\- also in = clearing. And he can get the metal equivalent on the\- world market for = rare metals or, rather , from the local agents of\- that world market. That redemption fund is = larger than any other\- that could be provided by any of the issuers = themselves. The \-issuer has a vested interest in keeping his notes at = par. He\- wants to stay in business, which may largely depend on the\- successful = issue of his notes, i.e. their par value. The general \-circulation will = not accept under par notes to any great extent and is free to refuse \- them. The par value certificates preserve purchasing power as\- well as = metal units themselves would. No panics can result when\- the issuer = himself does not have to redeem them with their metal\- equivalent but merely to accept them like their metal equivalent.\- = Thus even less frequently than usual will conversion on the free\- rare = metal market be wanted by the note and certificate holders. \- Unless banks of issue make at the same time great issue and reflux = mistakes, their failures or liquidation will become much more rare than = it was among the metal redemption banks. - J. Z., 18.8.92, 24.4.97. \par REDEMPTIONISTS: Redemptionists, advocates of gold or silver\- = convertibility, gold bugs, defenders of 100% or fractional gold\- = reserves for redemption, do in their enthusiasm for their\- favourite = choice of an exclusive exchange medium and value\-=20 standard - manage to overlook the most important and largest redemption = option of \-all, namely that in the goods, services and labour that are = ready \- for sale, and the redemptions consisting in all the possible, desired = and necessary debt payments and clearing transactions.\- They do not = consider that insistence upon ANY, even the best \-possible means of = exchange, as an EXCLUSIVE means of exchange, \- and as one that may be arbitrarily and suddenly demanded by any\- = creditor from any debtor, instead of a non-cash or clearing = \-settlement, will sooner or later at least (if not continuously to\- some extent already), lead to payment and settlement difficulties, = \-which we call economic crises. Mostly these currency enthusiasts \-for = the "noblest" and most honest and most efficient and lasting\- currencies of them all, imagine that it could, under all\- = circumstances, be adapted to suit all honest requirements, that \-it = could bring about all possible and desired exchanges at market\- prices = under all conditions. They are=20 usually advocates of free\- market pricing for goods and services, for = competition and\- against monopolies. Alas, in this sphere, they are = not. Often\- they do even insist upon legal tender for their gold coins = -\- although a money that is supposed to be the best should not require = legal \-tender to be readily acceptable. They do also condemn all\- = alternatives to their favourite currency as "fiat" money, whether legal = tender or not, \- optional and market rated or not. They welcome free competition \-and = free trade, free enterprise, free markets, free pricing, freedom of = contract, in all other spheres, but not in this one. \- To that extent they are part and parcel of the whole system of = \-monetary despotism, not its opponents, even though they do offer \-a = system of monetary exclusiveness that cannot be as easily \- manipulated as that of forced and exclusive paper currencies. \-Almost = all "free banking" advocates of the Austrian School of\- Economics, who = followed Hayek's "Free Choice in Currency" and "Denationalisation of = Money" writings, in 1975 and 1976, still\- are merely redemptionists - although even Hayek tried to lead \-them = away from considering merely this option. Or they follow\- the path = trodden wrongly for centuries, of "asset currencies",\- while continuing = to ign ore the largest of all and the most liquid and most \-wanted and most = natural and seemingly obvious redemption fund: \-that of daily wanted = goods, services and labour and daily owed debts. They might be compared = to the one-eyed person appearing as \- king in a kingdom of the blind. But they are still at least half = \-blind, if not much more than half blind to the full options of \- monetary freedom. - J. Z., 21.10.91,, 28.4.97. - Not only do they manage = to overlook redemptionism in goods, services and via other deb t payments but also the biggest gold stock of all, the total market = offer in the world of gold for sale, as a measuring option for gold = clauses and as a value standard measuring unit in competitively issued = notes etc., in prices, wages etc. For all curren c ies and clearing certificates that are counting or reckoning in gold = weight units, without promising redemption in gold coins or bullion by = the issuer, could be kept at par with their nominal gold weight value or = close enough to par, to circulate very wid e ly and, thereby, would be convenient purchasing media on the free gold = market for all the gold in the world that is for sale and that is wanted = by them and that they are willing to pay for with such gold for clearing = only or gold for accounting currency.=20 They manage to habitually overlook this gold clearing standard, with = very few exceptions. - J. Z., 8.9.02. \par REFUGEES, BOAT PEOPLE, ASYLUM SEEKERS, DESERTERS, RETREATING = \-REBEL ARMIES & THEIR SELF-HELP OPTIONS: Assume a refugee camp\- of a = million people, either civilians who escaped or soldiers who \-deserted = or rose=20 and fought their way clear when their military \-insurrection did not = succeed in overthrowing a dictator. All \-might be penniless, with more = or less insufficient clothing on \-their backs, no food stocks, = medicines, tools and machinery. But\- all of them (except the sick, wounded, too young or dying, would be = \-prepared to work honestly, hard and long hours, even in shift-\-work = and in other jobs than those they were specially trained\- for, at least for a while. Even their children should be \-permitted to = work, if they are able to, want to and their parents\- will let them and = potential employers, at least within that\- refugee community or between = its members. - Assume further that\- the government of the host country would not imprison them in\- = concentration camps, possibly far from centres of civililisation,\- = would not refuse them work permits or green cards or permission\- to seek or provide accommodation for themselves to the extent\- that = they could. It would not impose any monetary and financial restrictions = upon them - or upon those prepared to help them. - \- However unlikely this kind of scenario presently appears to many, let us = assume,\- too, that it would not impose taxes or compulsory unionism = or\- collective bargaining, wage-, price, rent-, interest-rate\- con trols or compulsory licensing or movement restrictions or\- building and = zoning laws upon them and would not outlaw value \-preserving clauses. = Least of all would it threaten to deport them\- against their will, back into the countries they escaped from, back = \-under the regimes they have reasons to fear or despise or that fail to = respect their economic rights and liberties. Assume also that no = protectionist \- trade restrictions of any kind would be applied against their productive = and\- trading self-help efforts. Coercive and monopolistic unionists\- and privileged industries would not be given any powers over any of = their activities. No subsidies at taxpayers expense would be = \-guaranteed to them. Even food and shelter would not be assured to\- = them or only, perha ps, for a day or two. No communication, \-transport or credit channels = would be closed to them. It would be \-open entry and "root, hog or die" = or the full release for all\- their creative energies for them. Then, and only then, could they = advance from rags to\- riches fast. Most of the goods in a country are = produced within\- the last 12 months. Most important of all, they would = fully know\- and appreciate and apply between them and with their trading\- = partners, monetary and financial freedom. Their exemptions and\- = liberties would not be "privileges" or monopolies, in a\- derogatory sense, but, rather, no more than the realisation of their = basic economic individual rights and liberties - which other people\- = also could and should claim. They should best be formalis ed via full exterritorial minority autonomy for volunteer communities.- = Would\- there be or could there be soon enough productive capital and\- = machinery to fully employ them? Most factories do not operate 24 \- hours a day but they could. And equipment manufacturers all over\- the world, look for customers, often offering credit. (Now there are = also miniaturised and computerised advanced production facilities = offered in containers, which could rapidly moved almost everywhere, = hundreds of different types hundre ds of different products. - J. Z., 8.9.02.) When they are free to offer = value-preserving clauses and could immediately establish free trade and = industrial zones exempted from all the usual restrictions, the refuge = capital of the whole world would be almos t instantly at their disposal. - - Would they then be helpless and\- = starve to death or could they integrate themselves into the\- general = process of production and consumption and could they do so fast, or \- fast enough, increasing output, increasing capital values, increasing = their own and the general prosperity rapidly, perhaps \- overcoming an economic crisis existing in the host country? Imagine = Australia gaining suddenly the benefit of half a dozen Hong Kong type = free enterprise and free trade centres wit hin its borders, each with millions of refugees and deserters. Would = they remain mere refugee camps or "gold rush" tent cities for long? What = \-could and would then be done by them and for them, in the short, = medium and\- long term? To what extent could they help themselves and the host = \-country at the same time? How could they avoid becoming and\- = remaining a burden and a threat to the host country? Welfare \- statist policies have no answers to offer in this respect but see\- and = treat them, as a rule, only as a burden (as mouths to be fed, not as = hands and minds that can produce not only their own keep) and thus keep = them\- forcefully out or push them out again, even when they do face = \-genocide threat, as e.g. in Rwanda. - If the defence departments = \-were sensibly run, they would be interested in answering such \- questions sensibly, too. One division or army less, of enemy = \-conscripts, as escapees and refugees or deserters no longer under = \-the command of some despotic regime, or crackpot dictator, would\- be = in the ir interest. It could also be a valuable ally in the\- long run, not = only a mass of production and trading partners. The industrial and = agricultural power of \- any despotic regime, whose forced labourers had escaped it, by the = millions, would be correspondin gly reduced, that of the host country could be correspondingly = increased, like West Germany was by the influx of ca. 7-8 million = refugees after WW II. - Similarly interested should be \-shopping = centres, entrepreneurs, financiers and free banks and\- clearing centres, transport companies, associations of professionals = and tradesmen. - I assert, and if you studied the \-monetary and = financial freedom options like I did, you, too,\- would become convinced that additional millions of refugees could = become \-financial, employed, self-employed and able to pay their way, = \- through their own honest work, within HOURS even (electronic = communications are fast enough for this and so are electronic \-money = markets), or a few days at most. This could be achieved,\- essentially, = via 4 different and combined steps. None of them\- miraculous, although operating much faster then the famous \-"German = miracle" of recovery did after WW II. More precisely, this \-"economic = miracle" happened after the currency reform and \-abolition of wage-, = price- rent controls and rationing of June=20 \-1948. Then the task was also to integrate ca 7-8 million refugees = \-and get the production and exchange for ca. 60 million others \-close = to its full potential, fast. The steps then taken were \-considerable = impro vements but did not go far enough in releasing\- all creative and = productive and exchange energies and not fast\- enough effective. E.g., = value preserving clauses, like gold\- clauses, were expressly prohibited = - unless permission for them\- could be obtained and that was almost never the case. Monetary\- = despotism and financial despotism was continued to a large \-extent. = Dirigism and State monopolies persisted in many other spheres. Also a = large tax and welfare state burden was imposed \- and self-help and autonomy largely frowned upon if not outright\- = outlawed. International trade was not unilaterally liberated into Free = Trade, as far as one side can do that. For the sudden settlement of a = million\- refugees, in a relatively small country, the anti-communist refugees = from Red China, in Formosa, later Taiwan, might be a better example, in = spite of all its remaining \-political, economic and territorial flaws. = 1.) They could, \- each, have applied to the world financial market for a personal \-loan = of, let us say, $ 5,000 each, repayable within 5 years. They\- should = have offered a) an attractive value-preserving clause for\- these loans b) an attractively high interest rate, c) a mutual\- = guaranty for these loans by all who received them, d) no taxation\- on = these loans, e) no limitations or restrictions on the payment\- and transfer of securities, recognising these loans, e) these = \-personal loans would be certified in bearer bonds, freely = \-transferable, in convenient\- denominations, of, let us say, $ 50 to $ = 100 each, credi t-insured or guaranteed by associations debtors. Such loan opportunities = could appeal to the world wide market of refuge \-capital that tries to = escape inflation, confiscations, taxation,\- interest regulation etc. = 2.) These refugees, deserters, escaped\- rebels or insurrectionists, could also issue personal clearing = \-certificates, which they would oblige themselves to accept, at their = nominal value, in all wage or salary payments and any other \-payments = that would be due to them. These would also be in \- standardised money denominations and e.g. with a gold weight unit\- = as a standard of value, in denominations from $ 1 to 20, perhaps. \-They = would make this a common issue but each would receive from \- the common issue initially no more than he could expect to be \-able to = earn within a week or a month. Let us say $ 250 to $ 1000 \-each. These = would not be legal tender but optional and market-\- rated clearing certificates. Only all members of the issuing = \-communities would have to accept them at par in all their \-dealings. = - 3.) The million refugees would declare themselves to\- be free traders and entrepreneurs and free cooperators, ready to accept = any goods and services supplied \-by the whole world, without any = protectionist restrictions. \-Initially, they could accept imports only = upon credits, secured\- e.g. by claims upon the goods supplied and the proceeds from \-them. In = the long run, though, they could promise to pay with \-international = clearing certificates based upon their coming-up \-output to the extent = that it w ill have value on the world market. (For many years, under still limited = economic freedom, tiny Taiwan outproduced the whole of Red China on the = world market!) \-4.) If sufficiently informed on monetary and financial = freedom\- options, they could set up banks of issue, clearing houses and = international clearing centres to liberate international trade, \-in the = host country. That leads to the important point of: 5.) full \- Exterritorial autonomy for their volunteer community. While some \-of = these refugees and deserters might aim only at rapid integration with = the \-host country, subject to its territorial laws, the whole \- remaining refugee community might declare itself to be\- exterritorially = autonomous under its own laws. As such it would not have to be feared. = As such it could not e.g. outvote the natives and impose its rules and = systems. Later it might\- even form, upon individual initiative, several such communities.\- That = exterritorial independence declaration could and should at \-the same = time be a peace declaration towards the host countries, \- and an offer of friendship, alliance and common defence efforts. It\- = should clearly state that it would never treat, e.g. if such a\- = community is established in Australia, any Australians as = \-disadvantaged and second-rat e aliens or foreigners but grant them \-the same rights as the already = existing citizens of the own communities, if that would\- be their wish. = The refugee community would have no exclusive\- territorial ambition, not even for a segment of the host country's = \-territory, comparable e.g. to the Hong Kong colony. Its citizens\- = would only claim property rights to the residential and business \- blocks they peacefully obtained by individual or group purchases, = \-e.g., the same rights that many Asian investors now acquired in\- Australia, from ready Australian sellers. (But without the costly and = time-consuming as well as counter-productive bureaucratic = super-structure involved now for Australians.) The laws and customs of = \-this volunteer community would form no threat e .g. that their votes\- might one day imposed upon the natives. Their = laws would be merely \-personal laws, obliging only themselves. As a new = and independent\- nation or community they could offer a treaty of = peace, permanent\- alliance and unilateral or mutual free trade to the host country.\- All = its economic freedom rules would not be an imposition upon the host = country but merely their personal preference. Through it \- they would not be a burden but, become very rapidly, a welcome and = prosperous \-trading partner. Moreover, that trading partner would be as = \-useful as e.g. a new island nation of 1 million people, but\- it would not be thousands of km away, thus causing additional = transport\- costs and risks. - Their exterritorial status would perhaps = soon \-be recognised as a peace and prosperity promoting model for the = \- rest of the world, with its numerous suppressed and agitated \-minority = groups, otherwise resorting to terrorism, rebellions,\- and territorial = secession attempts and civil wars, and leading to \-police states in = order to reduce or suppress their violent=20 \-protests. Exterritorial autonomy permits peaceful on-man = \-revolutions. That is one of their greatest advantages. They would also = permit voluntary and tolerant monetary revolutions - among their = supporters. See the ON\- PANARCHY subseries of PEACE PLANS for some further details. ----- With = the value-preserved and mutually guaranteed personal loans\- of $ 5,000 = each, they could set themselves up with some work\- clothing, tools, and = even some primitive first accommodation, and shop facilities,\- which need not be more than some = temporary shelters in tents or\- Nissen huts, buying these outright or = leasing them or leasing or\- buying other portable cheap dwellings, e.g. = caravans. Some might \- begin with the mass production of these, e.g. of cheap caravans \-or = large enough tents, for a family for a few weeks to a few \-months, if = the market is not full of them, and ready to supply \- them with these. Old buses and trucks and goods containers could\- also = serve as temporary shelters in many areas of Australia.\- Humanity = before architectural beauty! Others would bid for\- whatever spare = accommodation the existing housing market could=20 \-supply. No restrictive landlord and tenant acts, rent control\- acts = and zoning laws ought to apply to these refugees. If goods\- and people = cannot freely cross frontiers and set themselves up as\- peaceful producers and exchangers, armies will, sooner or later.\- At = least for humanitarian reasons, the host country should\- declare that = it would not tax such rent earnings of house and \-flat owners of the = host country. - With their personal loans=20 \-proceeds and clearing IOU's these not only poor but, initially,\- = destitute refugees, would first of all appear as buyers, not as = \-beggars on the local markets. Buyers are always welcome, if their\- currency is acceptable enough. Maybe their IOU's would suffer a\- = discount in general circulation. But that would make them all the \-more = attractive to potential employers, as means of payment\- towards these = employee s. (Even under the system of monetary\- despotism and before the current = depression, according to a \-report by Peter Samuels, years ago, Asian = refugees, within 2\- years, were usually employed, even at higher wages = than native\- Australians, and used less social services than Australians did. \-- If = Welfare institutions have got careless in recent years with\- their aids = and some immigrants abused that abuse, who is really \- to blame for this waste of taxpayer's money?) Some banks might \-come to = specialise on mediating the personal loan certificates\- and IOU clearing certificates of the refugees. - J. Z., 4/97, 8.9.02. - = For another comparison see how Jewish refugees made desert areas = bloom. Alas, their exclusive territorial claims led to wars, terrorism = and bl oody attempts to suppress terrorism. This happened, due to the = nationalistic territorial prejudices, still popular on all sides, in = spite of the precedents lasting for centuries before, set by personal = law communities in that area, of Muslims, Christians=20 and Jews. Moreover, they, too, institutionalised monetary despotism - = with the usual consequences. Because of it they and surrounding Arab = States did not solve their refugee problems, either. - J. Z., 8.9.02. \par REFUSAL, RIGHT TO REFUSE ACCEPTANCE OF VALUE STANDARDS & \-EXCHANGE = MEDIA: In money as in politics the right to refuse \-alternatives = offered is as important as the right to accept them.\- - J. Z., 2.8.93. - One should not only be free to vote with "one's = dollars", which are reall y the dollars issued by the government, but with the dollars etc., that = one has issued oneself. Moreover, one should become free to vote against = the dollars issued and offered by others, by totally refusing or = discounting them, when they are either deteri orated or suspected. The refusal option should extend to all the = exchange media offered by others as well as to their exchange media - = but not to the exchange media and their value standards that one has = issued and used oneself. - J. Z., 8.9.02. \par RETAIL TRADERS' SPENDING: Independent of the supply of retailers = with the forced and exclusive paper money of a central bank,\- their = spending, under monetary freedom, could be at least as\- large as the = amounts of the own currency that an association of=20 \-local retailers could get printed, offered for acceptance and = \-accepted in the local community, although it would offer no more \- to the holder than ready acceptance, at par with their nominal value, in = the payment of all their ready for sale goods and \-services. This kind = of redemption fund, which the retailers hold\- between them, is huge. = (Excepting only prolong ed times of State socialism, wars, revolutions, natural catastrophes or = barbarism, family communism, pestilence etc. - J. Z., 8.9.02.) It is = also the real redemption fund for \-any kind of currency. No currency = would be highly valued and\- considered readily acceptable or a currency, without that \-redemption = fund. Currently, under monetary despotism, retailers \-are prohibited = from mobilising it. They are rather driven into\- bankruptcies. Once monetary freedom is legalised or if they dare \-to = usurp and practise this freedom at a politically opportune \-moment, = during a severe depression, shortly before an election,\- and carry it out well informed, technically correct, fast \-and thus = successful, then they could, from one day to the other,\- offer millions = to billions in short term wage and salary payment \- loans for additional jobs, while already ordering more goods for \-the = restocking of their shelves, which would soon be required,\- when these = shop currency notes would stream back to them, fast, for\- consumer = goods and services. They would then use them to pay their suppliers, who, = could then repay the short-term loan from the bank of issue.\- (The wholesaler's bill of exchange (or equivalent short-term IOU), to = pay for the goods received from the factory or farm, wo uld have been discounted, by the note -issuing bank with its notes - = thus dividing an unsuitable means for general payment, temporarily, into = suitable means for general payment - with which the employer could pay = wages and his other debts.) That form of m utual debt settlement, essentially a clearing process but facilitated by = banknotes, for complete and easy sales and full employment, is presently = outlawed and much frowned upon by\- popular opinions, even among = supposed experts. The thin edge of \- the wedge towards such a solution of the problems posed by a\- = depression could be merely the calculation by retailers and their = \-associations, of the total amounts, of\- such a shop foundation = currency, which they, based on the stocks\- and services, that they have ready for sale between them, could offer, = \-in short term loans, mainly for the payment of wages and\- salaries, = to local employers. These potential payments, in local \- shop currencies, should also become of interest to local \-manufacturers = and to employees, whether unionists or not and whether currently = employed or not - if people can at all be \-interested in their own = monetary affairs and problems. Perhaps \- these figures should also be confronted with the total amounts \-that = are still being granted in wage payment loans to local employers, \-but = only in the government's forced and exclusive paper money.\- People interested in their monetary emancipation and capable of = \-realising the consequences of monetary despotism, might then come\- to = see that for hundreds of years, like many Arab tribes, they\- were camped upon huge "oil resources", they remained unaware of,\- = which they needed only tapping, to become rich almost overnight.\- Money = has often been called the oil of any economy based upon the \-division = of labour an d free exchanges. Lets tap these monetary \-oil riches, in any = community, by all the potential oil producers, \-primarily the local = retailers and their shop associations. Will \-they leave these potential = riches untouched once they are pointed\- out to them? Woolworth supermarkets on their own turn over more\- than = 1 billion per month (By now about 2 billion per month! - J. Z., 8.9.02.) = and you can only rarely see any bar\-e shelf in them. Freed to issue = their own currency, in short term\- loans for the employment of local unemployed, maybe they could = \-turnover 3 billion a month. Coles-Meyer stores are not far behind\- = Woolworths. Only yesterday, in Franklins supermarket store in\- Bowral, I saw a sign that indicated that Franklins' issues = gift\-vouchers in $ 10, 25 & 50 denominations, which are usable in all\- = of 240 Franklins stores in Victoria, NSW & Queensland. These,\- too, could suddenly be transformed, over-night (if the educational = groundwork has been laid!) into loans \-to employers for wage payments. = It might be worth a try for them. (The Bowral store of Franklins had to be closed = by now! - J.Z., 8.9.02.) One or the other\- shop association or chain = store ought to take the lead in this. -\- At present the Australian = stores are held up or held back more by the \- Reserve Bank and its exclusive and forced currencies than they \-are by = all the hold-up men and shoplifters in Australia. Why\- should they have = to accept the paper money of the central bank at\- all - when they could issue better money themselves, almost as \-much = as their local communities needed? - Naturally, under \- monetary freedom, all other potential issuers would tend to become = independent issuers until the circulation is finally sufficiently\- = saturated, everywhere and at any time, with all the sound \-exchan ge media it requires, to turn over all its goods, services \-and labour, = under permanent boom conditions. - A million\- unemployed (a billion in = the world) and thousands of\- bankruptcies and a slack economy and = everlasting inflations are \- too high a price to be paid for the minor convenience of a\- uniform and = exclusive currency, which, by the way, tends to\- destroy e.g. all old = age security, too. - J. Z., 25.4.97. \par RIGHT TO ISSUE, FREE BANKING AS A RIGHT: BRECKENRIDGE, R.M., The\- = Canadian Banking System, 1871-1890, N.Y., MacMillan, 1895,\- defended = the right to issue as the common right of all. -\- According to = Wells/Scruggs, Towards Free Banking, p. 1. - Westrup=20 \-may also refer to him. Alas, I have not yet been able to obtain\- this = book by Breckenridge for microfiching in my monetary freedom\- series. - = J. Z., 26.4.97. \par SALES DIFFICULTIES: They may be due to a number of difficulties = \-that people do already pay attention to, often quite \-sufficiently. = But the factors that they have so far neglected or\- were even legally = forced to neglect are the ones that bring about\- most of their remaining difficulties. That applies to the sellers\- of = labour as well as to the providers of goods and services. 1.) \-The = quality offered is not the wanted one. 2.) The price offered \- is not one that enough people can afford and are willing to pay.\- 3.) = The product or service offered is still largely unknown and = unappreciated. 4.) There are better and cheaper alternatives, \- satisfactory to many more of the potential buyers. 5.) Guaranties\- = given may be insufficient. 6.) After-sales services may be = \-unsatisfactory. 7.) Packaging by competitors might be better. 8.) = \-Advertising & publicity might be insuf ficient. 9.) The displays \-may not be attractive enough. 10.) Sales = personnel might be\- disinterested or even impolite. 11.) The goods or = services might\- be outlawed or rendered artificially too expensive, = e.g. by \- regulations. 12.) The location may be wrong. 13. Transport costs\- might = be too high. 13.) Communication channels might be \- insufficient. 14.) The service might be insufficiently listed in = standard reference works. 14.) Current prejudices, customs, habits\- or = the "Zeitgeist" might be against a product or service. 15.) \- Competitors might be subsidised at the expense of the taxpayers, \-as = are e.g. public library services. - These and more sales \-difficulties = are usually taken into consideration. But the \-following are still = widely neglected, although they bring about\- often catastrophic sales difficulties and losses to bankruptcies\-: 1.) = An insufficient supply of sound means of exchange for wage \-payments = and shopping purposes. 2.) An unsound and imposed value standard that = prevents just exchanges and the correct adaptation \-between the goods, services and labour offered = and the quantity\- of exchange media expressing that exclusive and = forced value\- standard. --- In other words, the demand for goods, services and labour = is not free but, instead, so confined and manipulated that \-many = possible and desired exchanges do not take place under these \- conditions and buyers, sellers and investors are misled,\- exploited and = impoverished. Sales difficulties will be minimised \-to the extent that = producers, owners and providers or traders of goods, services and labour = can directly or indirectly monetise=20 \-them, at least into local currencies or clearing certificates, = \-redeemable only in their goods, services and labour. These, like = \-tickets to buses or cinemas or trains, can always be issued by \- the providers in sufficient numbers, no more, and will be = \-self-liquidating, with the service provided and paid for with \-them. = - J. Z., 11.10.91, 26.4.97. See: DEPRESSIONS, CREDIT\- RESTRICTIONS, = RECESSIONS, DEFLATIONS, UNEMPLOYMENT, MONETARY\- DESPOTISM, MONETARY CRISES, BOOM ECONOMIES, RETAILERS, ISSUING = \-CENTRES, CENTRAL BANKING, BANKING PRINCIPLE.=20 \par SAVINGS & INVESTMENT BANKS, LONG TERM CREDITS, CAPITAL MARKET: = \-"Clearly, there could be no easier, more flexible, less\- interfering = method of joining ability to capital than to allow the \-savers and the = enterprisers freely to meet and make their own\- arrangements for loans. Note that this is not a proposal to \-create = money: It proposes only that existing money should be\- allowed to be = freely lent." - Henry Meulen, THE INDIVIDUALIST,\- 6/75. \par SAYS LAW: Goods and services - or, rather, their owners - can\- = create their own purchasing power - if only they are legally free \-to = do so and are informed about this issue and reflux option for \- means of exchange, with a sound value standard and the techniques \-to = be used. In other words, under monetary freedom Say's Law does \-apply. = He did also formulate it while a degree of monetary \- freedom still existed and a totalitarian monetary despotism was\- still = the exception rather than the rule. Or he might have had in \-mind a = circulation that would exist only of rare metal coins, all\- subject to free private coinage and no laws against their free = \-internal and international transfers. But under monetary\- despotism = his "law" does obviously not apply. Under exclusive\- gold currencies = there are difficulties for all who do not own\- gold mines or mints or gold hoards and do not trade sufficiently with = gold mine owners and gold traders.\- Referring the providers of goods = and services only to the \-existing rare metal money stocks, as monopoly = means of payment,\- does not libe rate them sufficiently. It does not, e.g., set them\- free to clear = their goods and services against each other, via\- clearing house = certificates or sound private and competing banknotes on the banking = principle, or real bills doctrine. (In it\- convenient small bills do temporarily replace inconvenient large \-ones = and lastly redeem them. This can be and should be a pure \-clearing = transaction, not requiring any gold reserve or\- convertibility - except = via the par value to be maintained on a\- free gold market.) - J. Z., 7.12.92. \par SDRs OF THE IMF: Special Drawing Rights, equivalent to US $ at\- = par value, since Dec. 1946 and allocated by the International\- Monetary = Fund. (IMF) - Suggestion by Joe Cobb: If SDRs were to have a\- standard = MOA (money of account) and no legal=20 tender and if they\- were used in a world-wide clearing service only, = not granted at\- all in medium or long term credits by the IMF, then = they might\- well serve as international clearing house certificates, \- self-regulating, self-limiting, requiring no reserves, \-redemptions or = set issue limits. The IMF as an authority. set up and supported by = governments, should be replaced by a private or\- cooperative = institution. - The very name is misleading - as if a\- special privilege were involved. But any group of people prepared\- to = give credit to each other can clear these credits against each\- other. = No capital is needed and no redemption fund in rare \- metals. But they do have to agree upon their value standard for\- = clearing. Moreover, each member must, at least in principle, be prepared to accept clearing certificates of other = members, at least when they are at par with their value standard, each = debtor or when they are his own, and, otherwise, prepared to accept them = but only at a negotiated or arbitrated discoun t rate. All who would then have wanted consumer goods or services or = labour to offer that are in sufficient daily demand, at least locally, = or that can be cheaply enough transferred over distances, could then = effectively participate in such a clearing. But =20 if they had only goods to offer like my still unpopular libertarian = microfiche, then their exchange options through this clearing facility = would remain rather limited. That in future my microfiche - or some = gadget that is now still unappreciated, might co m e to encounter a strong demand for it, would not make them a sound basis = for effective and extensive trading through a world-wide clearing house = service right now. Only if there were already thousands to ten-thousands = of regular customers for my own and t h e libertarian microfiche of others, could these microfiche themselves, = or claims to them, to a limited extent and among such buyers, circulate = as exchange media or clearing certificates. Their value standard might = in that case be: One information "unit",=20 w hich might contain, on its one microfiche, 98 to over 1,000 pages, at = relatively low reduction rates. So far, it is more likely that e.g. = libertarian text floppy disks and CD-ROMs will one day be so traded. At = a central libertarian information clearing ho use they or microfiche might then be filled with the texts one wants and = one could get credit, in floppy disks, microfiche or CD-ROMs, for = libertarian texts supplied to that centre. Naturally, the\- clearing credits or certificates need not be printed out on paper = tokens at all \-but might merely be transferred in account books or = account cards\- or in electronic accounts. - See : CLEARING, = INTERNATIONAL \-CLEARING, FREE TRADE, MILHAUD, BECKERATH. \par SECURITY FOR CIRCULATING NOTES: What the volume of money in\- = circulation is, is of no importance, provided all of it is\- secured. - = Westrup, Plenty of Money, 13. - Security upon final \-liquidation should = be distinguished from securities that assure \- their par-value in current circulation. If the latter is achieved\- then = the former is hardly ever necessary for banks that merely \-issue = turnover credit banknotes, e.g., upon sound commercial\- bills (or their equivalents), do not engage in capital investments or = speculations and do not promise gold\- redemption upon insufficient gold = stocks or do not promise such\- convertibility at all but rather refer = those interested to the \- gold stocks of the world, on the world gold market. - Current \-money = must be secured as currently or immediately as possible, \-i.e., not = only by short term debts and their certificates, kept\- by the note = discounters as security, but also by the goods, \- services and labour that the debtors must be immediately prepared = \-to offer in exchange for the issued notes, from anyone who has to\- = make payments towards them. Only thus will this turnover or \- clearing credit be liquid and self-liquidating and make an \-ultimate = security, upon liquidation of the bank business, quite \-unnecessary, = because then the bank will not fail in the vast majority of cases \- that can be imagined and experienced. - J. Z., 26.8.91, 26.4.97. -\- = Even the best other securities, intended to safeguard investors upon = liquidation of such a bank, will not help if they are destroyed by an = attack by terrorists, through warlike or revolutionary violence or through natural catastrophes. - See: COVER, = REDEMPTION, CONVERTIBILITY, REAL BILLS DOCTRINE,\- BANKING PRINCIPLE, = BANKRUPTCY. \par SLOWING DOWN THE ECONOMY - ONE OF THE INTENTIONS OF MONETARY = \-DESPOTISM: Central banks were not established, nor are they able \-or = intend to bring about all possible, desired and mutually\- beneficial = exchanges via their monopolised and=20 forced currencies.\- On the contrary, sometimes their spokesmen are = quite frank about\- what their real aim is: Bernie Fraser, then and = possibly still\- president of the Reserve Bank of Australia, according = to ABC\- radio news, 30.3.95, stated: "We could not be sure that the \-economy = would slow down sufficiently." - This was in a comment, in \-which he = did not rule out interest rate rises on top of various\- budget policies. - So the intention of the central bank is no\- longer = to make our exchanges easy and fast but, rather, difficult\- and to slow = them down! - What he, probably, referred to, was the\- so-called "over-heating" of the economy, due to the never \-admitted = but still continuing inflationary policies of the \-central bank system. = First it over-issues - and then it partly \- reduces the money circulation, e.g., by a high discount or interest rate = \-policy, with which it tries to reduce the total of new lending, = \-lending with the money it has already inflated. Even if it were\- = thus to slow down the further inpu t of its monopoly money (with a\- compulsory acceptance and forced = value), into the economy, the\- already over-issued legal tender paper = money would remain in\- circulation, at least until withdrawn via = taxation. And the tax \- gatherers tend to spend tax money again and, via deficit\- "financing" = spend even more than they received in taxes, in \-additional paper money = issues ("covered" by government\- insecurities that are often and as a = matter of policy, forced\- upon investors, e.g. superannuation and pension funds). The \-interest = rate then may or may not embody the inflation rate.\- Sometimes the = inflation is sufficiently anticipated by an \-addition to the interest = rate for monopoly money and sometimes it\- is not, so that some account holders, upon a prescribed low interest, = paid on their deposits accounts, after taking the inflation rate\- and = taxes on their accounts into consideration, and also \-extortionist bank = fees by monopoly banks, which they are\- sometimes forced to use, end up with a negative interest rate on\- = their accounts. Oh the results of the dominant "wisdom" of \-government = policies, political representatives, bureaucrats, \-their preferred = experts and their coercive institutions and\- measures! - The former ALP Prime Minister of Australia once spoke \-of = the "recession we had to have!" And still people, apathetically or with = misplaced faith, submit to such \- inflationists, deflationists and stagflationists, senseless, helpless, = idea-less and vision-less before the results of their policies, e.g. 1 = \-millio n unemployed (or under-employed) in Australia, up to 200 in Red China = alone and ca. 1 billion in the world. - J. Z., 25.4.97. \par STANDARDS OF VALUE, ISSUE MONOPOLY & THEIR MORAL, ECONOMIC,\- = POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSEQUENCES: Governments have destroyed\- the = customary and market-developed standards of value by their \- despotic legal tender legislation and freedom of exchange by their = \-issue monopoly. Legal tender laws and monopoly note issue = \-legislation do not only destroy morality and efficiency in \-monetary = exchanges and in credit relations, impoverishing a \- nation, but lead to a lowering of moral standards in all other\- = spheres, too - and to more and more interventionist legislation, \-none = of which can make up for the wrongs and damages of monetary despotism. = Only taxation and wars come close to the destructive\- effects of monetary despotism. = Regarding Germany it has been\- estimated that it lost as much through = the 1914-1923 Great\- Inflation as through WW I and then, again, as much = through the \- Great Depression of the thirties. This was also one of the\- = preconditions for the rise of the Nazi Regime, with its mass \-murder = and mass destruction. Nevertheless, monetary despotism was \- continued, even there and even now. - J. Z., 7.9.89, 29.4.97. This in = spite of its links to totalitarianism, dictatorships, wars, civil wars = and mass unemployment and economic crises. \par STANDARDS OF VALUE. DOES THEIR MULTIPLICATION REDUCE THEIR VALUE?\- = The multiplication of standards of value does no more reduce their\- = value than does the multiplication of meter rulers reduce their length, = that of kilograms their=20 weight and that of litre\- measures the volume of 1 litre. No more of = such rulers will be \-accepted than are found useful by their potential = users. One\- wrongly identities the multiplication of standards of value = with \- the multiplication of means of exchange, due to the current = \-predominance of legal tender and the tradition of the\- convertibility = of exchange media into value standard units. Even\- then a depreciation = would not set in unless the multiplication\- goes beyond that volume of circulation at which the exchange\- media = would still be accepted as par, as necessary means to \-mediate the = exchange of ready for sale goods and services in an\- economy habituated = to exchange them via standardised money\- denominations in some format of the other. If they are without legal = tender\- and the money monopoly, then exchange media would be in = competition\- with each other and all creditors would be sovereign consumers towards = them - their own issues excepted. As a result, they would\- be = multiplied only to the extent that they are needed and would\- not be wilfully issued beyond that limit and more would not be = \-readily accepted by potential acceptors. Only money with a premium or = that that stands at par with its value standard would be \-readily = accepted or the accepted mo ney would have only such a small discount that it would not \-matter to = most acceptors. Still more readily accepted, by definition, would \-be = the money, in a few rare cases and occasions, that stands\- above par i.e., that has a premium. - See: QUANTITY THEORY, = CIRCULATION, VALUE STANDARD, MEANS OF EXCHANGE, DEPRECIATION, = \-INFLATION, EXPANSION OF MONEY & CREDIT. \par SUBJECTIVE VALUE THEORY: It could in economics be largely = \-completed via full monetary and financial freedom and in politics\- = via panarchism or full exterritorial autonomy for all volunteer\- = communities. - J. Z., 25.10.93, 18.4.97. \par SUPPLY & DEMAND, THE LAW OF, MONETARY FREEDOM & MONETARY = \-DESPOTISM: All too many have thoughtlessly asserted that all \-one = would have to know about economics is the "law of supply and\- demand". = But at the same time they refuted themselves, in most \- instances, by being unable or unwilling to apply the law of supply and = demand to exchange media and value standards. Without being applied to = these as well, the law of supply and\- demand cannot always satisfy and = clear the market sufficiently\- and regulate production and exchange in free market ways. - \-Monetary = freedom is required, i.e. freedom to clear, to issue (\-to facilitate = clearing), to accept exchange media at par or\- close to par with a = sound value standard, to refuse to accept \- them at all (unless contractually obliged to do so), or to\- refuse them = when they suffered a considerable discount, combined\- with the = obligation of issuers to accept their own notes at par \-at any time = from anyone and the contractual obligat ion of their\- debtors to accept these notes at par, too. It means also = freedom \-to clear rather than an obligation to supply upon demand of = a\- creditor a means of exchange one has not contracted to supply, \- least of all a payment in rare metal coins or one in scarce, \-because = monopolised, legal tender currency. - The other major part \-of monetary = freedom to be realized, fully in accordance with\- supply and demand, is the value standard that is accepted or \-agreed = upon. To it as well, freedom of choice for value standards, right \-to = refusal and to market rate it, are to be applied. This kind of\- monetary freedom is as important for the successful sale of goods,\- = services and labour, or a fully free exchange economy or free\- market = or free enterprise and free trade economy, as are free \- pricing, free contracts, freedom of expression and information, = \-freedom of transport and movement. They could be defined as mere = extensions of property rights. But most property rights advocates\- have = not extended their thinkin g as far. All too general terms \-and statements, which do not clearly = express their widest\- possible consistent application, can lead to many = errors,\- omissions and wrongs. Monetary freedom makes the law of = supply\- and demand operate smoothly. Monetary despotism prevents it from\- = operating almost frictionless in all situations. It introduces\- = confiscations, errors, malinvestments etc. and prevents the \-degree of = harmony or equilibrium that freely and rationally=20 \-acting participants in an exchange economy are capable of achieving.\- = The law of supply and demand, applied to competing monies, does \- already indicate, in a general way, that over-supply and under-supply = are there as little to be expected, in the medium or\- long run, as for = any other commodity or service. \par SUSPENSION OF PAYMENT: "... forced to suspend payment". With \-that = they meant, usually, payment in gold coins, by the issuer ,\-upon demand = by a note holder, or, nowadays, payment in exclusive \-and forced = currencies (legal tender paper money) or in\- customary means of payment. It also means absence of freedom to = \-clear, to the very limits that clearing is still possible, e.g., \- by offering one's own means of exchange, based upon one's own goods or = services, even if only at a considerable discount (which\- is due to the = much reduced transferability of one's own IOU's,\- compared e.g. with a local currency). These IOUs can well be in \-form = of standardised and typified clearing certificates, in convenient = denominations and gold weight accounting as their v alue standard. - In most cases the debtor will probably be able to get = his IOUs discounted \-by a local bank of issue and then can offer his = creditor the\- local currency in payment, which he might find more = acceptable or \- fully acceptable at par, as long as it stands at par in the local = \-community. But then not the creditor but the bank will reap most of = the benefit of \-the discount which the debtor will be prepared to offer = for his\- IOUs. - J. Z., 19.8.92, 23.4.97. - See: BANK FAILURES, FAILED \-BANKS, = BANKRUPTCIES, CLEARING, RIGHT TO CLEARING. \par SYMBOLIC MONEY, ABSTRACT MONEY, NUMERICAL COUNTER MONEY, INDEX = \-CURRENCIES: Why should a symbol represent anything but the thing \-it = is supposed to accomplish? - Robert Heinlein, Beyond this\- Horizon, p. = 71. - That is certainly true for a mere clearing \- certificate, whatever sound value standard may be expressed in\- it. = And goods warrants and service vouchers are merely a symbolic = \-representation of the rightful claims to goods and services which \- they do represent. - J. Z., 24.4.97. - See: COVER, REDEMPTIONISM, = CONVERTIBILITY, COVER, GOLD. \par TAXES TO BE PAYABLE IN PRIVATE, ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF EXCHANGE: = \-Taxes, as long as these tribute payments can still be imposed \-upon = and extracted from tax slaves, should be payable not only in \-the = government's own paper money, at par with its no minal value\- standard, but should be determined in a sound value = standard, and\- become payable in all kinds of alternative exchange = media, but at par only if they stand at par on a free market and at a = discount, when they \- have suffered a discount. Otherwise, as someone once said, the = government often acts like an inquisitor who tortures an accused, \-who = is deaf and dumb, in order to extract a confession out of\- him. - J. = Z., n.d., 29.4.97. See : UNEMPLOYMENT. \par TOKEN MONEY DEVELOPMENT ON A FREE MARKET, FROM TRUCK PAYMENTS TO = WAGE PAYMENTS IN CURRENCIES OF LOCAL SHOPPING CENTRES: The market, if = only it\- had been left to itself, would have developed, long ago, the = \- ideal token money for most of our transactions. - J. Z., = 15.3.84,\-22.4.97. - See also TICKET MONEY, MONETARY EXPERIMENTS. \par TRANSACTION COSTS, ESPECIALLY ADVERTISEMENT COSTS BECOME REDUCED = UNDER\-MONETARY FREEDOM: For turnover credit one would not have to\- = appeal to the market for more or less scarce saved-up capital, made = available for this purpose and would\- not have to pay a high interest for it. A small administrative fee = would \-be enough. Once private exchange media are launched on their = way, \-they have only one ultimate reflux option and value - namely,\- back to the issuer. Consequently, to the extent that he could\- = anticipate the sale of his products and services and that, in = \-anticipation of his products and services, people would accept them, = with the intention \- to soon redeem them in his goods and services, he would not have \-to = advertise to induce them to buy from him, no more so than an \-issuer of = tickets has to ad vertise his performances, once he has succeeded in issuing them. These = tickets, being for a choice\- of goods and services, are easier to sell = than any particular\- goods and services to any particular customer and = this for\- only for scarce, because monopolised and under-issued or wrongly or\- = unevenly distributed legal tender cash. The issues themselves\- could to = some extent, serve as advertisement leaflets. \-Historically, some token = money was mainly issued for that \- purpose, not only as a substitute for missing means of payment or = \-missing small change official coins. Compared with the general\- sales = costs the printing and administration costs for the issue \- and reflux of the own notes are rather insignificant. They might \-come = only to 1/2 or 1 %. - As long as his notes are accepted at \-par, the = issuer could issue more of them, up to his readiness, at\- any time, to redeem them with his goods and services. However, it\- is = to be expected that in practice only a fraction of the ready-\-for-sale = stock and service capacity could be so mobilised. The \- issuer also wants to prevent that too many of his for sale items \-run = of stock, as a result of a sudden demand for them, before he\- can = re-order them. On the other hand, re-ordering and restocking\- can = nowadays be achiev ed almost instantaneously or overnight. -\- His sales being thus more = assured and regular, the issuer might \-even be able to reduce his = prices and make a better use of his \-labour power. - J. Z., 1.8.94, = 17.4.97. \par TRANSPORT TOKENS: How much better off would all transport = \-industries be and, as a result, the general economy, if they were free = to issue and accept their own kind of monies: railway, bus,\- train, = flight, trucking, taxi, petrol, oil or road toll money \- tokens? Why should they and why should we have to depend on \-central = banking money when their monetary expenses and earnings\- would permit = them to issue their own and when they could only \- hope to prosper steadily while being free to thus monetise their\- own = service and supply capacities? - They are often considered to\- be = powerful or at least influential. But their thinking rarely\- goes beyond trying to get monopolies or privileges, restricting \-entry = and competition, fixing prices, paying bribes or engaging \-in = "cut-throat" competition to get a larger share of the pie - in \- government supplied legal tender currencies. Their employees\- are at = the same time largely limited in their thinking through \-unionist = prejudices. They remain all too willing subjects and\- victims of monetary despotism, even while complaining about some \-of = its symptoms. - J. Z., 16.5.94, 22.4.97. - See: RAILWAY MONEY, BUS = MONEY, AIRLINE MONEY. \par TURNOVER CREDITS EXCHANGE MEDIA, VALUE STANDARDS, MONEY REFORM, = INFLATION, DEPRESSIONS, & \-UNEMPLOYMENT: For short term turnover = credits for labour,\- services and goods the value standard is not very = important (\- except in times of rapid inflation) but the availability of \-exchange = media and clearing facilities for turnover credits is\- very important. = Nevertheless, all too many money reformers\- concern themselves not with = the media of exchange and clearing\- options but, instead, merely with alternative value standards and\- = thus, and to this extent, misdirect their energies, researches \-and = proposals. Compare e.g. Andre Spies' attempt in 1990 to\- introduce silver weight units as alternative value standards in\- = Nevada & California. - Naturally, all such attempts are merely\- = applications of the monetary right that may be called "free \- choice of value standards" but in times of a shortage of sound = exchange\- media, when unemployment and underemployment in the world is = suffered by about a billion\- people, it amounts to a misdirected = effort. Assume that Spies had\- succeeded and, as an a lternative private currency, silver weight \-units could have been = coined in great quantities. They would not \-be legal tender by merely = optional means of exchange. Assume \-further, that the government paper = money and coins would still\- have legal tender power. Then Gresham's Law would come to operate\-: = The silver weight units would be hoarded and people would pay \-usually = with legal tender money instead, except among the silver\- fans, who would try to refuse paper money as far as they could.\- The = same value standard reform experiment could be tried much more cheaply, = without investing in a stock of silver and coining it, by issuing\- , instead, merely silver weight unit clearing certificates, which\- the = issuers and their debtors (as far as they legally or \-illegally could) = would merely accept as if they were coins of \- the stated silver weights and not mere silver weight ACCOUNTING & = CLEARING\- units. Then they would not need any convertibility by the = issuer\- at all but would merely have to see to it that their=20 silver-value-certificates are kept at par with their nominal \-silver = value, by sound issue and reflux techniques. Then the\- redemption = option could be transferred to the world silver \-market, which offers = all silver stocks combined - as a redemption\- fund for silver certificates standing at par with their silver \-weight = unit. - But silver bugs have other and fixed ideas on this\- subject, = supported by silver producers and traders and their \-vested interest. - = J. Z., 24.4.97. \par UNEMPLOYMENT & GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYMENT POLICIES: Governments \-like = to pretend that THEY are able to provide additional \-productive jobs. = All they do offer, in practice, are subsidised \-and relatively = unproductive or even unnecessary make-work and\- training schemes - at the expense of the remaining employed. In other = words, they shift work opportunities from productive jobs \-to less = productive jobs - especially those of public servants.\- But, obviously, = they can prevent the employment of millions - at present,\- world wide, even of a = billion of people. They can also keep \-people out of the workforce via = compulsory licensing, conscription \-into armies of schools, by quotas, = trade prohibitions or \- barriers, age limits for young and old people and by an avalanche of = expensive and counter-productive \-regulations. That is well enough = proven in many text books. But \-to counter the false pretences of = politicians one should simply \- ask them: If YOU area REALLY ABLE to provide ANY productive jobs\- - = then WHY don't your provide ALL the millions of extra jobs that\- are = required? Are you unable or unwilling? Moreover: How many jobs are \- prevented or destroyed by your job promotion schemes and other = interventions? I believe almost all of them, at least for all of the = involuntarily unemployed that remain unemployed for all too long. - J. = Z.,\- 19.8.92, 7.9.02.. \par UNLIMITED LIABILITY TO ACCEPT THE OWN NOTES AT ANY TIME AT PAR: = \-When the issuer does not so redeem his IOUs etc., does not fulfil his = redemption obligation with his goods and services, or acceptance in = payment\- or clearing for any other debt owed to him, then he ought to be under\- = unlimited liability with all his property and future earnings. That\- = should also apply to all directors and managers of an issuing centre,\- quite apart from their penal responsibility for any fraudulent or = \-negligent actions, if any such actions were involved. - J. Z., 3.8.94. \par UNSTABLE CURRENCY VS. STABLE CURRENCIES: All of life becomes at\- = least somewhat and indirectly unstabilised by an unstable \-currency - = when it is legally turned into an exclusive and forced (\-legal tender) = currency. - All of life becomes more secure, free\- and just once stable currencies can be freely issued and\- = accepted. - Naturally, nothing in life is TOTALLY or ABSOLUTELY = \-stable. Even the best value standard is not. But fluctuations or \- changes that can barely be measured over years or that become = \-significant only over centuries or that are trivial when compared = \-with other changes in our lives, are quite acceptable for value\- standards. Even the Earth's rotation about its axle is slowed\- down by = tidal forces and the universe may keep expanding. But for\- our = lifetimes and that of quite a few further generations, these \- minor changes hardly matter at all. - J. Z., n.d. & 27.4.97. \par VOLUNTARY TAXATION: This is obviously the major aspect of\- = financial freedom. But the literature on taxes and the prejudices\- on = this subject are so numerous that to deal with this subject at\- least two separate volumes would be required. One might deal with\- the = thousands of errors and wrong premises on the subject, \-refuting them = as well as can be done, utilising all prior \-refutatio ns as much as possible. A second volume might describe voluntary = taxation proposals and experiences and also include the objections = against them and their defences. If very well\- compiled, written and = edited, 2 volumes like this cold well \- become best-sellers. But probably quite a few interested\- researchers = and writers would have to collaborate to make these\- volumes = informative and attractive enough. As it is, the current \- tax legislation of any major country is usually so large already\-, on = its own, that no individual would have the time and energy to \-read it = through even once. Far less could any individual study \- all the literature on the subject. Thus, in this compilation I\- will = have to confine myself to some hints and references. A few \-of them can = also be found in my PEACE PLANS collection on LMP \-microfiche - J. Z., = 26.4.97. \par WESTRUP, ALFRED B., Periodical, AUDITOR, for free banking. = At\-least 2 issues appeared. I have not seen any yet. - J.Z.,\-28.4.97. \par WOOLWORTH MONEY? Woolworth sales in 95/96 came to A $ 14\- = billion, with net profit of 234 million. - THE AUSTRALIAN, \-15.4.97. - = That would probably permit a circulation of Woolworth\- shop currency = from between 1 billion per months to 3 billion per \- quarter, depending on the turn-over speed of its notes and, \-naturally, = upon how many notes of this kind would be accepted in\- general = circulation, by its suppliers, by Woolworth employees and \-by workers = fully or partly paid in Woolworth money. Local \- Woolworth supermarkets might also prefer, instead, to participate\- = in the issue of a local shop currency. - Woolworth is supposed to \-turn = over ca. 10% of the turnover in food stuffs in Australia. -\- So, at least in that sphere the issue potential in Australia\- would be = ten times as large - for a currency with which wages \-could be paid, if = employers, employees, unions, legislators and\- judges are amenable to = this option. - Under free market\- conditions and in the long run, only better monies can prevail and\- it = should not be difficult to provide better money and do so = \-competitively, than the money now provided by monetary despotism.\- It can only claim uniformity in its favour. And even this brings \-a = higher forgery risk with it. Naturally, the close to 1 million = \-unemployed in Australia might be obstinate and insist: We will\- = rather re main unemployed than be paid in Woolworth money or local\- shop currency = money. Likewise, businessmen might continue to ignore their currency = issue potentials to get them out of their\- troubles. But the more such = estimates are made and publicised, \- the more at least some of them will ponder their monetary \-emancipation = options. - J. Z., 22.4.97. \par WORLD HISTORY OF FREE BANKING, THE, by SCHULER, KURT, Oct. 1989,\- = 57pp, with tabulations & bibliography, reproduced in PEACE PLANS 936. - = This is to my knowledge the first - and an excellent -\-survey of its = kind. - J. Z., 9.11.89. \par YOUR MONEY? MONETARY EMANCIPATION FROM CENTRAL BANKING: Your = \-money is not YOUR money - as long as it is issued and mismanage\-d by = the government. - Even while you hold rightfully earned government paper = money in your hands or in your wallet, it can be \- inflated, deflated or stagflated by the government - with all \-kinds = of harmful and wrong consequences for you. - You, too, have \-to become = monetarily emancipated from the forced and exclusive\- currency of the central bank and from all its other present\- powers = and privileges. It is the nerve centre of a state planned\- and = mismanaged econo my, of state socialism or state capitalism and a very early demand of = totalitarian communists like Karl Marx \-and Friedrich Engels, in their = 1848 Communist Manifesto. - J. Z.,\- 14.9.92, 22.4.97. \par ZEPPELIN MONEY? What is holding up the development of Zeppelin\- = transport for persons and goods? Helium has become cheap enough \-to = fill toy balloons with. Airline money would be possible\- already now - = due to the existin g network or airline services and \-their value. To some extent = aeroplanes do also benefit from\- flying high, in thin air - and thus = could make money " out of \-thin air". With Zeppelins, using hydrogen or = helium or an\- enclosed vacuum (or close to vacuum) for lift, the money "out of\- thin = air" option would be more obvious. But has anyone as yet \-produced = containers so strong and lightweight that the air could\- be safely pumped out of them, i.e. that they would not collapse, \-and = that then they would weigh considerably less than the air pumped\- out, = which would provide a lift option? When will material \- science reach that stage? Then we would neither have to risk the \-use = of Hydrogen or pay for relatively expensive Helium. They\- could be so = much more quiet than are jet liners and helicopters and\- could winch goods and persons up and down almost everywhere. They = would not need vast airport facilities, either. Just some\- shelters and = anchorage points for repairs and maintenance. Alas, \-the existing air = transport industry has a vested interest against\- their development. But, if, at = least in some respects it become technically superior and more = economical ... - J. Z., 27.4.97. \par }} ------=_NextPart_000_0006_01C25830.BC95BEC0--